

Country Report

Canada

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This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious diversity and violent religious radicalisation in the above-named state. It is an additional case study to a series from October 2019 which covered 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Other countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<http://grease.eui.eu>



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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

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1) Introduction

As one of the most multicultural of the western countries, Canada offers a unique insight in the opportunities and challenges innate in welcoming multiple different religious and ethnic groups. The country represents a post-Christian secular state which has made its inclusive policy a unique model of multiculturalism. The current level of inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities is the result of decades worth effort in policy, some more successful than others.

From its conception, Canada juggled multiple heritages on its land, being built from the union of British and French colonial territories. The first example of peaceful coexistence between the two, which arguably set the example for future lawmakers, can be found in the 1867 the British North America Act. In this instance, both English and French were established as official court languages, hence validating the heritage of the French colonials, despite their loss to the British. On the other hand, the modern legal roots of today's thriving multicultural landscape are found in 1982's art. 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which ensured equal rights for all religious denominations; and in section 27 of the same document, which guides the interpretation of the Charter as to preserve Canada's multiculturalism.

Building from these important institutional and legal milestones, the accommodation of religious minorities has been more fluid and flexible than in other countries. Following 9/11 and a handful of high-profile terror attacks, the country adopted an anti-terrorism framework focused on tackling violence. However, in 2017 Ottawa moved its focus from damage control to prevention. This put in place a number of initiatives aimed at preventing violent radicalization and terrorism before it occurred, by supporting communities and youth groups. Said approach also facilitated the creation of a stigma towards the Muslim community.

The report will be structured as follows: The following section will offer a socio-demographic overview of the country's composition, elaborating on significant trends and patterns. Next a historical background of state-organized religious relations from colonial, to independent Canada. It will then present a summary of violent religious radicalization challenges, exploring the main threats to security, known and emerging. The report finally outlines the most significant practices placed to address and prevent such violence. The basis for each section will be governmental data obtained from Statistics Canada, paired with relevant academic articles.

2) Sociodemographic review

In 2013 Pew Research nominated Canada as one of the most multicultural countries in the world. Ever since the establishment of the Canadian Federation in 1867, the immigrant proportion of the population never decreased under 13%, and was 21.9% in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2010 and 2017). Such multiculturalism is embodied not only by the different ethnicities, but also by the number of accompanying religions.

This achievement is not an accident, but the result of years of inclusive policy and integration strategies. This section will aim to explore the result of such policies by observing the position of visible and religious minorities through the lens of population growth trends, religious groups, hate crime incidence, employment, education, and political representation.

Real-time population estimates

As of the writing of this paper, Canada's population is 38,175,217, of these approximately 14,000,000 reside in Ontario, making it the most populated province, followed by Quebec, which houses 8,000,000 (Statistics Canada, 2020).


Of this population, according to the 2016 population Census, 23.9% are first generation (or born abroad), 17.7% are second generation (born in Canada from at least one parent born abroad), and 58.4% are third generation (born in Canada from parents born in Canada). Of the total population, 22.3% belong to a visible minority. The term visible minority is defined in Canada's 2015 Employment Equity Act as a "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". Such group is mostly comprised of individuals from the following groups: "South Asian, Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Arab, Southeast Asian, West Asian, Korean and Japanese". Outside of Canada, this definition may be better understood as 'racial minority').

A unique position is held by Canada's Indigenous population. As the original populations native to the land, we now call Canada, they only comprise less than 5% of the entire population (Statistics Canada, 2018). The history of the indigenous population and its relationship with the European colonial population will be explored in more depth in the following third section. Still, it should be noted that Canada's settler colonial origins as a state are the reason behind the current numbers of said native groups. Settler colonialism is defined by Jacobs as "*a distinct form of colonialism that involved sustained migration and permanent settlement by European-descended families, the dispossession of Indigenous peoples, and the development of elaborate institutions that allowed settlers and their descendants to gain numerical and political dominance*" (2018). Similarly to the United States and Australia, other settler colonial states, these strategies resulted in a complete remodeling of the land's original ethnic composition. According to the 2017 Census in Brief from Statistics Canada, in 2016, 2.1 million Canadians, or 6.2% of the overall population, claimed Aboriginal ancestry (single or multiple response). With 1.5 million individuals, First Nations (North American Indians) was the largest of the three primary Aboriginal tribes. Cree (356,660), Mi'kmaq (168,480), and Ojibway (125,725) were the most frequent ancestries within this group. A total of 600,000 individuals claimed Métis heritage, while 79,125 claimed Inuit ancestry (Statistics Canada, 2017). There are over thirty distinct aboriginal groups in Canada, which are included in the three general categories of First Nations, Métis people, and Inuit (Notzke, 1994). Eight in ten aboriginal people currently live in Ontario and in the Western provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba). Furthermore, of all indigenous people, more than half live in metropolitan areas (Statistics Canada, 2017).

Ethnic groups group and trends/ census data

In 2016 Canada's Census registered over 250 different ethnic or ancestries among its population.

Table 1. Top 20 ethnic origins reported alone or in combination with other origins (single or multiple response), Canada, 2016¹.



As visible in the table above, among the various ethnic ancestries, English, Scottish, and French are still three the most common numerically, but have been substantially decreasing in share of population over time. This is an indication of a change in migration patterns over time.

The Longitudinal Immigration Database breaks down the data on immigration by category, offering an insight into the motivations and needs of new Canadians. In 2017, of those who entered the country, 52% were definable as 'economic migrants', 31% were sponsored by their family or spouse, and 12.9% were defined as 'refugees' (Statistics Canada, 2019). This proportional division has remained consistent throughout the 2007-2019 period of observation. According to the 2016 Census data, there has been a very significant geographical shift over the past decades. Before 1980, more than half of all immigrants originated from Europe. Ever since then, Asia has become the most prominent continent of origin, now representing more than half of the total (Statistics Canada, 2017). What has remained the same is their province of destination, 65% Ontario. With regards to the immigrant population's country of origin, the top five countries of origin for immigration data are currently the Philippines (14.6%), India (12.8%), China (11.3%), Iran (4.3%) and Pakistan (3.8%) (Statistics Canada, 2017).

¹ Source: Statistics Canada, 2017. Ethnic and cultural origins of Canadians: Portrait of a rich heritage.

Such trends are only expected to gain momentum in the coming years. Statistics Canada's Population Projections forecast that the immigrant population to represent between 24.5% and 30% of the population in 2036. Statistics Canada, 2017). Additionally, up to 58% of the immigrant population could have been born in Asia (44.8% in 2011).

Religions


The immigrant population is closely tied to religious diversity as well. Similarly to most western countries, Canada's Christian faith is declining, in parallel with a rise of non-Judaic faiths, and people choosing to avoid any religious affiliation. One note about the data in this section is that the most recent and accurate religious demography data from Canada is from the 2011 Census. No more recent data with the same scope, breakdown for each religious affiliation, or accuracy is available. However, the 2021 Census is being processed as this paper is being written and scheduled for release based on topics starting 2022.

A micro-scale survey (1200 Canadians) was conducted by author Cansec from ResearchCo and it found that 57% are Christian (including Catholic and Protestant), 32% are atheist, agnostic or have no religion, 3% Muslim, 2% Hindu, 2% Jewish, 1% Sikh, and 1% Buddhist. Still, due to the limited size in comparison to the population, the survey's capacity to represent Canada's religious landscape as a whole is far from certain.

Table 2. Canada's Changing Religious Landscape².

