Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

LEBANON

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:
Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: LEBANON

I.   Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

Lebanon is a confessional system where religious communities have significant power in social, political and cultural realms. Therefore, the state autonomy from religion is very weak. There are two articles in the [Constitution of Lebanon](#) that define the relationship between the state and religion. According to the Article 9, "There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and shall guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected." In this article, the state is entitled with the task of fulfilling the requirements of religious authority/authorities in "rendering homage to the God Almighty." This requirement considerably reduces the state autonomy from religion.

Similarly, according to the Article 10, "Education shall be free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction." This article provides a considerable autonomy of religious communities from the state in organizing their religious institutions and curriculum.

Under the auspices of the [French mandate](#), a constitution was written in 1926 while the 1932 census was realized to serve as a point of reference for the confessional partition of power over subsequent decades. The Constitution created a parliamentary regime coupled with proportional representation along confessional lines, with a Christian president and a Sunni Muslim prime minister. Furthermore, Decree No. 60 L.R. (1936) recognized 18 official sects in Lebanon—Twelve Christian, five Muslim, and one Jewish—and their right to create and manage their own religious courts and to follow their own personal status and family laws.

Yet in the C section of the Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution, it is stated that "Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination." Clearly, there is a tension between this section and the Articles 9 and 10.

Another element of the constitution which further reduces the state autonomy from religion is political confessionalism which requires a power sharing based on religious communities. Although the political confessionalism is declared to be transitional in the same constitution (Article 95), it is still shaping the political elite formation in Lebanon. According to the Article 24, "The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed of elected members; their number and the method of their election shall be determined by the electoral laws in effect. Until such time as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-confessional basis, the distribution of seats shall be according to the following principles: a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportional

representation among the confessional groups within each of the two religious communities."

Despite constitutional guarantees for the Christians in general and recognized religious sects in particular, the post-Civil War Lebanon witnessed declining power of Christian communities *vis a vis* the Sunni and Shia minorities. There is also a similar hierarchy within the Christian and Muslim communities based on various factors such as the relative weight of population and relative influence in the realms of economy and state bureaucracy.

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	Low	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion	Low	2020

2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Low	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Low	2020

3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Low	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Low	2020

4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	High	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	High	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the	High	2020

regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.		
(5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020

6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	High	2020

7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020

8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Medium	2020

II.   Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

Today Lebanon has a confessional system of power-sharing where the main lines of divisions take place around religion. In this system, there is considerable religious diversity and religious minorities enjoy significant rights and privileges recognized by the constitution and basic law.

Confessionalism is a sub-category of consociationalism which is employed in countries that have a variety of different segmental groups along social, political, ethnic, linguistic and racial lines as well as by religion or by region/nationality. It is a form of power-sharing among various segmental groups in order to maintain political stability, civil order and to avoid the outbreak of civil violence. In this system, religious groups are directly sharing power and participating in political decision making and policy-making. The Article 9 of the Constitution of Lebanon is the source of the rights and privileges of religious communities in Lebanon: "There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and shall guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected."

According to the Article 24 of the Constitution of Lebanon, "...the distribution of seats shall be according to the following principles: a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each of the two religious communities." In addition to these measures, the president must be a Maronite Christian, Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim while the Assembly Speaker a Shi Muslim.

There are 18 officially recognized sects in Lebanon (12 Christian, five Muslim, and one Jewish) and they are free in organizing and regulating their religious councils, endowments, properties, schools (Article 10), their religious courts and in following their own personal status and family laws. Since there is no civil court for personal status matters, those citizens who do not belong to a registered religious group, cannot marry, divorce, or inherit property.

Sectarian system disproportionally empowers some minorities *vis a vis* the others: Sunni and Shia minorities among the Muslims and Maronite Christians and Greek Orthodox among the Christian Population. These minorities strongly benefit from the sectarian distribution of power and create significant political supporters due to their control of public funds and media outlets.

