

Indicators Assessment – Non-Unitary States

Russia

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: ___Russia_____

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

Overall, state and religion are separated in Russia. Officially, the Russian Federation is a secular country, which is clearly stated in Article 14 of the state Constitution adopted in 1993. This norm did not change ever since. However, in March 2020 the State Duma (the lower chamber of the parliament) confirmed president Vladimir Putin's suggested amendments and included words "god" and "faith" into the new version of the Constitution. This might be the first step towards a different relationship between state and religion.

The official separation of state and religion became rather nominal since the ascendance to power of Putin in the year 2000. The state leadership demonstrates its belonging to the Orthodox Church during religious celebrations and actively involves the Church into foreign politics, especially dealing with Orthodox countries or Orthodox Christians abroad.

The efficiency of the implementation principle of secularism differs in different units (republics, territories, regions, cities of federal importance, autonomous regions, autonomous districts) of Russia. The two analyzed cases (the republic of Udmurtia and Chechen republic) represent the opposite poles in the scale of such implementation. Udmurtia's political authorities follow the principle of secularism as it is prescribed by the Federal legislation to nearly full extent. This became possible due to several factors, among which there is the minuscule importance of the republic in the eyes of the Church and a balanced approach adopted by the leadership of the republic. In Chechnya, the situation is different. This is a Muslim republic, with the leadership and most of the population being adherents of Sunni Islam. The religious schism of the late 1990s and early 2000s contributed to the necessity to include religion into politics due to security reasons.

The same Article 14 of the Constitution precludes the participation of religion in politics. Despite a certain level of involvement in foreign politics, religious leaders should not participate in decision-making process. The analyzed units represent the opposite poles again. If Udmurtia successfully separates Church from politics, Chechnya includes and relies on it.

The secular nature of the state is also supported by the Federal law N95-F3 "On political parties". The law restricts the creation or registration of the religiously-based political parties.

The principle of secularism works both ways. Religion does not interfere in the state's affairs and vice versa. In practice, the elections of religious leadership are usually being unofficially approved by the state. This is not the case in the territorial units, where the representatives of the religions are being appointed by the central religious institutions. This does not happen in Chechnya. The dominant religion (Sunni Islam) operates independently from the federal center.

The state's restrictions on religious freedom take a subtle form. According to the law "On freedom of consciousness and religious organizations" (N 125 F-3) adopted in 1997, no religious organization can be registered in the country unless it can prove that it has been operating in the country for at least 15 years. This law effectively limits religious freedom of all religious communities but those that follow officially recognized (institutionalized) religions. The suppression of religious freedom in

Chechnya takes even harsher forms due to the religious confrontation that the republic experienced in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	Very high	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion.	Very high	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/ independence from religion	Low	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Very high	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Very high	2019
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Very high	2019
4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very low	2020

5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very low	2020
6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	Medium	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2019
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2019
7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Very high	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	Very high	2020
(8b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Medium	2020
(8b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Medium	2020

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

Overall, there has been little change in the situation with religious minority groups during the time-period of 2000-2020. To some extent this stability was determined by the Federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations" (N125-F3) adopted in 1997. According to this law, all religious groups enjoy the same rights and have the same accountability.

However, the same law asserts the criteria of registration for religious minority organizations. To be eligible for registration, a religious minority must prove that it's been operating in the country for at least 15 years. This effectively restricts freedom of conscience in the country. All religions other than Orthodox Christianity (majority), Sunni Islam, Buddhism, Judaism struggle to register their Churches or organizations. The participation of religious groups in the political life of the state is restricted by the Russian Constitution (1993) and the Federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations" (N125-F3). No religious group is allowed to participate in the state's political life, create or finance a political party. However, the religious authorities of the institutionalized religions often make public statements in support of state politics. The critic towards the government can be regarded as a criminal act, according to the Federal law N114-F3 "On countering extremist activities" (2002). Regarding social security, no religion in Russia has a privileged position in terms of receiving social support from the state. The members of the institutionalized religious groups are entitled to have the same legal rights as other citizens of the Russian Federation. This is guaranteed by the corrections to the Federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations" (N125-F3).

The religious organizations are taxpayers, according to the Federal law N7-F3 "On non-commercial organizations", adopted in 1996. However, they enjoy some privileges, such as tax-free publishing and selling literature, video and audio materials, owning real estate, including houses of worship, etc.). The social security perks of the believers are the same as every Russian citizen. Additional perks are guaranteed by the organization a person belongs to. The social security regulations of the organization should not contradict the State's legislation.

