

Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

Canada

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eui.eu>



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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: Canada

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

*Overall, Canada is a post-Christian secular country. Although the wording of the charter and the anthem both contain references to the supremacy of God, the state and the church remain clearly divided entities. The 1982 **Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms** was added to the Constitution art. 2 "Freedom of Conscience and Religion". This ensured equal rights under the law for all religious denominations and non-believers, setting the conditions for the development the now most multicultural state in the world. Despite the wording of the charter, all supreme court sentences following 1982 strengthened a **completely secular interpretation**, making it a point not to favour the Christian god mentioned in the preamble. The overarching goal was to create a space where all faiths would be able to peacefully and publicly coexist. Quebec represents an alternative approach to religious coexistence, opting for the removal of religious symbolism instead of the acceptance of it. Following up on campaign promises, the 2019 Bill 21, "An Act respecting the laicity of the State" actively banned the use religious symbols from public workers in 'positions of authority'.*

*The preservation of religious freedoms is not without limits. Constitutionally, religious **freedoms can be suspended if threatening fundamental rights**. One example of such ruling is the 2003 case of the "Shari'a Court", in which a Muslim group lobbied for the institution of court that would rule in accordance with Shari'a law. In this instance, the Canadian Constitutional Court rejected the proposal as it would interfere with the equal treatment of its citizens under the law.*

*Practical **financial support** from the state to religious organizations comes in the form of tax and property exemptions, in addition to the non-taxability of collected charity. Only state-recognized religions can obtain this treatment which excludes groups such as Scientology.*

Originally, Canada's aboriginal religion was shamanistic. Following the French and British colonization, Roman Catholic, and Protestant respectively were established as official faiths. Today the country is mostly Christian, with Roman Catholic representing the largest religious affiliation (67.3%). In the past years, the influence of Christianity has been declining.

***Religious groups are allowed to organize in confessional parties** and run for elections. Still, the notable diversity of religions within Canada is not mirrored in the political landscape, as no parties of official religious affiliation have reached significant votes. One example of this trend is the newly-2018-formed People's Party of Canada (PPC), which adopted a more populist narrative and ran candidates on 315 ridings for the 2019 election. The party used some degree of antagonistic religious symbolism, campaigning, among other themes, against the spread of Islam. Following the vote, the PPC won no seats, and its leader, Maxime Bernier, lost his bid for re-election in the electoral district of Beauce.*

*Within the scope and limitations posed by the fundamental rights, **private religious educational institutions** exist. Their curriculum is evaluated beforehand to ensure its adherence to the values of secularism and pluralism. Additionally, Catholic educational institutions are state-funded under the section 93 of the Canadian constitution and supervised by the Catholic School Board. This financial support for education is not extended to the other religions, which have organized in private schools, such as private Islam schools.*

***Religious media is permitted** and legislated in accordance with the same laws that govern state media. Currently, there are seven religious television networks in Canada, which span from Catholic to multi-faith broadcasts.*

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion	Very High	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	High	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Medium	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Very High	2020
4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020

(4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	High	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	Very High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Very High	2020
7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	High	2020

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

Freedom of religion and protection of religious minorities has been one of Canada's policy priorities since the early 80s. The first is ensured through the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The second is guaranteed through a series of Acts and codes, namely the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988), the Canadian Human Rights Act (1985) a number of provincial human rights codes, the Employment Equity Act (1995), and the Canada Labour Code (R.S., 1985, c. L-2).

The participation of such religious and ethnic minorities in everyday life has been encouraged through a series of initiatives, programs, and benefits. Among which are the access to justice (Court Challenges Program (CCP)), employment measures (Employment Equity Act), education, poverty reduction, and political participation strategies. This endeavor, in conjuncture with the absence of any limitation to political involvement, also facilitated their **entrance in political life**. In the 2019 election, of the 6 major parties, 15% of candidates belonged to a visible minority ("persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour") making it the most diverse political composition to date. This number, however, falls short from the percentage of visible minorities in Canada, which as of 2016 are 22.3% of the population.

Conversely, there are **no religious restrictions to access public spaces** other than the general restrictions all citizens are subject to. Almost all public spaces have inclusive architecture such as multi-faith prayer spaces. Religious minorities also have freedom of construction under the Religious Organizations' Lands Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.23. This allows religious minority groups belonging to one of the officially recognized faiths to own land for religious purposes.

Religious dress in public is permitted following the 1991 case of Baltej Dhillon. Dillon successfully applied to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police but had to comply with the police's dress code, renouncing the Kirpan (turban) and cutting his beard, thus compromising his Sikh traditions. Following a formal complaint, his request was approved and he was allowed to keep his turban instead of the classic RCMP cap or stetson. A further step in this direction was taken in 2015. Zunera Ishaq, a Sunni Muslim woman had chosen to wear a niqab at her citizenship ceremony. Initially, this was refused as the traditional dress would cover her face, but following an appeal, the ban on niqabs has been permanently lifted. This type of regulation was not admitted in Quebec, where Bill 21 of March 29, 2019, banned the use of all religious symbols among public workers.

