

Comparative Report

Religious Radicalisation Dynamics in Different World Regions

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Comparative report on (violent) religious radicalisation dynamics in different world regions ¹

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¹ This report is based on national notes of 11 countries in different world regions, prepared by Thomas Sealy and Tariq Modood (UK and Belgium); Tina Magazzini (France and Germany); Vanessa Barolsky, Vivian Gerrand and Michele Grossman (Australia); Georges Fahmi (Tunisia); Liliya Yakova (BiH); Mehdi Lahlou (Morocco); Pradana Boy Zulian (Indonesia); Hisham Hellyer (Egypt); Imran Rasid and Zawawi Ibrahim (Malaysia); Marat Ilyasov (Russia). Further details on each country can also be found in country case reports: <http://grease.eu.eu/publications/radicalisation-and-resilience-case-studies/>.

1. Introduction

This report presents a comparative analysis on religious radicalisation dynamics across our world regions. We reflect on the understandings of religiously affiliated or inspired (violent) radicalisation along with state responses to it. We also reflect on links between religious radicalisation and state-religion relations and the governance of religious diversity, state-political orientations, and counter-/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) policy, strategy, and practice. The combination of state responses and the governance of religious diversity provides the main focus of the analysis presented.

The discussions are largely organised around common themes, with comparisons, contrasts and differences, both intra-regional as well as inter-regional, being brought out within these shared areas. The aim of the sections is not to try to determine or define what radicalisation is, how it comes about, or how it should be addressed. The focus is rather on how different states define, understand and respond to radicalisation and how this relates the governance of religious diversity.

2. Overview and key challenges

Religiously attributed or influenced violent radicalisation has been an issue that countries across the world face and which in recent years (since the 2000s and especially in the 2010s) has come, on a global scale and in the public arena, to be principally associated with the violent radical Islamist groups al-Qaeda and more latterly ISIS, although regionally other groups have also become prominent, such as Jamaah Islamiyah in South Asia.

Before focussing on these most recent forms, it is important to note that countries have longer histories of violent radicalisation, whether somehow connected to religion or not. These historical (and in some cases more recent) experiences with violent radicalisation have all marked current approaches, whether through laying the foundations of a legislative base, institutional structure, understandings, forming collective memory and experiences, or some combination of these. From these rather different histories, nevertheless, across the world the issue of violent religiously attributed or influenced radicalisation has arisen most strongly in relation to violent radical Islamist groups.

In this context, our country cases bear some common features and challenges, as well as variations and exceptions. One of these common features is **foreign fighters**. A number of European countries have seen some of their citizens leave to fight in the wars in Iraq and Syria, mostly young men but women also². The highest were from Western Europe and Russia, and although elsewhere in Europe and Australia numbers were lower, foreign fighters

² The phenomenon of foreign fighters is nothing new and is found in relation to a number of different conflicts and situations, although not always attracting the attention and controversy of those here.

still formed a significant issue. Outside Europe, citizens of Indonesia and Malaysia (although lower in the latter) also left to fight in these wars. Numbers were also high from Egypt and Morocco, and Tunisia is thought to have the highest ratio of foreign fighters per capita in the world (Arab, 2019). Although departing foreign fighters might no longer be a significant challenge, what to do with those who left and have returned or might return remains a contentious issue. Indeed, in France most of the attacks in 2015 were by returnees and in Malaysia Afghan war returnees were detained for allegedly trying to overthrow the government through violent means in the name of *Jihad* in the early 2000s.

As well as those leaving to fight abroad, all countries have faced **domestic attacks** in the 2000s and continuing into the 2010s. These have targeted civilians and have involved both high- and low-tech attack methods including suicide or remote bombings, stabbings and shootings, and vehicular rammings. Notable incidents include; the bombings on 7th July 2005 (7/7) in London and the Manchester Arena suicide bombing in 2017, alongside vehicle rammings and stabbings near Westminster in the UK; the Brussels bombings in 2016 in Belgium; a hand grenade explosion at a nightclub in Puchong in Malaysia in 2016; the 2003 Casablanca attacks in Morocco; the Bali bombings targeting a tourist nightclub in Indonesia in 2002; a series of vehicular, stabbing and firearm attacks in Australia between 2014 and 2018; the Paris attacks in 2015; the suicide attack in the centre of Tunis in October 2018 and the double suicide attacks in Tunis in June 2019; bombings at the J. W. Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta and in Indonesia in 2009; and the 2005 Sharm al-Shaikh bomb attack in Egypt. These attacks, moreover, sit alongside an even larger range of disrupted or interdicted terrorist plots.

A further common feature are forms of **identarian, populist, or majoritarian backlash**. In some cases, these have given rise to further attacks by groups or individuals whose actions may not be influenced by or attributed to religion themselves, but which target a religious 'other'. In Europe, this has predominantly come from far-right groups and targeted Muslims, and has been a growing concern for politicians and security bodies in several countries. Germany has in fact been comparatively much less effected than our other European cases when it comes to violent Islamist attacks, but represents "the country in Western Europe with the highest level of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence" (quoted in Ravndal et al. 2020: 17). There has also been something of a political backlash in some states. Far right and populist political parties began to gain ground, often on explicit anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant platforms, the so-called refugee crisis in Europe also being an important aspect of this, and some have observed a mainstreaming of some of these views.

In Muslim majority countries, domestic attacks might be aimed at non-Muslim religious minorities such as the explosion near the Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Cairo in 2015 or the attacks in 2017 on Christians in Tanta, Alexandria, Helwan and Minya, or attacks on Muslims such as the 2017 Sinai mosque attack.. They might also be more concerted efforts directed at changing the political system, especially its religious character, and even operate through the political system. In this sense, these backlashes might be seen as forms of political Islamist populism, and, rather than being attacks by non-Muslims on Muslims,

Muslims are both the perpetrators and targets. In this way the governments' initiatives to eradicate radicalism have aroused severe and intensive backlash from religious groups, especially Muslim ones.