Access to the public space for religious practice and ceremonies is regulated by the local administrations. They decide if on a certain date public gathering for the religious ceremony is allowed or not. Having in mind compliance of the institutionalized religious groups with the state, it is not so difficult for them to gain access whenever they want, even if according to the law "On freedom of conscience and religious organizations" (N 125 F-3), all religious organization should conduct their services in the places designated for these purposes. Non-institutionalized religious groups are not allowed to conduct their rituals in public space.

There are no official restrictions for the legal bodies (including religious organizations) to access public funds for financing their activities. Since 2012, when the Russian Parliament adopted the corrections to the law "On non-commercial organization" (N121-F3), NGO's and other legal bodies that are funded by the foreign institutions should self-declare being the "foreign agents". The negative connotation of this definition, even if it does not invoke any legal consequences, limited the number of the applications for the foreign funds and, thus, decreased the number of NGO's and weakened Russian civil society.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.

Score

YEAR (Most Recent)

(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2019
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	Low	2019
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	Very low	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Very low	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Very low	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Very low	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Very low	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Medium	2020
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	Low	2020
5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Medium	2020

6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Very high	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Medium	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Low	2020
7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	Very high	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Medium	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Medium	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

Overall, since Vladimir Putin became a president of the Russian Federation in 2000, an evaluation of the country in the global ranking is steadily exacerbating. Russia is repeatedly named as not a free country in the Freedom House annual reports. Russia is often considered a country, which disregards the principle of the rule of law. The country imposes more and more restrictions on civil society and religious groups. It disregards and violates human rights.

The index of the state legitimacy is considerably low as well. The conduct of Russian elections was regularly criticized by many international observers. The critique includes not only violations during the elections but the ways in which V. Putin circumvents the mechanism of checks and balances and remains in the Office. The latest amendments to the Russian Constitution opened the possibility for Putin to stay in power at least until 2036.

The level of group grievances was always very high in Russia with a slight improvement during the period of 2009-2012. Controversially, these years demonstrated a peak of hate crime in the country.

Due to the growing middle class, the level of uneven economic development is steadily, even if insignificantly improving. The same trend was observable calculating the ownership of the Russian wealth. The top 10% of the country owned less and less (even if insignificant) of the state's wealth.

Perception-based indicators:

There are three important dimensions (political, economic, and societal) that embrace the factors contributing to religious radicalization in Russia. The political dimension relates to the trust in state institutions. Traditionally, the Russian population trusts the most the president institution and distrust the police and the parliament. Trust in the army improved over the years, whereas trust in the Orthodox Church (applies to all institutionalized religions) decreased.

The economic indicators demonstrated improvement since the beginning of the 2000s but fell down due to the world economic crises in 2008-2010 and 2020 again. This fluctuation demonstrates that the number of those vulnerable and dissatisfied with their economic situation remains considerably high.

The societal dimension includes estimating xenophobia, which is often equal to anti-Islamism. Russia remains a country with a considerably high rate of hate crimes. The peak of hate crime was observed in 2008-2010. Since then the amount was steadily growing smaller. The crimes against Muslim migrants are still common in big Russian cities (2020).

According to the criteria developed by the University of Uppsala, Russia does not experience a civil conflict currently. The second war in Chechnya was the main violent conflict in the country from 1999 until 2009. Large-scale clashes between the State forces and rebels in the North Caucasus continued up until 2014 when the most rebel groups left the country for jihad in Syria. Since then violence in the region is rather sporadic and incidental.

Nevertheless, the level of social hostilities remains quite high. So is terrorist activity. According to the official data of the law enforcement institutions, the number of extremists and terrorist acts in the country steadily growing (see Shalagin A. and Grebenkin M., 2017). This growth contradicts the declarations that come from the same institutions. According to them, the major terrorist groups that operated in the country (ISIS, Caucasus Emirate) are neutralized.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: Not free Freedom score: 20	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 94 (128) Overall score: 0.47	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: Over 6.6. Level: Very high	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 8.2 Level: Low	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 9.1 Level: Low	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: 8.6 Level: High	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 5.6. Level: Moderate	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 45.5%	2019
2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust in Government: No data Distrust in Parliament: No data Other: Distrust in president (all categories not "trust"): 40% Other: Distrust in Church (not "trust"): 60% Other: Distrust in police (not "trust"): 70% Other: Distrust in governors (not "trust"): 69%	n/a n/a 2019 2019 2019 2019
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: No data Situation in country is bad/very bad: No data Dissatisfaction with democracy: 49% Other: Dissatisfaction with the direction in which the country is going: 42% Other: Probability of political protests: 24% Other: Disagreement with the government's politics: 48% Other: Disagreement with the parliament's politics: 54%	n/a n/a 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: No data Dissatisfaction national economy: No data	n/a n/a