The effort Canada has demonstrated in **targeted inclusive policy** is made even more commendable by the current religious make-up of the country. Christians make up for the 67.3% of the population (Catholic 38.7%, Protestant 28.6%), followed by a growing 23.9% of 'Non-Affiliated', which leaves minorities under the 5th percentile, with Muslims making up 3.7% and Hindus the 1.5%.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	Very High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	Very High	2020
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	High	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	High	2020
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	Very High	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	Very High	2020
5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Very High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Very High	2020

7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

Structural indicators

Canada's **level of freedom** is consistently among the highest 6 in the world (Freedom Score of 98 in 2020). In the past year, the country registered a slight negative change (-1 point) due to the approval of the aforementioned provincial Quebec Law Bill21. This, together with the Supreme Court's decision to deny constitutional protection to a territory of spiritual importance to the indigenous of the Ktunaxa Nation, are the only two significant examples of **government-based restrictions on religion** and spirituality (scored Low 1.2).

The **adherence to the rule of law** is high, attaining an 81 in 2020 after a steady increase in the past decade, and scoring very positively in relation to other nations.

Canada's overall score within the **Fragile Stated Index** has sharply improved following 2015. This amelioration awarded the country entry to the top 'Very Sustainable' category, leaving the regional US partner in the lower 'Very Stable' group. With regards to **state legitimacy**, the country scored a positive 0.5 (against the more negative 2.9 US level), following a decade-long shift of improvement. The level of **group grievances** recorded a slight worsening between 2012 and 2015, after which it improved, returning to levels close to the lowest positive registered in 2006. **Uneven economic development** was the worst indicator for Canada (which still has to be put in the perspective of the country being one of the best scorings globally). Still, after 2008 it began improving drastically, recording the lowest -positive- score in 2020. The percentage of **wealth disparity** dipped to the lowest point in 1985 and started growing in 1990, reaching the highest point in 2007 (the indicator's data stops after 2010). Also, **protection for human rights** has followed this overall improvement. The only category which has worsened since 2016 is the **national security apparatus**, due to the growing implementation of surveillance technology. This could be related to the introduction of a series of more stringent security strategies following the jihadi terror attacks in Europe.

Perception indicators

Political grievances and trust in state institutions are observed through the Edelman Trust Barometer. The level of trust in the Informed Public is 67, against a 53 is among the General Public, demonstrating how political grievances are expressed differently across one population. Canada's informed group decreased seven points in trust in one year. Still, the score has improved from two years ago.

The score of the population's **satisfaction with democracy** has also suffered, falling a harsh ten points in one year (2017: 70/100, 2018: 61/100). Still, in comparison to the regional average of 40/100, Canada places itself as a positive example of overall satisfaction.

Economic discontent appears to be diminishing, as the country recorded a positive trend in trust towards its own businesses.

Perceived discrimination and polarization is low as the country demonstrates a positive shift in the factor 'intolerance of diversity'. In this instance specifically, the

wording is fundamental, as there has been a significant increase in people who believe that “immigration levels are too high”. Namely, in the 41 years of the survey, there has been an almost steady increase in negative sentiment towards the number of immigrants entering the country. Still, it should be noted that this result is not indicative of the country’s acceptance of immigrants, but a judgment on their numbers.

With regard to prejudice, Canada’s general population believes that Muslims, Middle-Eastern, and Indigenous people are the most likely to experience discrimination.

As for **concern for violent extremism**, there was a notable (almost 20 point) increase.

Canada experienced no domestic state-based conflict. Internationally, it has partaken in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and against the IS in Iraq and Syria.

Hostilities involving religion have increased from Low to Moderate, probably due to the wave of anti-Islam sentiment.

The **impact of terrorism** grew, despite remaining in the “Lowest impact of terrorism” category. In 2018 Canada experienced 6 terrorist attacks, one was Incel-based a second was Jihadi- inspired, and the remaining are of unknown affiliation. Incel stands for ‘involuntary celibates’, it was born as an online subculture individuals struggling to date, and developed into a cesspool for extreme and often violent misogyny. Incidentally, the **biggest domestic threats** to Canada have been the radicalization of jihadi terrorism and incel/ right-wing extremism. The first has been a decade-long threat, but of dwindling incidence. The other, right-wing-extremism, especially xenophobic and gender-based violence, has grown.

(Note: some indicators are flagged as n/a, this is because this section’s indicators draw a lot of data from European Union sources, for which there is no exact Canadian equivalency.)