Canada's Religious Composition, 1971-2011

% of Canadians who identify as ...



Sources: 1971-2001 Canada census; 2011 National Household Survey

*Data for the "Other Religion" category in 1971 are not shown because the figure is not comparable with the figures for 1981-2011. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

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
² Source: Pew Research Centre, 2019. Canada's Changing Religious Landscape.

According to the latest official data from 2011 visualized in table 2 above, Christianity remains the largest religion in Canada, counting 22.1 million, roughly 67.5% of the population, in 2011. Of these, 38.7% are Catholic, and 28.6% are Protestant (Statistics Canada, 2017). Of the Christian confessions, Anglican were last quantified as 1,631,845, Baptist 635,840, Christian Orthodox 550,690, Lutheran 478,18, Pentecostal 478,705, Presbyterian 472,385, and 'other Christian' 3,036,780 (Statistics Canada, 2016). With regards to non-Christian faiths, 2.4 million, 7.2%, identified as Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist. Of the entire population, non-Christian faiths are divided as follows: 3.2% are Muslim, 1.5% are Hindus, 1.4% are Sikhs, 1.1% are Buddhist, and 1.0% are Jewish. The remaining 7.8 million, 23.9%, belong to those with no religious affiliation. Only 64,935 were counted in the aforementioned religious census as following a Traditional (Aboriginal) Spirituality (Canada Census, 2011).

Table 3. Religion in Canada.

More than half of Canadians are Christians, but three-in-ten are unaffiliated

% who say their current religion is ...



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey.

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A more recent look into the Christian faiths and religious non-affiliation is offered by a 2018 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, as seen in table 3 above. According to the global attitudes survey: "Canadian adults (55%) say they are Christian, including 29% who are Catholic and 18% who are Protestant. About three-in-ten Canadians say they are either atheist (8%), agnostic (5%) or "nothing in particular" (16%)". (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Paired up with the information in table 2 it can be seen how traditional Christian faith is in a steady decline. In its place, an almost inverse rate of growth is visible among "other" religions (Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist), and the "non-affiliated" category, which grew from 4% in 1971, to 24% in 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2019). However, as the numbers originate from a survey, we do not have the exact breakdown of figures from each faith. That level of detailed analysis will be released in 2022 with the latest installation of the Canadian Census.

Such trends should continue in the next decade. It is expected for those who report having no religion to increase to 34.6% in 2036 (Statistics Canada, 2017). With similar intensity but in the opposite direction, the percentage of Catholics and Protestants is expected to decrease to 29.2%. A staggering growth is attributed to the non-Christian religions, which are foreseen to double their percentage up to 16% of the population.

Economic, employment, and education

Other significant social indicators for minorities are education, employment, and political representation. However, as such data on various religious minorities is not available at the moment, this section will not discuss statistics on religious groups. Instead, it will discuss economic status, employment and education from the lens of different ethnic groups which have historically been visible minorities.

Education in immigrant families appears to have improved over the past decade. Children of immigrant parents are more likely to complete post-secondary education than their non-immigrant third-generation-counterparts (Turcotte, 2019). Namely, immigrant households don't follow the trend observed in non-immigrant households, according to which children's level of educational attainment mirrors that of their parents. This means that it is more likely for children of immigrant households to pursue secondary education, even if their parents stopped at primary education. To further that point, data from Canadian post-secondary institutions underlines that students from immigrant households outperform non-immigrant students (Boyd 2002). Such high educational expectations are also visible among visible minority youth, who on average receive one or more university degrees (Krahn and Taylor 2005). This phenomenon, described by Abada and Tenkorang as "intergenerational educational mobility", is visible across almost all immigrant households, but varies significantly across ethnic groups (2009). For instance, groups from the Caribbean or Oceania tend to lag behind Asian groups in educational mobility. On the other hand, a study performed on first-generation Asian students, confirmed the group's propensity for exceedingly high educational achievements despite their initial difficulty in integrating into the new social and academic environment (Aisha, 2013).

Employment and compensation in the immigrant of minority households vary significantly across generations and countries of origin.

With regards to employment, it is suggested that across the board all second generations experience greater inter-generational mobility than their parents (Reitz, 2011). This is an encouraging trend, that differently from the aforementioned educational mobility, does not seem to exclude specific ethnic categories, despite in most cases Asian communities positively outperform other groups.

With regards to earnings, immigrants, and minorities, in general, perform less positively, and the aforementioned specific differences between ethnic minorities grow strikingly. The relationship between ethnocultural characteristics and employment was investigated in a 2019 study. Here, visible and religious minorities consistently had lower employment incomes than non-minority control groups (Statistics Canada, 2019).


A study of visible minorities' performance in the public and private sector conducted in 2010 predates and anticipates this trend. The findings underline that an extremely large gap existed between not only Whites and minorities, but especially among minorities, specifically /South Asians and Blacks (2010). Namely, for occupational distribution and average earnings, some Chinese households significantly outperform other minorities,

suggesting that the intergenerational educational and employment mobility are positive trends, but not sufficient to close the gap.

Finally, governmental representation is another method to establish how much mobility minorities have acquired in the process of integration. A 2019 study examining the candidates belonging to visible minorities for each major party found an improvement between the 2015 and 2019 elections (Griffith, 2019).

Table 4. Visible minority representation in 2019 elections³.

Visible minority candidates by party, 2015 and 2019 federal elections



As shown by Table 4, the most notable increase was in the NDP Party, which managed 23%, while the remaining parties reach on average 15%. As a reminder, Canada's current percentage of visible minorities is 22.3% of the population" (Statistics Canada, 2016). This can be interpreted as a sign of the country's need, but also willingness to improve.

This section was meant to give a data-driven overview of Canada's demographic composition and how different groups perform and relate to the rest of society. It can be observed that visible and ethnic minorities comprise the fastest-growing demographic group, but still lag behind in income, education, and political participation. Most negative indicators are being addressed by policy initiatives and are receiving more research attention, but it appears more work needs to be done in order to achieve equal opportunities across the societal board.

3) Historical background of state-organized religion relations

This subsection offers a historical overview of Canada's roots, from the native inhabitants, to the colonial rule, to the current independence, all through the lens of

³ Source: Griffith, 2019.

religious practice. The history of Canada's relationship with religious institutions is a long and complex one, detailing which in depth is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, the following paragraphs will detail a summary of those crucial events, so to offer a general understanding of the country's religious institutional backbone.

From native to colonial Christianity

For centuries before the arrival and conquest of what is now known as Canada by Europeans, the land was inhabited by a number of Aboriginal people (Statistics Canada, 2018). The first tribes to be affected by the newcomers were the ones in the proximity of St. Lawrence River, but by the end of the European arrival, all tribes were affected by their colonial rule (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2018). Most if not all of the tribes' religious life and practices were destroyed by the same process, through missionary efforts or specific policy (Melton, 2020). A remarkable differentiation of religious practices spanned across the many Canadian Aboriginal people, from the Huron and Algonquin in the east to the Blackfoot of the plains, to the Inuit of the Arctic Region, to name a few. An integral part of many of these beliefs was the shamanistic element, which designated one of the clan's members as a medium, capable of interacting with divinity through a state of trance (Bakht, 2017).