3. Understandings in comparative perspective

When it comes to identifying the main drivers of instances of radicalisation in the country as well as the main understandings that state authorities operate on – as found in policy and strategy documents, for instance – we can outline a tripartite typology of 'schools' of thought. This is presented in Table 1 below and is adapted from WP1 D 1.2 (Hellyer and Grossman), where a discussion of the relevant academic literature can also be found. As will be seen, there are three main points of commonality we can highlight, which, nonetheless, vary in their detail between our cases. The first is the centrality of ideology in general understandings. Related to this is an emphasis on the importance of values in countering radicalisation. The third is an understanding of radicalisation in both violent and, increasingly, non-violent terms. These common points, along with their variance, are discussed in the sub-sections that follow.

3.1 Before applying this typology to our cases, we can briefly note a couple of important factors and further common points. One is **unclear or vague definitions of radicalisation**, causing confusion for practitioners and leaving their interpretation open to misuse, abuse or at least being stretched so far as to absorb and conflate too much. Countries might have clearer definitions when it comes to terrorism, based on acts of violence or their planning, than when it comes to radicalisation, based on ideas, views and values without necessarily translating into acts. The second is that there can also be a **lack of consensus** on definitions even between government departments, as well as between different levels of governmental authority (national and local, for example), although this is not the case everywhere. It is more pronounced, for instance, in Belgium, Germany, the UK and Malaysia, whereas there is perhaps more consistency in BiH, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (even if a coerced consensus in the latter).

Moreover, although the focus here is on government understandings, we should note that civil society organisations are more likely (but by no means exclusively) to emphasise socio-economic conditions, sociocultural and structural issues, alongside other social experiences such as discrimination, exclusion and alienation as prevailing determinants of radicalisation processes or make more intersectional arguments, and criticise the government for their lack of attention to these issues. Some also point to an increase in non-ideological radicalisation, echoing Roy's (2017) argument about the 'Islamisation of radicalism'. This becomes important when such organisations partner with the state to deliver prevention programmes and projects (see section 4).

3.2 Applying our three-school typology to our country case studies we can see a **general emphasis and centrality of ideology** and a comparative neglect of socio-economic and socio-structural issues. This is the case even where we can observe intersectional approaches

that acknowledge both, where government strategy continues to reflect an emphasis towards ideological factors in rhetoric, policies and practice. Islam has come to be the focal point for religiously attributed radical ideologies, yet it is not Islam per se but rather certain forms of Islam that are seen to be particularly strict and intolerant, ‘foreign’ to the context, and that foment violent action. Thus, distinctions are made between acceptable and unacceptable, ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’, ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ Muslims forms of and Islam.

3.2.1 In European countries (a category in which Australia, given its historical alliance with the UK, is included for the purpose of our analysis), where Muslims are a minority, the understandings of what radicalisation is are often contrasted to liberal values. Moreover, these can also take a national form and are seen as an antidote to radicalisation and to which Islamism is antithetical, as in ‘Fundamental British Values’, the idea of ‘values of the Republic’ in France, the core values of ‘lived democracy’ in Germany, and similar features also characterise the Australian emphasis on liberal rights. We also find emphases on British, French, Belgian or German Islam, for instance, less reliant on foreign influence and more in step with the cultural and political values of European nation states.

Table 1: Schools of understanding radicalisation

Schools	Features
the ideological school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideas (religious or non-religious) are held as the inspiration for or equivalent of the ideology in question: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ specific religion(s) seen as responsible for radicalisation ○ a particular interpretation or methodology of religion (or of a sub-set coming under a broader religious tradition) is seen as responsible for enabling and legitimating radicalisation ○ political motivations, especially linked to forms of exclusivist nationalism or supremacism, are seen as the salient factor ○ political motivations might draw on a religious register (historical or civilisational) or target (a particular) religion
the social experience school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • socio-economic conditions and other social experiences are the prevailing determinants of radicalisation processes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ sociocultural structural issues that affect people’s social relationality, economic disadvantage and exclusion ○ includes social and political disenfranchisement, exclusion, discrimination, humiliation and rejection that result
the intersectional school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • social experience (social and political disenfranchisement, exclusion, discrimination, humiliation and rejection) are key drivers for radicalisation to violence but requires alignment with ideological frames <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ extremist ideology is nurtured by alienating and dehumanising social experience but ideology provides a framing of perceived antidotes to these experiences ○ different contexts or cases within a given context may be better captured by different emphases (some might be more ideological, some more to do with social experience, some a mixture of the two)

One of the main points of ideological focus is the Saudi-origin school of Salafism, or what is commonly referred to as Wahhabism³ as the particular problematic form of Islam that needs addressing because it is held to contrast starkly with liberal values, and is found throughout discourse in our European country cases.

This focus on ideology is further represented through shifts in understanding that can be observed in some countries, from a focus on violent acts, to a concern with ‘radicalisation’ as the process towards violence, to a greater focus on pre-criminal extremism as beliefs that are associated with the radicalisation process. In some cases then, especially those most affected by domestic attacks, notably France and the UK, the identified threat has come to include *non-violent* extremism. Germany and Australia provide something of a contrast here, however, and it is perhaps worth highlighting that they have faced far fewer and less severe violent attacks.

A range of factors that contribute towards an individual being vulnerable to extremist ideologies have become increasingly acknowledged. Nevertheless, while these might present flashes of something more intersectional, and the idea that extremist ideology is nurtured by alienating and dehumanising social experience, there is a continued centrality of ideology, antidotes to which continue to remain foremost. It would seem that the intersectional nuance takes a back seat when it comes to actually constructing policy.

In some European states there has been a more recent shift in emphasis to now also include the far-right under the scope of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This is not a shift away from ideological factors but rather a shift that acknowledges that ideological factors might be political as much as or even rather than religious, and that threats posed by radicalisation are not solely, or even mainly, related to radical extremist Islamists.