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Classification: Free Rating: Freedom score 99	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 14/ 102 Overall score: 78	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Level: Moderate Score: 1.2	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 0.5 Level: High	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 1.4 Level: High	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: 2.5 Level: Low	2020

(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 1.8 Level: Low	2020
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 41.4%	2010
2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Score: 47 Level: Medium	2020
(2b) Political discontent	Discontent with country direction: 61% Discontent with democracy/ government performance: 39/100	2019
(2c) Economic discontent	Discontent with country's economy: Score: 47, Level: Neutral	2020
(2d) Discrimination	Opposing diversity: 19% Discomfort with minorities: 19% Experiencing discrimination: Score 8%, Level: Low Public opinion on the likelihood of discrimination: Medium	2018
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: 56% ISIS considered major threat: 55%	2018
3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Level: No	2020
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: Moderate	2018
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: 3.591 Number of Incidents: 6	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: 1798	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/ networks	Level: Low	2020

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Main strategic plan or response

The first step towards building **resilience to terrorism** was arguably the 1985 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (R.S.C., c. C-23) which created the CSIS, Canada's national intelligence service.

Following the September 11 terror attacks, Canada adopted the Anti Terrorism Act (ATA Bill C-36) in 2001. The ATA revised the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and a together with a number of other Acts. It additionally enacted the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act. Next, Canada developed and implemented a Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2012, named the Building Resilience Against Terrorism, which coordinated the action of 20 government agencies. The Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-59) of 2015 further expanded on the state and agencies' ability to collect and share information. Following the complaints over former Bill C-5, which had failed to provide clear explanations to the collection and use of information, among other problematic shortcomings, the National Security Act, 2017 was introduced. This revision aimed at enhancing accountability, amending C-51 limitations, and expanding security and protecting rights.

Canada's concern with the **prevention of radicalization** was formalized with the 2017 launch of the [Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence \(Canada Centre\)](#). This initiative promoted policy guidance, stakeholder coordination, research funding, and support for interventions with the goal of countering radicalization. In 2018 the centre released the [National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence](#), which sought to explain radicalization, and recommend government strategies. This strategy included a number of non-governmental agencies, groups, and organization in the drafting and more significantly implementation of the plan. Especially in addressing online radicalization, it engaged with youth groups, technology companies, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), EU Internet Forum, front-line workers, and anti-radicalization agencies across Canada.

As for **civil-society grassroots-initiatives**, the 2015 [Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence \(CPRLV\)](#) seeks to prevent radicalization through a community-based approach. Other significant grassroots initiatives are the [Counter Extremism Project \(CEP\)](#) which has developed the Edmonton's Organization for the Prevention of Violence and the 1982 Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW).

Multi agency cooperation on the identification of **early warning signs** was formalized through the G7, EU internet Forum, and GIFCT partnership with tech organizations such as Facebook and Twitter. This cooperation allowed to map early signs of radicalization online. As for in person intervention, the Canada Centre and the CRF developed a multi-agency response plan to potential radicalization cases in a community. Among the initiatives active on the ground are the 2017 Ottawa Multiagency Early Risk Intervention Tables (MERIT), 2019 Edmonton Resiliency Project, and the [Calgary Re-Direct](#).

The aforementioned strategies have **internal evaluative mechanisms**. Externally, the first [Public Reports on Terrorist Threat to Canada](#) document was released in 2014 and it outlined the latest threats and the government's strategies and responses. However, a greater need for transparency fuelled the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) in 2017 under bill C-59. This body unites the previous review bodies of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the Office of the

Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC), and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC). NSIRA will evaluate agency effectiveness.

*With regards to **terrorism financing**, the most detailed response is found in the 2011 [Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy](#). Measures are defined under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). Additionally, Canada's is an active member of the [Financial Action Task Force \(FATF\)](#) an international organization which coordinates the response to terrorism financing. On the federal level, issues of terrorism financing pertains to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.*

*In **support of victims** of terrorism, the [Justice for Victims of Terrorism](#) was created under the 2012 Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. This act allows victims to sue the perpetrators of the violence, be it individuals or states, for the damage received. These are persecuted at a Canadian court, and any act of terrorism occurring after the first of January 1985 can be brought to court under this act.*

Canada has been swift to adapt to its allies' shift in strategies, as seen by the 2001 Anti Terrorism Act, and the 2017 focus on prevention. This indicates the states' willingness to incorporate preventative strategies, given that Canada has never experienced terrorism as the US or Europe has. Additionally, Canada's focus on prevention has not only been thorough, but also future-oriented, considering the countries' diverse composition.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2018
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	Yes	2020
(1e) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	Yes	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2018
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	High	2018
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2019
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2018

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	Yes	2018
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	High	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	Yes	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	Yes	2018
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	Yes	2020

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