Arguably, the current situation experienced by the native Canadians began long before the Indian Act, but the Act made it increasingly complicated (Melton, 2020). The new 1876 Indian Act, now a federal responsibility, detailed all aspects of reserve life through government administration. Among the various dispositions, the act enumerated: "*rules for the management and sale of minerals and timber; procedures for the disposition of Indian moneys; enumerated powers for the chiefs and band councils; band election procedures; specific Indian privileges*" (Leslie, 2002). In practice, the act allowed for indigenous lands to be acquired by the government. In addition, native culture became illegal to practice, the population was forcibly relocated, and children were placed by force into Christian educational schools (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2018). Elaborating on the long-term effects of such policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it serves to note that according to the WHO, such policies have produced colossal disparities in quality of life and social mobility between what remains of the Indigenous population and the rest of Canada (2010).

In parallel to the aforementioned decline of indigenous populations, with the advent of the European population, Canada became a colonial society. The first French settlement was established in 1604, in what is today Nova Scotia, and expanded in what is now Quebec. At the same time, English colonies were established along the Atlantic, which eventually became more populous. This coexistence soon became a rivalry, and in the Seven Years War of 1759-1763, Great Britain and France battled for the land, resulting in the latter losing its territorial claim. This event marked the former French area being renamed as "Province of Quebec". It maintained its language, law, and Catholic belief, despite the rest of the land now speaking English and adopting the Protestant faith. In order to facilitate the rule, in 1774 the Quebec Act was passed, Art.5 of which allowed religious freedoms, for Roman Catholics to hold office, and the preservation of French civil law. The act not only set the grounds for the cultural coexistence of French and

English colonials but was also the first official recognition of the separate nature of Quebec's society (Trent, 1997). This set a precedent for the establishment of religious pluralism in contrast with the pursuit of eradication (Clement, 2012). Following the declaration of American independence, more than 40,000 people loyal to the crown fled to Canada, bringing a myriad of different religions, cultures, and backgrounds. (Melton, 2020).

Fast forward to 1867, when the British North America Act births, uniting the previously separated territories of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the Dominion of Canada (1867). The Act, which would serve as Canada's constitution until 1982, established sovereignty over the dominion of the British Monarch. Furthermore, the document defines the division of power, the asymmetrical nature of the new dominion, and Quebec's use of English and French as the official language in the courts. This is significant because, in the words of MacDonald, "*This is the fundamental bargain of Confederation. The bilingual character of our country has its very origins in the duality of our legal heritage*" (2007). The bilingual bargain allowed for the accommodation of different religious communities through the organization of private denominational schools. According to section 93 of the BNA Act, minorities belonging to a state-recognized faith, which at the time solely included Protestant and Catholic minorities, could set up an education establishment. Hence, the Protestant minority in Catholic Quebec could attend a different school, and vice versa in Protestant Ontario. Once again, this decision heavily influenced today's Canada, by establishing an official recognition of religious pluralism (Cardus, 2020).

The 1885 Indian Act reminds us that such pluralistic endeavours were only destined to be for variants of the Christian faith (Indian Act, 1985). The Act criminalized the gift-giving feast known as potlatch, together with ritual dancing. This was part of the previously addressed strategy of forced assimilation. A better understanding of the intentions behind the Indian Act's subsequent additions through the years is offered by the comments of Deputy Superintendent-General Duncan Campbell Scott in his 1920 speech at the Special Committee of the House of Commons: "*Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question*" (Chater, 1999).

Following the end of the Second World War, Canada had to acknowledge that its population, more diverse than ever, required the formed religious dualism (Catholic-Protestant) to expand and incorporate new faiths. This sentiment was implemented in the Roncarelli v. Duplessis Supreme Court ruling, which forced premier Duplessis to pay damages to Roncarelli, whose liquor license had been revoked on the grounds of belonging to Jehovah's Witnesses (SCR, 1959). The decision clarified how the core principles of public law applied to religious diversity, broaching the nature and scope of restraints placed on public powers in defence of individual freedom, and detailing the modes of compensation public authorities are subject to if found guilty of causing harm, as in Roncarelli's case (Cartier, 2010). This historical decision in the defense of minority religious rights would set the political stage for the approval of the Bill of Rights in 1960, which in section 1 provides freedom of religion, while at the same time acknowledging "the supremacy of God" (Cardus, 2020).

An additional step forward in the path of religious pluralism was the country's incorporation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Constitution Act of 1982. Section 2 reaffirms the "freedom of conscience and religion" not in virtue of being citizens, but as human beings (Clement, 2012). Furthermore, Section 15 declares religious discrimination to be unconstitutional. It should be noted that different from the 1960 Bill of Rights, the entrenchment of the Charter in the Constitution makes it applicable to all governmental legislation at every level and allows the courts to overturn offending legislation. The exact interpretation of freedom of religion was elaborated on in a historical 1985 Supreme Court decision: "*Freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.*" (Supreme Court, 1985).

Current institutional structure and governance framework

Canada is a parliamentary democracy, a political system in which the law is the supreme authority. The country's written constitution, adopted in the 1867 Constitution Act, establishes the Parliament to be composed of the Crown, Senate, and House of Commons. The country's colonial past also makes Canada a constitutional monarchy whose executive authority resides with the Governor General, who represents the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Parliament of Canada, 2000).

As for the political system, there are three levels of government. These are the Federal government, responsible for topics of national significance (trade, direct and indirect taxation, defense); the Provincial and territorial governments, responsible for education, transit, and healthcare; and the Municipal (local) governments, in charge of local matters such as city streets and firefighting (Government of Canada, 2020). This division accounts for the large differences in education funding across the country, as education is part of the provincial level's mandate. Among the number of significant milestones in Canada's state-religion relation, two are particularly significant.

The first is the aforementioned 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As seen above, this statement of rights and freedoms was added to the second article of the constitution as a tool to protect Canadians from breaches of specific rights of religious and cultural minorities on the federal and provincial level (Government of Canada, 1982).

Despite the wording containing a mention of the "Supremacy of God", all interpretations from the Supreme Court participated in strengthening an interpretation that protected the rights of religious minorities. The introduction of the Charter resulted in an increase in power of local courts, as these were responsible for deciding whether laws were consistent with the Charter. Additionally, the decision of the courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The second is the 1985 Multiculturalism Act. As the above detailed, Canada has always been understood to be sociologically multicultural, meaning its demographic composition made it such. Still, it is with the addition of the Charter and the Multiculturalism Act that the country made an effort to also be politically multicultural. This differentiates from the first as it entails a governmental policy effort aimed at managing diversity on all levels of government (Brosseau, Dewing, 2009). The

Multiculturalism Act formally incorporated the federal government's commitment to a multicultural society into law. Namely, it encouraged the implementation of inclusive policies through diverse inclusivity (Multiculturalism Act, 1988). Brunel scholar Uberoi numbers the act's three main points of significance: "*first, the act altered the policy of multiculturalism by empowering it to encourage all federal departments to reflect Canada's ethnic diversity among its staff and to promote respect for this diversity too; second, the act increased oversight of the policy as it compels the federal government to report to Parliament annually on how the policy is 'operating'; third, the Multiculturalism Act explicitly empowers a policy of multiculturalism to promote understandings of what Canada is, or what we might call, 'Canada's identity'*" (2016). It is to be noted that Canada was the first nation to ever approve a law concerning the promotion of national multiculturalism.

In practice, the legacy of the act is visible in today's inclusive legislation and governmental initiatives. Among these, the establishment of a Canadian Multiculturalism Day, June 27th, and the Department of Canadian Heritage, especially its multiculturalism section. Furthermore, under the Culture, History, and Sport governmental section, a number of services are offered to strengthen multiculturalism (Culture History, and Sport, 2020). Among these, the Community Support, Multiculturalism, and Anti-Racism Initiatives Program; and the Federal Anti-Racism Secretariat are perhaps the most active in the effort towards inclusivity.