3.2.2 Muslim majority countries also distinguish between different forms and interpretations of Islam, and thus between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam/Muslims, although in ways notably different from European cases and related to the very different place of Islam in these contexts. The focus can still be Salafism/Wahhabism (as outlined above) and other focuses include Brotherhood style modernist Salafism.

Looking first at our South and South East Asia cases, in Malaysia Salafism/Wahhabism is held responsible for violent terrorist narratives and this has also come to encompass non-violent groups, particularly those opposed to the government, and that stands opposite to ‘moderation’ (*wasatiyyah*). In contrast to the discourse found in Europe, however, this extends to include ‘liberal Muslims’, putting violent groups and groups of liberal Muslims under one unifying category of extremism. The former prime minister, Najib Razak, for

³ For shorthand this will from now on be referred to as Salafism/Wahhabism.

instance, launched blistering attacks on the ideologies of ‘human rights-ism’, ‘liberalism’, ‘secularism’, ‘humanism’, and ‘pluralism’ as growing threats to Islam.

In Indonesia, a consequence of the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 was a rise in religious conflicts generated by political contestation and religious radicalism, which has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of Muslim forms of populism. A shift has taken place in Indonesia over time to reflect the threat from radical groups, who have switched focus from global and foreign arenas to domestic ones (Mbai, 2015; Gerges, 2009) and which as a result pose a threat to the state-sanctioned form of Islam. The Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, defines radicalism as “an ideology willing to replace the state’s ideology by means resisting rules of law, infiltrating young generations’ thought”. As a result, regardless of religion, anyone committing such acts is called ‘radical’.

3.2.3 Turning to the MENA region, Morocco’s conception of terrorism is without reference to any religion. Yet, following the Casablanca attack, associated with Salafi groups, the state promoted Maliki thought and Moroccan Sufism against ‘foreign’ forms, notably Salafism⁴.

In Tunisia the focus has also been on Salafi groups, especially Hizb-ut-Tahrir. After Tunisian youth joined Salafi-jihadi groups abroad following 9/11 and in 2002 Salafi-jihadists attacked a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba, the Ben Ali regime entered into a full war against Salafi jihadism. Yet, the Salafi jihadist movement grew in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011 and more groups emerged to fill the void that was left by the security vacuum. Some members of the most organised post-2011 Salafi-Jihadist group, Ansar al-Sharia, have engaged in violence by targeting security forces and secular political figures, despite the groups official position being peaceful within Tunisia (albeit not elsewhere). In August 2013, the then Prime Minister, Ali Larayedh, declared Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization which led to the arrest of more than 6,500 young people and also prompted many other Jihadi Salafists to leave the country for Libya or Syria, most of them joining the ‘Islamic State’ group (ISIS) in Libya.

In Egypt, both the state and civil society agree that extremist Islamism poses a serious threat, although the focus is very much violent rather than non-violent forms; for instance, hate speech towards Coptic Christians receives little attention. Yet, Egypt contrasts in relation to the above cases and their emphasis on domestic Islamist political groups. Ideologically the influence of foreign powers and interests is commonly held to be the root of the problem, rather than any specifically Islamist ideology or agenda. Salafi political groups like Hizb al-Nour are not so problematised, even though they are not generally regarded as normative, which is the domain of the Azhari religious establishment to identify. In different fora, privately and publicly, Egyptian security officials have stated they view religiously inspired radicalisation in the country as at least partially the product of a Western conspiracy against them, and that it can only be eradicated with force.

⁴ See, for instance, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/62463>

3.3 What has come to be the main concern for states discussed above, and that is important for the understandings outlined, is the issue of what has in some contexts been called the ‘home-grown’ problem. In Europe this has been particularly focussed on foreign transnational links and influences. A significant part answer put forward by European states relies on the issue of shared values and ensuring that everyone can and (perhaps more emphatically from a policy perspective) does share those values.

Outside Europe, foreign influence as a distortion of values, although here the correct Islamic rather than liberal values, has also been a feature, and also often been tied to Salafism/Wahhabism. Yet, there are further important strands. One is the role the West, as actors influencing and manipulating as in Egypt, or ‘Western ideas’, as foreign and inappropriate as in Malaysia, are perceived to play. And both of these points relate to the greater direct political threat that becomes associated with radicalism, that is of political parties or groups attempting to seize political power in the country and attempting to redefine the values on which the state operates.

4. Radicalisation and the governance of religious diversity: responses in comparative perspective

This section now turns to state responses to (violent) religiously attributed radicalisation and, in particular, the relationship between the governance of religious diversity and (violent) religiously attributed radicalisation. There are two main considerations: on the one hand, whether particular forms of governance make (violent) radicalisation more likely, and on the other hand, how this radicalisation affects the governance of religious diversity. The key issue addressed in this section is whether and how the modes of accommodation and governance of religious diversity (identified in D5.1) can be seen to make a difference to state responses to radicalisation. The guiding questions are, therefore, what features of the governance of religious diversity (from our table of modes and norms) can be seen pronounced in state responses to radicalisation? What kind of effects is this having for religious diversity and freedom of religion (enhancing/restricting)?

4.1 Links between state governance of religion and violent radicalisation

In approaching these questions, we can first note that connections between the governance of religious diversity and violent radicalisation is an area of research that has received scant attention so far. The findings from existing studies that in some and various ways address this issue do not yet form a coherent body of work and therefore a typology of the type presented in section 3 for understandings of radicalisation, derived from a substantial body of existing research, is not possible. Most studies that discuss links between state action and terrorism (not radicalisation) come from conflict and grievance studies, and focus on collective action responses to state violence against a group and whether religion can be said to be a catalyst for violence (for example, Lyall 2009; Kalyvas, 2006), rather than the possible role of modes of secularism and state-religion relations as such. Moreover, the focus on armed conflict and collective action between a group and state in these studies does not fit the kinds of attacks

linked to ISIS and very loose influence-affiliation based relations. This is further complicated by examples we have seen in some countries in the MENA region and South and South East Asia, where violence might emanate from groups within the dominant religious tradition rather than from minority religious groups. It has in fact been suggested, in reference to Copts in Egypt, that a history and normalisation of discrimination and marginalisation can cause groups to not protest (whether violently or non-violently) against their situation and treatment (Fox, 2000), but this gives us little to go on when members of minorities do undertake such action, whether as part of an organised collective or individually.