In order for a religion to gain legal standing in the eyes of the Lebanese government, they must submit a statement of doctrine and moral principles to the government for review and recognition. If a religion is not recognized by the government, the followers of that religion are still allowed to practice, but they do not receive any legal standing in the courts. For example, Baha'is, Buddhists, Hindus, and unregistered Protestant Christian groups can believe in, practice, and perform their religious rites freely, but members of these unregistered religions do not qualify for government positions.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020

2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020

3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Low	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Low	2020

4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	Very High	2020

5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Medium	2020

6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	High	2020

7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	Very High	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020

III.   Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:
Structural factors:
For the year 2020, Lebanon's freedom status was partly free with 44 as freedom score. With the decline of Syrian civil war, there is a slight increase in Lebanon's freedom scores. Lebanon ranked 96th out of 128 countries in 2020 WJP Rule of Law Index with an overall score 0.45. There is four point deterioration compared to 2019. In the MENA region (20 countries) Lebanon has the minimum level of government restrictions in general (Moderate, 3.1, GRI, 2015). Lebanon scored 7.1 and ranked 44th in the 2019 Index of the Country for P1 State Legitimacy (SL) in the Fragile States index (FSI). Lebanon scored 7.2 and ranked 44th in the 2019 Index of the Country for P3 Human Rights. Under the indicator E2 Uneven Economic Development (2019) Lebanon scored 5.2 with 44 in ranking. According to the World Inequality Database (WID), the Top 10 per cent of Lebanon had the 57.1% of the national income in 2016 (Bottom 50 per cent had 10.7% of the national income. There is persistent inequality in terms of national income distribution.

Perception-based indicators:
In the Arab Barometer (2018), distrust to government and parliament remains very high in Lebanon (80.8% /82.3 %.). Increasing popular discontent with the sectarian political class's unending disputes and deadlocks and systemic corruption can explain the general distrust. In 2018, those who believed their country was going right direction made only 3%. To the statement, "The government does all it can do to provide its citizens with necessary services", total disagreement was very high: 80%. To the statement "The percentage of those who think the economic situation is the most serious problem in their country", the approval rates was 44.9% in 2018 (60.6% in 2013). In the Arab Barometers 2016, "The percentage of the people who feel being treated equally being compared to other citizens in your country" was asked. Those who feel "not treated equally at all" (41.5%) ranked very high in Lebanon compared with the other countries included in the research. When we analyze (Pew Research Center GA&T, 2015) for the Lebanese views on the question, 67 per cent said they were very concerned while 27 per cent remained somewhat concerned. When we analyze the Muslim views on suicide bombing in the "PEW Research Center, GA&T, 2013, 2009, Lebanon's scores in response to the question "Suicide bombing can be justified often/sometimes" seem to be alarming. In 2015 poll, those Lebanese who stated that "Suicide bombing can be justified often/sometimes were, respectively 9% and 24% (33% in total).

Incidence-based indicators:
According to the [Uppsala Data Conflict Program](#), between 2005 and 2007, Israel and Hezbollah forces fought in Southern Lebanon. There were 1607 fatalities in this conflict due to the state-based violence. When we analyze the [Social Hostilities Index prepared by the Pew Research Center 2009](#) and 2015, Lebanon seems to have high level of social hostility with a score 5.3 score for 2015. Lebanon ranked 43rd in the Global Terrorism Index (2019) which makes the country a medium case with 4.3. According to the Global Terrorism Data (GTD) in 2018, number of terror incidents were just 7. There seems to be a significant improvement in Lebanon's scores compared with 2014-105 scores when the country faced the most intense incidents of violent extremism. According to the GTD, Hezbollah was the main group responsible from the violent extremism in Lebanon between 2000 and 2011. After the Syrian Civil war, other actors inclined to violent extremism also appeared on the Lebanese state: Al Qaida in Lebanon, Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad, Asbat al- Ansar.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: Partly Free Freedom score: 44	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 96 (126) Overall score:0.45	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Moderate (3.1)	2015
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Low (7.1)	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Low (7.2)	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	High (8.2)	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Moderate (5.2)	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 57.1 %	2016