When discussing the nation-wide reach of Canada's approach to ethnic pluralism, it should be noted that there is an exception, and that is Quebec. The province differentiates itself from the rest of Canada, especially in relation to the norms surrounding religious symbolism in public spaces. Namely, it removes religious symbolism and clothing from the public space altogether. This approach was made clear in the constitutional resolution ending religious funding and in the elimination of Protestant and Catholic Schoolboards altogether in 1997. This attitude was further formalized in the 2019 Bill 21, "*An Act respecting the laicity of the State, or La Loi sur la Laïcité de l'État*", which imposed a ban on wearing religious symbols or religious dress (such as the hijab, the turban, the kippah) for public workers in positions of authority (National Assembly of Quebec, 2019). The specificity of the Bill's restrictions on religious symbols lent itself to stark criticism. One such voice came from Ottawa Bureau correspondent Ballingall, who underlined how not only it potentially restricts hijab or burka wearing Muslim women from advancing in public service positions, but also shows how the legislation protected itself from the Canadian Charter of rights by invoking the notwithstanding clause (Ballingall, 2019). Said clause, also defined as the 'override clause', appears in section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and it allows federal, provincial, and territorial government to bypass the charter for a period of five years (Yarhi, 2018).

More broadly, the Bill established four-points: separation of state and religion, the state's religious neutrality, equality of all citizens, and freedom of conscience and religion. This is interpretable as the culmination of decades of the province embracing closed religious pluralism, in opposition to the rest of Canada's open pluralism (Cardus, 2020). The first considering pluralism of faith as the removal of all references to religion, the second considering it the coexistence of all different forms of religion. This difference

is elaborated on by Bindewald et al as contraposition between Quebec's interculturalism and Canada's multiculturalism. The first being an acceptance of migrants within the larger framework of its francophone language and culture. Here, it is implied that francophone culture is the standard to be eventually shared. The second instead view all cultures on the same level, considering the coexistence of diverse cultures as a goal (2017).

Throughout its history, the province strived to underline its cultural and intellectual distinction from Canada, and part of this type of separatory identity politics may have facilitated the decreased tolerance towards different religions, especially Islam (Monpetit, 2018). In the words of Bakali "*Through employing identity politics, which asserted the distinctiveness of Quebec society, as a means of political protection from being marginalized within Canada, Quebec engaged in 'Us-talk'; in the Quebec context, it has manifested through emphasizing the distinctiveness of Quebecois culture and identity in contrast to the 'Other'*" (2015). Fully investigating the different approach of Quebec to religion and multiculturalism as such goes beyond the scope of this paper and has been done elsewhere. Such as Burchardt's 2017 "Is Religious Indifference Bad for Secularism? Lessons from Canada" chapter, Bouchard and Taylor's 2008 Report "Building the Future, a Time for Reconciliation", and Malcure and Taylor's "Secularism and Freedom of Conscience" 2011 book.

Technical support, funding, and privileges maintained or granted to religious entities in society

Governmental support for all of the provinces consists of funding for private denominational schools with a religious curriculum and extends to larger benefits, such as property and tax exception, and the non-taxability of all collected charity. Furthermore, religious minorities are also entitled to freedom of construction under the *Religious Organizations' Lands Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.23* (1990). These benefits are extended beyond the Christian beliefs, but still, require the denomination to be considered as an official religion by the state (Justice Law Canada, 2020).

In addition to the aforementioned status and benefits awarded to recognized religions and charitable organizations, the Canadian governments also strive to accommodate specific religious guidelines. In 1996 the Ontario's Human Rights Commission (OHRC) published the *Policy on creed and the accommodation of religious observances*. The policy aimed at securing equal opportunities for goods, services, facilities, and more for people of each belief (OHRC, 1996). In 2015, the document was completely updated in order to better accommodate religious beliefs while protecting them from discrimination (OHRC, 2015). With regards to more granular food accommodations, in 2014 the Canadian Government amended the Food and Drugs Regulations. In light of the changes, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency requires that all products defined as 'halal' must pass more stringent tests to be labeled as such (Government of Canada, 2014). According to the Food and Drugs regulations, the use of the word 'kosher' is also restricted to foods that passed strict controls (Government of Canada, 2019). Food accommodations are also required to be an option in prison, as detailed by 2019 the 880-3 Guidelines to Religious Diets came into effect (2019).

Regarding accommodations for religious clothing and traditional dresses, the federal government has made an effort to expand its concept of inclusivity so as to better incorporate all religions and cultures on its land. Two cases specifically reflect this policy endeavor.

First, in 1991 Baltej Singh Dhillon succeeded in his effort to wear his Sikh religious turban with his Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) uniform (Foot, 2016). Before his case, an officer had no choice but to conform to the traditional RCMP uniform, whereas now there is the possibility for religious dresses to be incorporated. This decision was read as an application of open secularism, which was defined by Mann as “[a policy approach that] *accepts public displays of religion and, I would argue, creates the necessary political space to assess individuals on their actions, not on their appearance*” (2020). Open secularism is defined by Maclure and Taylor as a model understanding that completely limiting religion to the private realm is not a viable choice, and so is “open” to certain types of appropriate religious presence in the public arena (2014). In essence, the core principles proposed about the role of religion in public spaces and institutions are the following. If we want to give all citizens equal respect and safeguard their freedom of conscience, it is essential to ensure public institutions, such as schools, public institutions such as municipalities or courts do not endorse or promote any religion.

The second occurred in 2015 when Muslim woman Zunera Ishaq refused to partake in the Canadian citizenship ceremony because it forced her to remove her niqab (Saint-Cyr, 2015). Uncovering her face was the common practice according to the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 (2015). The case went to court, where she was initially rejected and tried an appeal. In that time the case became heavily politicized, being used as a proxy for a larger discussion on Islam and women’s rights. At the time, Justin Trudeau promised to make her citizenship ceremony his first act as prime minister. The conclusion was reached with the appointment of the Liberal government, which dropped the previous government’s appeal of the case to the Supreme Court, allowing the ceremony to take place in accordance with Zunera’s requested accommodations, and setting a precedent which changed the rule (Library of Congress, 2015).

With regards to Indigenous Spiritual practices, their protection and their privileges, these have been better implemented in Canada’s legal framework as of the last decades. Namely, the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, *Ontario Human Rights Code*, *Canadian Constitution*, *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and *United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* all protect the free practice of indigenous religious and spiritual traditions. Within these protections, organizations under provincial jurisdiction have a duty to accommodate ceremonial practices and customs and allow for scheduling to partake in them (OHRC, 2015). This also extends to access to sacred sites, such as ancestral burying grounds, and the use of sacred objects, such as smudging materials.

An important legal case regarding indigenous religious rights was discussed in 2017. Then, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Ktunaxa Nation did not have a religious freedom claim over their customary area under Section 2(a). The Ktunaxa Nation had previously rejected the construction of a ski resort in their sacred territory, which would drive away and damage their spiritual connection to the land’s spirit. Ultimately, the

ruling permitted Glacier Resorts Ltd. and British Columbia to start construction of a year-round ski resort that would ruin holy Ktunaxa territory and drive away the grizzly bear population, which was important to the Ktunaxa's religious beliefs (Policy Options, 2017).