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	Economic situation is the most serious problem: No data Other: Probability of protests due to discontent with economic situation: 26%	n/a 2020
(2d) Discrimination	Religious/Ethnic discrimination is widespread: No data Oppose diversity in own country: 29% Discomfort with minorities: No data Experienced religious discrimination: No data Other: Number of victims of hate crimes: 48 Other: Number of vandalism acts: 20 Other: Number of sentenced for hate crime: 212	n/a 2018 n/a n/a 2019 2019 2019
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: 66% ISIS is a major threat: 62% Other: No data	2015 2018 n/a

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	No	2020
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: High Score: 3.6-7.2	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: GTI 4.9 Number of Incidents: No data	2019
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: Hate crimes: 576	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: Moderate	2020

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Overall Assessment:

Systematic state policy on countering extremism in Russia have originated on July 25, 2002, with the signing of Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On Combating Extremist Activity.” Other relevant documents are: the law “On Counteraction to Terrorism” adopted in 2006, the Code of Administrative Offenses of 2001 (Article 5, 13, 20); the Criminal Code OF 2006 (Article 63; 148, 205, 280, 282, 354).

Later in 2014, the country accepted the Strategy of Countering Extremism in RF until 2025. Another relevant document is The Concept of Countering Terrorism, which was adopted in 2009. Both documents, as well as the laws, define the phenomena (terrorism and extremism) and specify what activities are considered extremist or terrorist. The documents also outline the ways, in which both phenomena should be countered.

Both (the strategy and the concept) were designed by mainly law enforcers without the participation of the civil society. This explains little attention paid to the issue of the possible violation of human rights, which the implementation of the counter-terrorism and counter-extremism measures might result in. The responsibility of designing and implementing strategies lies with the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC). This body was compiled out of law enforcers and only recently it started involving the public sector and the ministries of other sectors into the less secretive part of its work. The Committee organizes conferences and workshops, where leading scholars, politicians, and practitioners present their research and share findings. The main problem with the implementation of the strategies and policies that are initiated by the NAC is lack of accountability. No separate monitoring body with the relevant executive power was established in the Russian Federation. Therefore, control over the implementation and monitoring of “success” in countering terrorism is mostly an exclusive privilege of the separate law enforcement institutions such as Prosecutor’s Office, Federal Security Bureau, and Police. This explains why the dominant way of countering religious extremism relies on the usage of hard power and involves military and law enforcers. Besides the legal means, examples of the hard power methods include abductions, torture, extra-judiciary killings, military operations known as “mopping up” etc. For instance, according to Novaya Gazeta and Human Rights Centre “Memorial”, only in January of 2017, the Chechen police forces executed 27 people without any legal process.

Since 2015, civil society started being involved more actively in preventive programs. NGOs in collaboration with police forces and experts participate in explaining the essence of religious extremism and its danger; they try to create a counter-narrative and debunk the positive myth about the Islamic State; they encourage people to join a fight against extremism. In addition to this, NGOs propagate and encourage the revival of the local traditions and values, promote “peaceful” Islam over the “dangerous” form of it, and encourage social control over the possible spread of the Salafi Islam.

In general, the country lacks a complex and all-inclusive approach in its anti-extremism and anti-terrorism strategies. It does not spend enough resources or even attention to the rehabilitation processes. The detained extremists or their families are becoming targets of attacks and humiliation rather than the objects of rehabilitation. The approach and attitude in each Federal unit differ though. Some units adopt harsher countering and preventive strategies, others – milder.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2020

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(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation		No	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination		Yes	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law		No	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan		Yes	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan		Partial participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan		Yes	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan		Yes	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan		Yes	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects		Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism		Yes	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners		Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.		Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth		Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women		Yes	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders		Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.		Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention		Moderate	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns		Yes	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons		No	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism		Insufficient information	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings		No	2020

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