Within these areas, findings for whether a state's discrimination against religious population provokes violence in response are at best very mixed. Some find it does (Kalyvas, 2006; Ababa and Taydas, 2011), but other studies suggest that control or oppressive measures by the state can suppress or does not lead to violence (ibid; El-Katiri, 2013; Hazelton, 2017), or even that it does both (Wang, 2016). Some studies point to certain conditions that need to be present in order for retaliatory violence to occur. These might include, for example, religious identities overlapping with other (such as ethnic) identities, political exclusion (Bassedau et al. (2016), or weak of state institutions (Muchlinski, 2014). There is then, however, no indication of how to explain different levels of violence between similarly stable states and any possible connection to how these states govern religious diversity – how do we explain the relative absence of radical extremist Islamism in Germany compared to the UK and France, for instance, especially when previous research has found that it has poorer relations with its non-Christian religions than its neighbours (Großbölting, 2017: 240)? With a focus on collective action engaged with the state, there is also nothing about the targeting of minorities (by groups from the majority, such as far-right attacks on Muslims, or by other minorities, such as attacks by Muslims targeting Jews) or more indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians. It also gives us no way of approaching some of the patterns of majoritarian identerianism discussed above. These kinds of issues simply haven't yet been explored in this literature.

One recent study that has addressed this question more directly is by Peter Henne (2019), who used increased deaths from terrorist acts as his measure for terrorism and a series of government restriction and interference measures (such as on places of worship, religious organisations, activity in public facilities such as hospitals and prisons, on preaching content, funding, religious political parties). As Henne himself emphasises though, the findings are at an early stage and are as yet an undeveloped area of study. His findings and indications, nevertheless, provide a couple of interesting points of reference for our discussions below.

Overall, Henne finds that there is a very mixed or inconclusive picture when looking at government interference in religious institutions. One significant measure relates to restrictions on religious political parties, where interference corresponds to increased deaths from terrorism. However, he finds that when government measures of control *increase or intensify*, there is a correlative increase in deaths from terrorism, but this is only the case in the relationship between increased government control of and interference in *majority* religious institutions, but *not in minority* religions. Notable also, however, is that Henne does

not look at where the increase in violence comes from; that is whether they are attacks by religiously influenced groups or reactions from other groups. An earlier study, by contrast, finds a link between state involvement and restrictions for both majority and minority religions and terrorism (Saiya, 2016) and so again, we have a mixed picture on this relationship.

From this, nevertheless, we might expect to see some of the following:

- Interference by weak states with weak institutional structures = more violence directed at the state
- Increased state interference in majority/minority religion = more violence
- State interference in religious political parties = more violence

As we have seen, existing work in this area is scarce and mostly indirect to our main concerns. These few highlighted points, however, will form points of reference below where we explore what might be said for the effects of religiously attributed (violent) radicalisation on the governance of religious diversity.

Section 4.2 briefly discusses legislative responses across the different regions, before the longer second section turns to recap our modes of governance and discuss institutional measures at greater length. Here the sections are organised by region and around the dominant mode of the governance of religious diversity, as laid out in D5.1. In this way our European cases are broken into three sub-sections, with Australia making a fourth. The sections discuss how these modes relate to the understandings, trends and responses detailed in the previous sections. Section 4.3 then goes on to draw out relevant comparisons between regions/country cases on this basis. It should be noted that the purpose is not to suggest a causal connection between modes of governance and (violent) religiously attributed radicalisation as the trends already discussed do not point to such a connection. Rather, the discussion and way of proceeding presents an analytical approach to assessing how state responses take the shape they do and what kind of effects can be seen.

4.2 One instrument that all countries have used to address terrorism as well as radicalisation is legislation, and this has occurred in two main ways. Countries with existing terrorism related legislation have strengthened and expanded existing laws, and in ways that have brought radicalisation into its remit. All countries have also introduced new legislation specifically addressing aspects and issues around radicalisation. Legislation has been strengthened or introduced across the different countries covering areas such as detention times of suspects, providing or receiving training, dissemination of material, limitations on travel, measures against finance, increased powers of deportation and citizenship removal, different parole and release rules for those convicted of terror-related crimes, the criminalisation of foreign fighters, and, in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, and Morocco, the death penalty applies to terror offences⁵. As states have developed more

⁵ The Tunisian president recently called for its use following a decades-old moratorium, and terror offences are included.

comprehensive strategies and suites of responses, so the ideology based understanding of (violent) radicalisation can be seen through links between prevention and security, which have become integral to these strategies and responses, and with them sharp criticisms of a squeeze on civil liberties and curtailment of human rights.

4.2.1 Looking at our European cases, responses to Islamist extremism have largely developed out of earlier measures and different terrorist threats, in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland in UK, as a reaction to activities of left-wing groups in Germany, the GIA in France, for a few examples. A raft of new measures have also been introduced in each country, addressing, but not limited to, the areas listed above, and France declared a state of emergency in 2015 after the Paris attacks, which was not lifted until 2017 after being extended five times.

An important area of legislation has also grown in each country that can be seen to conflate, or at least provide a strong link between, radicalisation (through prevention measures) and terrorism (through security measures). These measures have been especially controversial. Criticisms point to conflating the issue of social cohesion and terrorism, thus stigmatising Muslim communities and threatening their sense of belonging and cultural security within the national fabric (Aly et al. 2015; Cherney & Murphy 2016), as well as how other issues, such as domestic violence or mental health issues, for instance, come to be drawn into a radicalisation framework that is inappropriate for addressing them. Commenting on the UK Prevent strategy, but relevant elsewhere also, it has been described as the securitization of social services and policy (Ragazzi, 2017; Sabir, 2017; Jarvis & Lister, 2013: 661). Belgium too brought in similar measures following the attacks in Paris in 2015 (see 4.2.1 below).