Evolution of religious education and non-denominational institutional models

Another contentious point in Canada's realm of religion is education.

As mentioned above, public education is fully subsidized by the government, differently from private, which in most provinces is not. With regards to denomination schools, section 93 of the British North America Act established that they are entitled to government funding as well on grounds of their minority rights (British North America Act, 1867). At the time in which this disposition was put into place, Canada was still in its religious dualism phase, in which territories were either Catholic, if French, or Protestant, if British; but Christian regardless. The scope of such section was to ensure that regardless of their location, families which belonged to one religious denomination but resided in the other's official territory, could still have access to the education they desired. This also was crucial in ensuring the peaceful amalgamation of different people in the same territory.

As of 2021, only three provinces allow for separate religious educational systems, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. This section guarantees the right to divide religious institutions into a 'class of persons' who already had that faith when Canada became a nation (British North America Act, 1867). At the time, this allowed Catholic and Protestant families to educate their children according to their own religious beliefs. This provision only applies to the Christian denomination and does not extend to any of the major religions (OHRC, 2013).

Fast forward to today's religious and demographic landscape, and the religious denominations have increased sixfold, but the legislation remained the same. Only Christians (Catholic and Protestant) are entitled to this governmental support of religious education (Wilson, 2012). Nevertheless, in the past years privately funded Islamic, Jewish, Sikh, and Buddhist private schools have emerged (OHRC, 2013). The birth and increase of these institutions can be interpreted as the conjunction of both Canada's changing demographic landscape, and of its policy direction, as represented by the increase of population from a religious minority (Statistics Canada, 2016), and the political will of the liberal party's leader bolstered by decades of multicultural leaning lawmaking (Uberoi, 2016), facilitated this growth in private denominational schools. Of these, only Protestant and Catholic schools are fully subsidized by the government, while the remaining must find independent funds (Education Law, 2019). All official state-recognized religions are entitled to privately organize and create a curriculum according to the Ministry of Education guidelines. Such curricula are dual-tracked, meaning they encompass both secular and religious subjects. The proportion can vary from two religious classes a year, to a third of all classes being of religious topics (Education Law, 2019).

The limitations of such policy, beyond education and in the larger legislative ecosystem, were tested in 2003, with the discussion over the Sharia courts and the following Boyd Report. In 1991, Ontario legislators made it permissible for parties in family court in the province to engage a third-party arbitrator to assist them to resolve their differences. People were able to engage in faith-based arbitration as a result. When Syed Mumtaz Ali, a Muslim lawyer, revealed in 2003 that he had founded an organization to arbitrate conflicts based on Islamic principles, he sparked popular outrage. In response, the government commissioned Marion Boyd to write a report. In it, she advocated for allowing faith-based arbitration to continue as long as certain protections are in place (Boyd, 2004). Despite these suggestions, the Family Statute Law Amendment Act of 2005, which affects individuals of all religions, was passed to prohibit the use of faith-based arbitration (Kerry and Ferguson; Ferguson).

Despite these suggestions, the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, which affects individuals of all religions, was passed in 2005 to prohibit the use of faith-based arbitration. This conversation provided insight into people's perceptions of what religious freedom entails. On the one hand, there is the negative freedom of not being able to practice one's religion. Religious persons are permitted to practice their faith and consult their religious leader under the current status quo, which is in line with this objective. This corresponds to the popular state secularism ideal in Quebec (Kerry and Ferguson; Ferguson). On the other hand, being given the resources to live one's chosen life can be a form of freedom. It may also be claimed that Ontario failed to protect religious people's freedom of religion by not allowing them to consult a family court in the manner that they preferred (Boyd, 2004).

2008 saw another document dedicated to understanding Quebec's stance on reasonable accommodations. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission was established by the Premier of Quebec, to investigate and defuse rising issues regarding the Province's tolerance of cultural and religious diversity. Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, the two scholars appointed, focused on social cohesion and immigrant integration, with a special emphasis on the Muslim minority in Canada (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). Though it is likely that it is still early to estimate the legacy of the report, scholar Sharify-Funk (2010) attempted an evaluation of its immediate impact by surveying groups discussed in the report. Most respondents maintained a largely good opinion of Bouchard and Taylor's intentions. Representatives from these Muslim organizations praised the Commission's efforts to rectify media inaccuracies, openness to engage Muslim communities, and open admission of Islamophobia in Quebec. At the same time, they voiced disappointment with the public views that prompted the investigation, with political leaders' refusal to accept major findings of the study, with a general lack of follow-up, and with prejudice's persistence (Sharify-Funk, 2010).

4) Violent radicalization challenges

Canada's relationship with terrorism and violent radicalization has been, overall, a relatively peaceful one. Despite having experienced instances of terrorism and violent extremism, such episodes remained sparse (FDD, 2012). The country never reached the same threat level of 'hot spot' that western locations such as the United Kingdom

suffered. Nevertheless, there were important moments that defined Canada's relationship with violent extremism and influenced the current policy framework.

Explanation of CVE and its radicalization models

Before overviewing the country's relationship with violent extremism through the years and the new violent radicalization trends, the paper will briefly provide a working definition for violent extremism, extremism, and the explanation of radicalization models sourced from the work of GREASE scholars and the Canadian Government.

According to Hellyer and Grossman (2019), violent extremism can be defined as: *"Violent extremism seeks to achieve the success of the in-group by attempting to subjugate or eliminate out-groups through the use of physical violence to achieve socio-political change in ways that are fundamentally constitutive of in-group identity"* (Hellyer, Grossman 2019). The paper tries to underline how extremism and violent extremism differentiate. Such distinction, clarified in the works of Bergen (2017), acknowledges how simply holding radical opinions is not and under the Charter of Freedoms cannot be treated as a crime, despite it being problematic within a societal context. It becomes a prosecutable act when such beliefs are acted upon, meaning if there is a will to advance the cause by instrumentalizing violence against specific groups of people (University of Maryland, 2020). Namely, Grossman defines extremism as: *"Extremism is the effort to legitimise and assert the superiority and domination of an exclusivist in-group identity over other out-groups in ways that are inseparable from proposing or causing harm to those out-groups, often through a process of consistent and harmful 'othering'."* (Hellyer, Grossman 2019).

Understanding the motives of radicalization is essential in the creation of an effective response. There is no one path to violent extremism, as each case is unique, because of this trying to create a standardized background of family history, mental health, or ethnic background is not only ineffective but damaging to societal cohesion. Nevertheless, there are a series of social dynamics and personal experiences that can influence a person's relationship with violent extremism. According to the latest research conducted by Public Safety, there are five recurring elements in the path of those who engage in violent radicalization (2018). These are influenced by social networks who espouse such ideals, real or perceived social injustice grievances which should be corrected, personal vulnerabilities in personal relationships that instill a desire to escape, the desire to acquire a sense of belonging in a group; finally, an attraction to violence and or the perceived heroism associated with such violence. Furthermore, it has been found that the absence of social security nets significantly magnifies an individual's likelihood to engage in such behaviors (Gurski, 2017). Such security nets are positive social influences, pacifist belief systems, presence of social purpose, relationships with trusted friends or family, and trained professionals that can recognize the early signs of radicalization.