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust Parliament/Government: 80.6 %/82.3 %	2018
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: NA Dissatisfaction with overall situation: NA Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: 80 % Other: NA	2018
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: NA Dissatisfaction national economy: NA Economic situation is the most serious problem: 44.9% Other: NA	2018
(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: Opposing diversity: NA Discomfort with minorities: NA Dislike neighbors from minority groups: NA Experienced discrimination: 41.5 % Other: NA	2016
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: Concerned and very concerned: 94% ISIS is a major threat: 97% Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: Often/sometimes/rarely: 9 % /24 %	2015 2017

| | /25 %
Other: NA | 2013 |

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	No	2018
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	High (5.3)	2015
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	GTI Score: 4.3 Number of Incidents: 7	2019
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: 7	2019
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/ networks	Medium	2019

IV. Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures

Overall assessment:
The National Strategy for Preventing Violent Extremism was adopted by the Lebanese Council of Ministers in 2018. Lebanon is also the member of Strong Cities Network (SCN). Launched at the UN General Assembly in September 2015, the SCN is the first global network of mayors, governors and local practitioners united in building social cohesion and community resilience to prevent violent extremism (PVE) in all its forms. The Prime Minister appointed a National Coordinator who, in cooperation with each ministry, will turn the strategy into action.

During the preparation process, the primary role was assumed by the Council of Minister. The non-state actors were not included in this preparation process. For the implementation process, however, many ministries committed themselves for the inclusion of the non-state actors, mainly the national and inter-national NGOs. The Strategy's PILLAR 3 emphasizes "Justice, Human Rights and Rule of Law." It is also stated that "The Strategy shall not contain any justification for the violation of human rights in all their forms."

Terrorism financing problem was not specified in the National Strategy. Yet Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).

Several pillars of the National Action Plan directly or indirectly draw attention to significance of a communication strategy to prevent violence extremism: PILLAR 1: Dialogue and Conflict Prevention, PILLAR 8: Strategic Communications, Informatics and Social Media, PILLAR 9: Empowering Youth.

There are no formal state policies developed to provide social support to the victims of terror and violent extremism. National Action Plan does not deal with this issue either. Syrian refugees in Lebanon are the most significant victims of terrorism and violent extremism. There is no efficient national strategy in relation to these war victims.
National Action Plan's PILLAR 6 is titled as "Education, Training and Skills Development." Under this Pillar, one objective is to develop educational curricula at all levels to protect youth from the risks of violent extremism and spread awareness among

those involved in the educational process. The National Action Plan's PILLAR 8: Strategic Communications, Social Media and Informatics put forward four objectives and task related ministries and state unit with implementation including security forces, army and justice institutions.

In the National Strategy, PILLAR 5: "Gender Equality and Empowering Women" is directly related with women's educational and social and economic empowerment. In 2019, the Government of Lebanon endorsed the country's first National Action Plan (NAP) on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

In the National Strategy, PILLAR 1: "Dialogue and Conflict Prevention" is directly related with utilisation of platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue in preventing violent extremism. There is a long-established tradition of inter-faith dialogue in Lebanon. After the outbreak of Syrian Civil War and with increasing sufferings from violent extremism in the years 2013 and 2015, such efforts were revitalized with an additional agenda for countering violent extremism. The Islamic-Christian National Dialogue Committee (1993), Arab Group for Christian-Muslim Dialogue covering the whole of the Middle (1995), Adyan Foundation (2006) can be cited as organizations in pursuit of inter-faith.

There are no multi-agency cooperation platforms or referral mechanisms at local level to monitor and prevent radicalisation, support at-risk persons. There is no sufficient data indicating that either Lebanese government or the Lebanese security forces are commissioning research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	YES	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	YES	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	YES	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	YES	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	YES	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	YES	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Partial Participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	NO	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	NO	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	NO	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	YES	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	YES	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	YES	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	YES	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	YES	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	YES	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	High Level	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	YES	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	NO	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	NO	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	YES	2020

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