A final important area of legislation emerging in some of these countries in this context is bans on some religious practices (such as religious ritual slaughter of animals) and clothing (such as head and face coverings), although these are discussed further in the sections below under 4.3.

4.2.2 The legislative context in parts of the MENA region was rather different as the consequences of the Arab Spring meant more wholesale legal reforms were negotiated, both Tunisia and Egypt enacted new constitutions in the 2010s, for instance. Radicalisation was addressed in the constitution in Egypt and in Tunisia brought in in 2015 to replace earlier laws from 2003. Morocco introduced its first terrorism law in 2003, following the Casablanca bombings.

4.2.3 In our South East Asian country cases, legislation in this area has also expanded and been criticised for its political effects and uses in restricting civil liberties. Indonesia introduced terrorism decrees in the early 2000s in response to the Bali bombings and Malaysia replaced earlier legislation, going back to 1960, with updated Acts in the 2010s. In Indonesia, as some Islamist groups conducted a widespread campaign to reject Pancasila as a state philosophy, the meaning of radicalism was extended to organizations or religious groups seen as having potential to become radical. In Malaysia, the Security Offences (Special

Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) and The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (Malaysia 2015, POTA), have raised considerable concern over limiting human rights and civil liberties.

4.3 Institutional responses again reflect the significance of ideology to state understandings and responses. They have seen the creation of new institutions in the social and repressive spheres – and has been a key instrument through which security, cohesion and welfare have become connected. Across our country cases the number of government agencies, departments and bodies that are part of the counter-terrorism apparatus has become spread across security, policing and social agencies and departments. New agencies and departments have also been created to monitor and coordinate responses between this large number of institutional actors and deradicalisation bodies have been set up. It is in this area also that we can see systematic collaboration with civil society actors in some cases, but where criticisms and accusations of securitization can also be seen clearly.

As well as expanding and strengthening state institutional infrastructure and institutional links between government and civil society organisations, institutions, such as Muslim organisations or mosques, have also been targeted for extra measures of control and scrutiny across our country cases.

The following section now turns to discuss these trends and measures in relation to our modes and norms of the governance of religious diversity, and includes reflections on the points raised in 4.1 above. Each sub-section first shows the relevant mode with its constituent norms before detailing responses in the country cases covered by that mode and highlighting points of comparison and contrast under the general trends just noted.

4.3.1 The UK, Germany and Belgium

<p>The UK Germany Belgium</p>	<p>5. Moderate Secularism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moral individualism – freedom of conscience • Religions may enjoy equal or unequal status but all are officially and socially tolerated • Religion seen as a public good in need of support (funding state schools) • Religion might also be seen as in need of regulation (to match some prevailing values eg, issues of women bishops/single sex marriage) eg social attitudes that undermine tolerance and respect for religion and religious diversity (in interfaith and with sec.) • Mutual autonomy but restricted neutrality, including ‘weak’ establishment and unequal recognition • Generally accessible/dialogical reasons
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Two types of response have been evident in our Western European countries characterised by moderate secularism, on the one hand, a more accommodationist, multicultural response, and on the other, a more radically secularist and ‘muscular liberalism’ more intolerant of such visible and audible religion in the public sphere (Modood, 2019). What we can see in relation

to our mode of moderate secularism is that the more diversity restricting measures and aspects, of interference and regulation, have become more prominent, particularly those that are grounded in the mode of Freedom of Religion, stressing liberal values and challenging the public presence of religious difference and its expression. This has not, however, meant the severing of SRCs but rather a revising of the character and relations between state and Muslim groups/organisations.

On the one hand, both formal and informal accommodations and connections have occurred between states and their Muslim populations and these gradual processes of institutionalisation represent in some ways the institutional accommodation of religious diversity and a difference-sensitive identity recognition. In the UK, since 2005 the government has increasingly recognised as well as had a strong hand in creating a more diversified ‘democratic constellation’ of groups it engages with; Germany has sought, through the German Islam Conference, to engage with a variety of Muslim groups, the first Muslim groups have begun to gain public corporation status (something devolved to the regions), and informal arrangements have been in place in some areas where formal connections are absent, especially in education; Belgium too, after a protracted process going back to 1974, has seen a representative institution established, the Belgian Muslim Executive (BME).

Nevertheless, these institutional accommodations are also marked by contexts characterised by fears over radicalisation and terrorism. As such, the process of institutionalisation has become part of processes of (de)politicisation and securitization, representing the view that religion, or at least Islam, requires greater intervention and regulation; although government-based restrictions on religions have fluctuated (Pew), rises have generally been associated with security-oriented moves related to radicalisation and extremism.

Different standards have been applied to different types of radicalisation, with Muslims coming under the greatest scrutiny and far right extremism only more recently becoming a focus. In Belgium, despite prevention being a devolved competence, following the Paris attacks, Local Integrated Security Cells – panels comprising representatives from social prevention services as well as repressive forces in order to collaborate – were brought in. In the UK the statutory duty under the CTSA 2015 and Prevent for public bodies to refer those deemed to be at risk of radicalization has been most controversial for stigmatising Muslims. As a result, a regulative function developed with a focus on Muslims has also come to have a broader effect on general prevention work and social services as more direct links between prevention, welfare and security become entrenched and more issues (such as domestic violence, for example) come to be drawn into a prevention framework.

Whether such strategies and the resulting breakdowns in trust between governments and their Muslim populations mean that the strategies themselves are able to be reformed remains a point of controversy. For example, the recent appointment of William Shawcross as the Independent Reviewer of Prevent in the UK has been seen as a sign the government does not take these issues seriously and has provoked a large backlash and hundreds of Muslim, anti-

racism and rights organisations are boycotting the review as a result, on the grounds that Shawcross himself has made Islamophobic statements and the outcome of the review is prejudged.