In addition to societal pressures, religion is often cited as another component of the pull towards extremism. More specifically, following 2001, Islam as a whole suffered from a damning association with violent extremism. This equation, pervasive in the early post 9/11 interpretations, is slowly leaving space for more nuanced interpretations of the

complex dynamic between religiosity and violent social alienation. For instance, interpretations that don't consider religion as a part of a zero sum game of causes. One such new approach was brought forth by Dawson, who defined the models of such relationship to be placed under a 'both/and' light, instead of an 'either/or' one (2018). Meaning that instead of using a 'the fault is either in Islam or in religion' interpretation, a more realistic interpretation would consider both parties at the same time while recognizing they might simultaneously influence the outcome at varying degrees. Despite acknowledging the greater nuance this interpretation offers, scholars like Helleyer (2019) still note that Dawson's material remains limited to Islam-centric research, which still has to include similar considerations applied to other denominations.

In the past 20 years uncovered plots and instances of violent extremism were relatively sparse (FDD, 2012). For instance, 'only' nine attacks were conducted in Canada between 2006 and 2017 (Public Safety Canada, 2018). This is not to diminish the seriousness of these events, but to contextualize them as rare and uncommon in the Canada's relatively sparse landscape of violent extremist attacks.

The first instance of violent extremism in Canada can be traced back to the activity of the Sons of Freedom in the 1920s. Still, the acts of violence of relevance for this analysis hinge on the distortion of faith for the benefit of violence. The complete history of Canada's relationship with violent extremism is beyond the scope of this report. To that end, the most recently impactful and active groups in the sphere of Canadian violent extremism will be considered, namely Jihadi-inspired extremists, and Right-Wing extremists. The first being a case of prevalent violent religious extremism, and the second being a violent reaction to many of the pillars of multiculturalism and diversity Canada has sought to build. On that note, the Sikh militants behind the 1982 destruction of Air India Flight will not be discussed, as their actions, as heinous as they were, do not have the same impact on today's policy considerations as other violent groups do.

Following the 9/11 attacks on New York, the Canadian government dispatched troops to Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf in support of the international coalition against terrorism. The fall of the same year saw the approval of the Canada Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which served as the first round of domestic security policy initiatives in response to the new threat (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001). Following the implementation of this response framework, and probably more importantly the cooperation in the US-led campaign in the Middle East, Canada was named by bin Laden as one of the possible future recipients of Al Qaeda's attacks. A significant shift occurred when this kind of faith-based terrorist acts started becoming carried out not by foreign nationals, but Canadian citizens. This occurred first in 2004 when an Ottawa native was arrested for the charge of having contributed to a plot against the United Kingdom. More troubling was the 2006 arrest of 18 individuals from Toronto (the 'Toronto 18') on the grounds of terrorist planning (Azzi, 2011).

Current groups ideologies and threats

Upon further analysis, there appear to be some commonalities between both the groups mentioned. Despite the polarly opposed ideologies, both tend to make use of everyday

tools as weapons, target civilian locations and are carried out by individuals, or “lone wolf”, who radicalized online. In 2018, Public Safety Canada stated that the biggest terrorist threats to Canada came from violent religious ideologies, and far-right extremist views (Public Safety Canada, 2018). Since then, two more attacks from both these groups have been recorded.

These two distinct currents are definable as Jihadi-inspired extremism, and Right-wing Extremism (RWE) (University of Maryland, 2020).

The first current is extremely wide, hence for the scope of this writing, it will be intended as Daesh. According to RAND, what Public Safety Canada refers to as “Daesh” can be defined as: “*ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), is a Sunni jihadist group with a particularly violent ideology that calls itself a caliphate and claims religious authority over all Muslims.*” (RAND, 2020). Most of the terror attacks carried out by this group have taken place in Europe, specifically France and the UK, but as indicated in the 2018 Public Report on terrorist Threats to Canada, terrorism inspired by violent ideologies remains an important concern for domestic security. The threat began intensifying in 2013 when the first official alert from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) regarding domestic Islamic violent extremism was dispatched. This alert was issued following the discovery that Canadians had joined the al-Quaeda affiliate groups, and that these groups had repeatedly mentioned Canada as a possible future target (Counter Extremism Project, 2020). Two attacks were thwarted by the authorities that year. The following year, two high-profile terror attacks were carried out in the same week, the first using a vehicle, the second engaging in a shooting in Parliament Hill. The threat level was significantly increased after these instances, resulting in the approval of the controversial Bill C- 51, which will be discussed in the next section and that granted the security apparatus powers which could overstep citizens’ rights and freedoms (The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015). Since then, the government’s concern shifted from reaction to prevention, investing in the research and creation of a center dedicated to the understanding of the radicalization process.

Today, domestic jihadi-inspired terrorism remains the country’s main domestic security concern (Public Safety Canada, 2018).

The second current is equally wide, but differently from the first, which encompasses all groups which have taken a twisted version of the Muslim faith as an excuse for violence, this includes all extremist groups whose ideas are traceable to far-right ideology. The current official definition is a group “*traditionally driven by hatred and fear, and includes a range of individuals, groups, often in online communities, that back a wide range of issues and grievances, including, but not limited to anti-government and anti-law enforcement sentiment, advocacy of white nationalism and racial separation, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, anti-immigration, male supremacy (misogyny) and homophobia.*” (Public Safety Canada, 2018).

Hate crime

From the many distillations of such a chaotic current of violent extremism, one main incarnation will be considered, Hate Crime. This is described as a criminal offense committed with religion, nationality, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender, or

disability as its main motivator (Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, 2015). As state in the previous socio-demographic section, hate crime in Canada has been decreasing, but due to its evasiveness, remains a concerning issue that should not be underplayed. Namely, it is concerning that during this pandemic, surveys have noted an increase of instances of islamophobia, underlining how in times of collective stress, undercurrents of racism can emerge in violent ways (Khaled Al-Qazzaz, 2020).


When discussing the topic of radicalization, it is worth mentioning the phenomenon of hate crime. Canada does not list hate crime as an offense in its criminal code, using instead "*criminal incidents in Canada that were motivated by hate*". For this to be such, there has to be a criminal offense, which must have been motivated by hate or bias (Peel Regional Police, 2018). Official data on hate crime began being collected and plotted by Statistics Canada in 2014, and since then, instances of violent victimization have increased steadily until reaching their peak in 2017 with 2073 reported cases (Statistics Canada, 2020). Among these attacks, 42% were race/ethnicity related, 36% were religion-based, and 21% were sexual orientation related (CRRF, 2020). With regards to the specific minorities subject to such behavior, the Black and Arab/ West Asian communities appear to be disproportionately represented. 2017 also recorded one of the worst hate crimes against Muslims in Canada. The Quebec City mosque shooting, in which Alexandre Bissonnette opened fire in the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City, killing six worshipers and critically injuring five more. The massacre sparked the debate on Islamophobia and hate crime as a whole. Despite the shooting being labeled as a terrorist assault by Prime Minister Trudeau, Bissonnette was neither tried nor punished under the Criminal Code's terrorism clause. However, this type of attack is not circumscribed to the past, as another similar occurred on June 6, 2021. On this date, Nathaniel Veltman attacked a Muslim family, killing four and injuring one. He is currently charged with four accounts of four-degree murder, and the police have described his actions as a terror attack against Muslims. Nevertheless, is yet to be seen how the court will rule in the end.