There has also been a skew towards Muslims in the framework of radicalisation under which much government funding is provided to civil society organisations to run de- or counter-extremism programmes. In Germany, one of its flagship de-radicalisation programme (EXIT), which was adapted for Islamist extremism from 2008, is funded by the government but independent of it. Government funding for a wide variety of counter-radicalisation programmes is administered locally in all three countries, and these are often social programmes and programmes to do with identity exploration more generally that operate autonomously. Civil society organisations delivering the government's strategy, therefore, often do so flexibly, cautioning against a simple narrative of top-down imposition (for example, O'Toole et al. 2012, 2013, 2016). This is not without controversy as civil society organisations have greatly varied in their response to funding under a radicalisation framework. Some have outright refused to take it, whereas others believe that improvements have been made, especially as attention has increasingly included far-right radicalisation, and that given the flexibility they enjoy, taking the money to run their programmes is not a problem.

A further controversial connection has been one between security concerns and integration and cohesion policies. For example, in the UK, organisations accepting government funding might also be expected to sign up to promoting FBVs through their programmes and projects, although this is not exclusive to religious organisations.

From the above we have already begun to see how measures addressing radicalisation have focussed on Muslims to a large degree and come to alter relations between states and their Muslim populations. In terms of state-religion connections, the focus on ideology, where this relates to religion, has meant that counter-narratives to radicalisation have heavily emphasised secular liberal values. As a result, extra conditions have been put in place for Muslim organisations that are a direct result of the context coloured by radicalisation. Levels of interference and regulation in the affairs of Muslim organisations have been higher than for other religious groups and various types of conditions have been imposed to ensure organisations oppose radicalisation and uphold these values, and these are often measures that are not required for other religious organisations or groups.

Muslim organisations enjoy a politically contingent relationship with the UK government, where the state might pick and choose which groups it works with and which it doesn't based on the alignment of political positionings, and organisations may fall in and out of favour for consultation depending on their stance on various issues. The Belgian government played an active role in the selection of candidates for the representative body the Muslim Executive in liaison with the security services, and mosques have come under greater scrutiny and regulation than applies to other religious places of worship. The Brussels attacks prompted the government to 'take back' the Grand Mosque in Brussels, which had been leased rent free

to Saudi Arabia since 1967, over concerns it was promoting radical forms of Salafism and as part of moves to end foreign influence over how Islam is taught and preached in Belgium. The mosque's administration was handed to the Muslim Executive. In Flanders, in order to be recognized, mosques, unlike other places of worship, must have written documents stating and proving their commitment to a) their use of Dutch as their lingua operandi (with the exception of the Khutba), b) their respect for the Constitution and basic rights and liberties, and c) their not being involved in terrorist activities (Adam and Torreken, 2015). Germany, shortly after 9/11, passed reforms restricting the rights of religious and ideological associations, although in terms of how the governance of religion affects and interacts with the occurrence of radicalisation and the state's responses to it, Germany sees significant variation across the country due to its federal model.

A final common feature is the desire to 'indigenise' Islam; to help foster a British, German, Belgian Islam – and many of the institutional and contractual arrangements and conditions already mentioned include this as one of their aims.

Further measures adopted, while sharing some common processes, have not been entirely consistent across our moderately secular country cases. A key difference is measures that specifically limit the public presence, or at least visibility, of Muslims. This is exemplified by debates over the headscarf and face coverings. Belgium introduced a criminal ban on face-covering in the public sphere in 2011, provoked by the desire to outlaw the wearing of the *niqab*. Although a general ban on head coverings has not been brought in, such bans have appeared in rather ad hoc and inconsistent ways. Headscarf bans have been introduced for employees of the French Community Parliament when in contact with the public, as have other local municipalities, although a general public sector ban has not been brought in, despite proposals for such a ban. Belgium has also banned ritual slaughter, which also affects Jews. In Germany bans were placed on teachers wearing headscarves in some regions, although not pupils. In the UK, by contrast, such bans have not become serious political issues.

While the measures discussed above have affected the character and conditions of state-religion connections, they have not prevented them. Moreover, a recent study comparing the response of Christian groups in Germany and the US to recent rises in populism (Cremer, 2021) found that the dominant Christian churches in Germany acted as an effective bulwark against identarian popularism in a way not possible in the US. These findings suggest formal forms of state-religion connections of the kind found in countries of moderate secularism, Cremer refers to Germany's approach as 'benevolent neutrality', can play a productive role against more extremist movements.

What we see from our discussions of these countries so far then is that the regulatory aspects of moderate secularism along with the liberal and secular character of the country become enhanced. These features, however, are not so much a part of the governance of religious diversity in general as much as they are about the governance of Islam. This is contextual though, as is also suggested by previous approaches towards NRMs; while particular

religions may come in and out of focus for particular attention, the general picture where religion is seen as a public good has held.

4.3.2 France

France	2. Secularist Statism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State control of religion • The state excludes religion from the political and the civic, confining religious freedom largely to the private sphere • May include some support of some religions, but religion mainly seen as belonging to the private sphere
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France bears some similarities with the three countries discussed in the previous section, particularly in regard to aspects of institutionalisation and indigenisation; part of the role of organisations such as the CFCM has been to monitor and domesticate Islam, for instance. Yet, given its quite different stance towards religion in general, there are also important differences emanating from France's conception of *laïcité*. In terms of how the governance of religion affects and interacts with the occurrence of radicalisation and the state's responses to it, it is noticeable that based on the principle of *laïcité*, France emphasises social cohesion founded in a civic nationhood, which is seen as antithetical to 'sectarian' or religious belonging. With the debate about violent radicalisation having increasingly become a 'French' problem and no longer a 'foreign' one (as it was perceived in the 1980s and 1990s), the uneasiness of France in accommodating religious minorities has turned the public debate around radicalisation into an issue that centres a strong identarian-citizenship approach, much more than in other EU countries.

This makes formal partnerships between religious institutions and counter-terrorism officials difficult with the result that the French state was slow in comparison to much of Western Europe in developing a prevention strategy and until 2014 did not seriously consider radicalization an issue that required intervention or rehabilitation initiatives (Hellmuth, 2015a). National action plans to combat terrorism and 'prevent radicalisation' have been developed and updated since. Direct work with civil society (mostly on education and employment, but also in offering specialised support for at-risk youth) also exists but tends to come through funding provided to local authorities and is focussed on poorer areas.

This has also meant that laws banning 'ostentatious religious symbols', in public schools, and face coverings in public places, although provoked by and targeted at Muslims, had a wider effect. As well as Muslims, pupils of other faiths were also expelled from schools, for instance. This has shifted recently, however, with measures that specifically target only Muslims and 'Islamist separatism [*separatism islamiste*]' (Hafidi 2020). Following the beheading of schoolteacher Samuel Paty, the French state approved a new controversial 'anti-separatism' bill to fight radical Islamism (December 2020) and promoted a Charter outlining a brand of national 'enlightened Islam' which has been signed by the French Council of the Muslim Faith, but has been widely seen as a top-down imposed measure aimed at increasing

the state’s control over Muslims. The charter is not without precedent, Muslim associations, for instance, are required to sign a declaration of adherence to its principles under the Constitution, going back to the early 1990s (Cesari, 2002: 341) similar to elsewhere in the region. Yet, these recent measures represent a significant strengthening of these types of measures. Mosques and Muslim organisations, some engaged in anti-racism work, have been shut down and the Charter established a body that will train imams allowed to preach in France (although state sponsored imam training programmes are also found in the countries above). The control of religions that is a core part of secularist statism has, therefore, become enhanced, and, notably has in some respects affected religious diversity as such, while more recent measures have focussed on Muslims in particular.

4.3.4 Australia

<p>3. Freedom of Religion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moral individualism – freedom of conscience • Religions may enjoy equal or unequal status but all are officially and socially tolerated
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In terms of how the governance of religion relates to radicalisation, Australia does not seek to suppress expressions of religion provided these do not impinge upon the rights or freedoms of others, nor are these in any way configured at the level of governance as being a threat to Australia’s secular democracy. In fact, we might Australia’s general mode as also undergirded by a form of multiculturalism (Levey, 2017).

Australia was an early adopter of CVE approaches in practice as well as in name. In 2014, shift in emphasis in the government’s CVE policy framework, while maintaining its earlier central focus on resilience, moved from broad-brush community prevention to more targeted identification and intervention with persons deemed to be at risk of radicalisation (Commonwealth of Australia 2015: 9). A government review of counter-terrorism policy and program architecture highlighted the importance of community involvement for future initiatives, including the developing challenge of returnees from conflict zones, and underlined the importance of including communities as equal partners in future CVE initiatives. A wide range of community groups and organisations are periodically or regularly engaged in or consulted about various CVE programs by Commonwealth and State or Territory governments, with a 2015 government review of Australia’s counter-terrorism policy and program architecture highlighted the importance of community involvement (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p. 32). As with the UK and Belgium, while some service providers were willing to engage in professional practices that could help people who were radicalising to violent extremism, others were reluctant to do so for reputational reasons or because they feared a reduction in client willingness to engage with services and other adverse community responses.

Australia, as our European country cases, has also seen anti-Muslim movements emerge, protesting against mosques, halal food and so on. The combination of social pressures questioning their place in society (Akbarzadeh 2016), along with media, political and policy discourse and scrutiny has meant that Muslims in Australia have experienced a high level of pressure and alienation from broader society, even as Australian Muslims themselves show overall high levels of belief in Islam's compatibility with Australian norms and diversity (Dunn et al. 2015).

4.3.3 WEA and violent radicalisation

Completing this picture of Western Europe with Australia, we can now reflect on the points raised in section 4.1. With regard to Henne's findings, we must first highlight that the increased measures of control and regulation in these cases are in relation to a minority religion and not the majority, with perhaps the slight exception of France's law on ostentatious religious symbols in public schools which had an effect wider than Muslims, so we might not expect to see increased violence in response. Nevertheless, while there have been periods of increased violent acts, it is difficult to suggest that this is a result of changes in governance. The reverse appears just as likely to be true and other factors such as foreign policy play a role; references to the shedding of Muslim blood and oppression abroad or solidarity with ISIS or the Ummah, for instance. Moreover, some attacks were carried out by recently arrived asylum seekers and the Charlie Hebdo attacks and murder of Samuel Paty point not so much to norms of governance characterised by *laïcité* as to cultural and narrative *laïcité* where the ridicule of minorities is staunchly upheld. Yet, the UK and France's existing modes of governance are very different in terms of regulation and interference, as well as in this cultural aspect which is present but weaker in the UK, and they have both also increased or intensified aspects of these existing modes in different ways. Yet both have suffered serious and high levels of violent attacks, and Belgium has higher degrees of interference and Australia lower levels of accommodation than the UK but both have faced fewer attacks. The far-right has been more of a concern in Germany but again, this can hardly be seen to emanate from state interference in how religious diversity is governed, other than wanting greater exclusion for Muslims – and we noted above that SRCs can serve to limit the political appeal and purchase of these movements.

4.3.5 BiH and Russia

BiH Russia	1. Majoritarian Nationalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong state identification with one religion; but not usually theocratic • May or may not include toleration for other religions • May or may not include personal laws • In radical cases the state takes over or controls the institutions and followers of one or more religions (e.g. Diyanet)
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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The state may come to be controlled by religious parties (e.g. AKP, Muslim Brotherhood)
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Our two European cases of majoritarian nationalism, albeit BiH is distinct in how this looks, exert strong forms of control over the religious sphere, with greater limiting impacts for religious diversity more generally than those countries characterised by moderate secularism, and more akin to the secularist statism of France in terms of the impact measures provoked by (violent) radicalisation have exerted more generally and more specifically for Muslims.