As alarming as such numbers may appear, they require contextualizing. The presence of such instances are not to be interpreted as a 'failure' of multiculturalism, but an unfortunate result of coexistence, which can also trigger constructive outcomes. According to domestic radicalization scholar Perry, the presence of such events can begin a larger conversation which "*... can simultaneously invoke reactions geared toward strengthening its (hate crime) underpinnings*" (2015). In essence, the acknowledgment of such, albeit sporadic events, is the first step to the path of getting to the root causes of the issue (Fleras, 2010). Furthermore, Canada's numbers, far from being dismissed, appear significantly distant from those of other democracies with smaller immigrant communities, such as the US' 15,588 cases from 2019 (US Department of Justice, 2019).

5) Practices addressing such violence

Having experienced terrorist activity since the beginning of the last century, there have been a number of instances in which government action was taken to strengthen national defense. Still, due to the nature of this work and space constriction, policies

inaugurated before 9/11 are beyond the scope of this analysis, despite their role in shaping pre-2001 policy.



The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act was adopted by Parliament after the attacks of 2001 and served as a crucial component of the government’s Anti-Terrorism Plan, which will be elaborated on in more detail in the following section. The ATA, or Bill C-36, was comprised of a complex legal framework, which encompassed the listing of terrorist entities, recognizance with conditions, surveillance and identification, financing of terrorism, and security intelligence to among others (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001). Additionally, it created five terrorism offenses in the criminal code, which allowed for their persecution. In 2011, Canada announced the Building Resilience Against Terrorism as its first nation-wide counter-terrorism strategy. The document started by defining the nature and scale of threats and later outlined the principles underpinning the counter-terrorism strategy. These were four mutually reinforcing elements: prevent, addressing motivating factors; detect, investigating, and identifying terrorists also through international cooperation; deny, mitigating vulnerability; and respond, quickly responding and ensuring containment (Public Safety Canada, 2011).

Table 5. Public Safety Canada, 2011

FRAMEWORK OF CANADA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY



AIM

To counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.

PRINCIPLES

1. Building resilience
2. Terrorism is a crime and will be prosecuted
3. Adherence to the rule of law
4. Cooperation and partnerships
5. Proportionate and measured response
6. A flexible and forward-looking approach

The Anti-Terrorism Act Bill C-51 was approved in 2015 as a series of amendments to national security, anti-terrorism, and privacy law. The Bill made six main changes to the aforementioned sections, among which: a preventative arrest, criminalized the advocacy of general terrorist offenses, created the notion of 'terrorist' propaganda, allowed the sharing of critical information, and most controversial, it allowed CSIS to take a measure which went against Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms (The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015). These measures sparked concern over the infringement of civil liberties, three in particular. The first is the limitation to free speech, as the offense is vaguely worded as "terrorism offenses *in general*" which may be excessively inclusive of non-terrorist related writings. The second is related to how limiting such speech may undermine efforts, as pushing problematic discourse out of mainstream media might make it harder to track. Finally, it was noted how the criminal code already defined 14 broadly defined terrorism offenses, and how adding the contents of this bill may limit their role.

In 2017, following the aforementioned criticism and concern over the extensive measures adopted in the name of national security in Bill C-51, a new security act was introduced. An Act Respecting National Security Matters (the National Security Act, 2017) or Bill C-59 attempted to address such concerns by accomplishing three objectives: enhancing transparency, amending C-51 as requested by citizen consultation, and reinforcing security while preserving rights (House of Commons, 2017). Out of the three concerns named above, Bill-59 solves the largest one regarding free speech. Namely, it acted upon the previous administration's criminalization of the promotion of "terrorist crimes in general," a phrase so wide that it endangered a variety of forms of expression, including community-based de-radicalization initiatives and journalists reporting on terrorism. Bill C-59 amends the legislation, as well as the definition of "terrorist propaganda," by making it a more targeted counseling offense.

The latest step in the ladder of acts and national strategies was placed in 2018 with the institution of The National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. This document shifts the focus of the prevention from terrorism to radicalization and underlines how the phenomena itself are not associated with any specific religious or ethnic group. The National Strategy has three main objectives: the explanation of radicalization, the instauration of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and the Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre), and the application of the support mechanism developed through the Canada Centre with stakeholders.

In 2019, Bill C-59 was strengthened, allowing Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to launch cyber actions (US Department of State, 2019).

Significance of the Canada Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)

The Canada Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 2001 was a turning point for Canada's domestic security legislation. It was implemented in what can be defined as the first wave of policy in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. At the time, there was widespread distress over potential new attacks on either US or Canadian soil. Additionally, what at the time were Canada's

resources were considered unsuitable to deal with the gravity of the new threat. This concern prompted the Cabinet Committee on Public Security, established in the aftermath of the attacks, to dispense an initial \$280 million, followed by \$7.7 billion. This momentum crystallized in the creation of the ATA, which was officially passed into law on December 24, 2001. Its scope was far-reaching, to say the least, but in the simplest of terms, it sought to institute measures that allowed law enforcement to act against terrorist activities, supplied investigative instruments, and ensured all was done in respect of Canadian values (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001). The latter respect for civil liberties, or lack of thereof, was highly criticized in the following years.

As an important element of the Government's larger Anti-terrorism Plan, the act served also as a formal definition of what now constituted Terrorism Offences in the criminal code. According to the new guidelines, terrorism offenses now included: "*knowingly participating in, or contributing to, any activity of a terrorist group; knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity; commission of a serious (i.e. indictable) offense [linkable to a] terrorist group; knowingly harboring any person who has or is likely to carry out a terrorist activity; and collecting, providing or making available, using or possessing property for certain activities/purposes (terrorist financing)*" (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001). The aforementioned Government's Anti-terrorism Plan, which was set in motion together with the ATA and under the same founding, had four main goals. These were preventing terrorists from entering the country, activating tools that allowed the persecution of such terrorists, the protection of the US-Canada border, and in the pursuit of international cooperation in the capture of terrorists (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001).

Evaluation of such large-scale initiatives proves challenging, still, one clear concern has emerged over the years regarding this Act. This concern was over the new powers put in place to expedite the investigations of potential terrorists. Namely, investigative hearings (under 83.28 and 83.29) and recognizance with conditions (83.3). Such extensive powers were unheard of in the pre-9/11 policy era, and understandably raised the question of legitimacy. Following this scrutiny, a sunset clause was introduced, this meant that without an agreed extension from the House of Parliament, the measures would expire on December 31, 2006; they expired officially on March 1, 2007.

Policy shift on the prevention of radicalization and CVE

During the two decades between the 9/11 attacks and the writing of this paper Canada's approach towards terror attacks has changed, particularly with regards to the targets. Initially, the 2001 policy initiatives were particularly extensive in power and scope but directed the almost entirety of their focus on damage control. Following Bill C-59 and the 2018 National Strategy, the focus shifted to prevention. The most prominent initiative in this new phase is the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence. Also known as the Canada Centre, the initiative was launched in 2017 to counter radicalization and violence. It provides policy guidance, support interventions, funding coordination, and collaboration with stakeholders. This is just one of many governmental, private, and non-governmental plans aimed at preventing radicalization in the past years (Public Safety Canada, 2017).

CVE definition and taxonomy

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is defined by the University of Maryland as: “*CVE efforts go a step beyond just disrupting mobilization and inducing a state of temporary disengagement, however, and can include actions like rehabilitating and reintegrating former violent extremists back into society, or leveraging the stories of former extremists who are often referred to as credible voices, because of their first-hand experiences with violent extremist groups and behaviours, to counter the propaganda produced by these groups*” (University of Maryland, 2020).

Table 6. Department of Homeland Security, CVE 2019.



Canada’s approach to countering radicalization to violence is defined in the aforementioned 2018 National Strategy. The CVE approach is divided into three steps: early prevention, at-risk prevention, disengagement (National Strategy, 2018). Early prevention aims to avoid the onset of violent behaviors altogether through raising awareness, digital literacy education, promoting positive social engagement, embracing meaningful social dialogue, and developing a classroom curriculum able to handle dialogue of complex issues. This level of outreach and early engagement usually entails coordination among Canadian municipalities, Provincial and territorial governments, and Non-government organizations to organize public series, events, and discussions on the topic. One such initiative was the 2019 Canada Centre’s 2019 Event Series, in which domestic and international experts on violent radicalization engaged with the public by sharing best practices and discussing the latest developments (Public Safety Canada, 2021). Next, At-risk prevention is aimed at individuals in the first stages of radicalization by individual interventions, development of mental health-oriented tools for families,

and online-radicalization-specific tools. Among the organizations that operate at the 'intervention' level, are Edmonton's Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV) and Calgary's ReDirect program. Their specific methods differ, but most actors on this level engage with a population at risk through dialogue and coordinate efforts with the community and sometimes law enforcement (Public Safety Canada, 2021).

Finally, disengagement is meant for those who have completely engaged and or returned from foreign extremist training; these tools provide support to Canada's police and security departments monitoring, investigating endeavors. In order to best deliver all stages, CVE requires a whole-of-government approach that parallelly mobilizes provincial, territorial, and governmental departments (Mussett, 2017).

CVE offers a new strategy to tackle violent extremism, one with new promises, but also unique challenges. Differently, from traditional counterterrorism, CVE aims at constructing a preventative social resilience in the community.

Resilience can be defined as "*the process of harnessing key resources to build and sustain the factors associated with positive psychosocial development and community cohesion in contexts where a population experiences high levels of adversity*" (Grossman, 2020). This precautionary approach aims at altering the circumstances which push some to radicalization, strengthening community resilience, and intra-cultural dialogue.

Main projects and their evaluation

As noted in the previous section, the Canadian Government has gradually shifted its attention from radicalization disengagement to preventing radicalization altogether (RCMP, 2014). For space, and available data, two crucial projects in the study of violent extremism and its prevention will be considered, the Kanishka Project and the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.

The Kanishka Project was a five-year-long research initiative launched in 2011 to gather actionable information on how violent extremism grows and manifests in Canadian society (Public Safety, 2018). The project significantly facilitated the country's understanding of the radicalization process in society. Notably, the program's evaluation mentions the creation of a number of networks connecting stakeholders and communities in the field of violent extremism and counter-radicalization. By establishing these community-level connections to share its findings, the Kanishka Project has placed the first stepping-stone in the path to a connected community-level approach to CVE. Despite this victory, significant gaps in the understanding of violent extremism remained, which encouraged agencies to continue the research on the radicalization process, and the best methods to disrupt it (Public Safety, 2016).

One of the projects born from this endeavor was the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence. Launched in 2017, the program oversaw the creation of policy guidance which contributed to the 2018 National Strategy, promotion of cooperation with local stakeholders in the field of CVE, coordination of research on radicalization, and straitening support of the Canada Centre's Community Resilience Fund (Public Safety, 2020). In the 2020 evaluation, the Centre recorded positive achievements, namely it was found to have carved out a leading role both domestically and internationally as a hub for research and partnership establishment. Nevertheless,

the Centre could benefit from more precise research topics, and from exploring mutually beneficial synergetic collaboration with other governmental departments (Public Safety Evaluation, 2020).

These evaluations are to be contextualized in the larger challenges of CVE. As mentioned while introducing CVE, long term community aimed policy programs are extremely challenging to evaluate in terms of efficiency. Former CSIS and CSE employee Gurski summarizes the evaluative challenges of CVE as follows: *“Does deradicalisation work? Unfortunately no one really has any idea. [...] Part of the difficulty in doing so lies with the unethical nature of running only some terrorists through the programme while having a control group remain outside such attention. [...] Without a control group it is impossible to determine whether any changes in behaviour or attitude are attributable solely (or largely) to the deradicalisation programme itself and not to some other factor. The absence of a scientifically accepted methodology renders any claim of success dubious.”* (2017).

Nevertheless, scope and methodology can be evaluated on their own, and regarding the Canada Centre for Community Engagement, Musset praises the program’s decision to combat all forms of extremism, not only ISIS-inspired, thereby not perpetuating the bias that equates suspect pool with an entire population (2017).

Because of the challenges encountered in evaluating CVE initiatives after their conclusion, growing research has been focusing on the identification of risk factors within communities. One of such researchers was Grossman’s initiative, which developed a series of measures used to track the availability of human capital in at-risk communities, and by doing so assessing their capacity to resist the societal pull factors which attract some youth to violent radicalization (2020). The measures applied, denominated BRAVE (Building Resilience against Violent Extremism), were revealed to be an effective measure of community level of resistance to the societal legitimization of violent radicalization. Learning from the aforementioned CVE initiatives, the BRAVE indicators evaluate the following sections: Cultural identity and connectedness, Bridging capital, Linking capital, Trust in law enforcement agencies, Violence-related behaviors, and Violence-related beliefs. This tool, together with other evaluations of community resilience, allows to identify and adapt interventions to the specific community, bolstering preventative action.

Concluding Remarks

Canada is an example of a country that has consciously made the application of multiculturalism as one of its founding principles. The country’s Christian origins are still visible in instances of legislative terminology and practical advantages as seen in the case of faith schools, which are still unique to this religion. Since its colonial origins, the institutional approach between the British and French was more closely resembling coexistence than it did annihilation. This first effort set the stage for an institutional framework with the flexibility to accommodate increasing numbers of different cultural and religious heritages. Today’s landscape is an incredibly diverse one, with more than 20% of the population being of immigrant status, and almost as much being second generation immigrants.

This institutional *forma mentis*, coupled with the practical ethnographic composition of the country, favoured Canada's generous approval of accommodations for religious minorities in everyday life. The clearest example was seen in the 1991 Baltej Singh Dhillon case, in which the traditional Sikh turban was allowed as part of the RCMP attire. This set the tone for more accommodations of the kind. In the wake of 9/11, the country approved a series of anti-terrorism Acts of varying degrees of securitization. With time, however, the most uncompromising instances of those regulations, for instance those with potential damages to privacy, were eventually amended. Additionally, the country switched its focus from terrorism to prevention, funding community resilience strengthening initiatives. This form of approaching violent radicalization, by addressing its root causes and by separating it from a specific community, appears to have yielded overall positive outcomes.

Despite the significant goals Canada has reached, there is more to be done. Three main circumstances have challenged the country's record of peaceful religious coexistence.

First, the oldest and in all likelihood most complicated to mitigate, is be the countries' historical treatment of its native population. As an ethnic and religious minority, the native groups inhabiting the territory suffered greatly from policies aimed at erasing their history and culture.

Second, Quebec's approval of Bill 21, which bans the use of religious symbols and clothing for public-facing jobs, represents the culmination of the province's different approach to multiculturalism, differs in theory and practice from the larger Canadian approach.

Finally, there is a concern for the growth of far-right sentiment, which has previously taken violent form in the Incel group and in instances of hate crime.

Regardless of these valid concerns, Canada represents a uniquely positive example of functional multiculturalism. With one of the most diverse populations in the world, and with legislation that prioritizes integration it manages to score very positively for education, social upwards social mobility, and overall integration of migrant population.

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