In Russia, on the whole, inherited Soviet totalitarian methods for controlling the population are still in favour today. Since 2010, Russian authorities started actively including and encouraging some NGOs to participate or even to run extremism and terrorism prevention programs and the Federal government entitled local authorities to design their own preventive programs and strategies, in accordance with the general guidance. Yet, civil society is trusted in countering or preventing radicalization only to the extent to which it collaborates with law enforcers. Those NGOs that receive funds for their activities from abroad are obliged to self-declare being foreign agents, a label assigned to them by law that bears a very negative connotation. Most programmes are informative-educative and ideological-repressive with the aim of stopping or reversing the trend of radicalization. Domestically, Russia uses the threat of terrorism to take under control the flows of information and the independent providers of the social networking platforms. After 2014, when the state parliament Duma expanded the Extremism Law, again making it possible for the authorities to ban websites and social media companies without a court order, Russia reportedly banned a number of Western analytical websites.⁶Closing Salafi mosques is also a practice that was widely used in the North Caucasus. Regular police raids during Friday collective prayers would result in detention of the believers, most of whom would be released after a few hours of detention or interrogation.

But Russia's response to radicalisation, expanded to include non-violent extremism from 2007, and its securitised approach has had wider ramifications than Muslims and Islam – Jehovah's Witnesses, having long been marginalised and vilified, have also been branded as extremist by the Supreme Court. Faced with the problem of the inflow of the new religions and radicalization in the 1990s, Russia adopted laws that imposed additional regulation for registering religious organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation with the effect, according to Verkhovski (2010), of marginalizing minority religious groups and forcing them to move underground. Thus, while the dominant Orthodox Church has become increasingly close to state authorities, religious minorities, especially 'non-traditional' groups where they are seen as a threat to the state, have become increasingly restricted. In fact, Russia has scored 'very high' on Pew's government restrictions index for the last decade, in contrast to

⁶ [New era of censorship as Russia bans news websites | News | The Week UK](#)

all other European cases covered here, which, with the exception of France at high, have fluctuated around moderate level.

BiH represents a slightly different case of majoritarian nationalism in that it is primarily sub-state within separate ethno-religious communities. In this regard, the very structure of the state of BiH has led to a deepening of socio-economic challenges which have largely shaped radicalisation tendencies in the country. The state's failure to address religious tensions at the entity level has strengthened religious hatred and harassment.

Considering the federal character of BiH, counter-radicalisation efforts have been marked by challenges in coordination and with synchronizing the legal system of BiH as an entire state. From 2017 onwards intra-actor coordination and collaboration between security agencies, policymaking institutions, counter-radicalisation practitioners, academics and NGOs have improved. Partnerships have been launched between the state, international organisations (such as the IOM, the OSCE) and religious communities resulting in prevention programmes. Some of these programmes have focused on developing resilience and others have focused more on addressing drivers of radicalisation. Non-governmental projects, however, seem to have lower popularity and potential for including wider communities and larger target groups (Turcalo and Veljan, 2018, p.20).

The state's main regulatory body for all religious groups and organisations, self-identifying as Muslim, is the Islamic Community (IC). Its main responsibilities include the oversight of religious practice and representation of the Muslim population, but it also holds a preventative function, and has called for state intervention in halting the operations of unregistered, therefore illegal, Salafi mosques (US Department of State, 2016: 6). Different religious communities have also been active in counter-radicalisation efforts, and the processes of violent radicalisation (inspired by religious motives in some cases) in BiH have provoked some changes in religious matters in the country. For one thing, they highlighted the importance of religious institutions on matters which are of high significance to the peace in BiH and the state. While unresolved ethno-religious dynamics have remained largely unaddressed after the Bosnian war, radicalisation and violent extremism have necessitated common prevention efforts on the side of religious communities exemplified through participation in community prevention projects by local imams and Orthodox priests.

In these ways, some of the approaches towards radicalisation have highlighted the delicate nature of mutual autonomy of the state and religious institutions, the ways in which religion simultaneously shows up as a public good and a threat in need of regulation, as well as the ease with which the state can impose its control over the actions of religious institutions. The responses to radicalisation have shown the capacity of the state to impose conditions and even control over religious matters. In this regard, the state issued a warning/ultimatum that unless the Islamic Community (IC) took action to bridle the activity of Muslim communities outside of its control, and where radicalisation was occurring, the state would intervene. Such a warning forced the Islamic Community of BiH to reassure its authority by creating a Platform of Cooperation of the Islamic Community as well as take firm action in limiting the

activity of these communities, eventually, terminating the activities of and incorporated around 90% of them under its official structure. It is important to note that the Islamic Community took action only under pressure and outright threat of intervention by state authorities. This example suggests that despite a seeming façade of mutual autonomy, under extreme circumstances, the state can exhibit the capacity and will to take outright control over religious matters, with forceful actions if needed.

4.4 MENA

Egypt Tunisia Morocco	1. Majoritarian Nationalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong state identification with one religion; but not usually theocratic • May or may not include toleration for other religions • May or may not include personal laws • In radical cases the state takes over or controls the institutions and followers of one or more religions (e.g. Diyanet) • The state may come to be controlled by religious parties (e.g. AKP, Muslim Brotherhood)
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In the MENA region, similar to our European cases, the more restrictive features of the general mode of governance of religious diversity have become more pronounced. Characterised by majoritarian nationalism, our three country cases in the MENA region have all seen much greater state control exerted over the religious sphere. As Muslim majority countries, however, this has also seen the enhancing of ‘official’ forms of Islam (Robbins and Rubin, 2017). This has taken a majoritarian form of Islamic identity bound to the state, laws and politics, which has effects both for religious minorities, freedom of religion, and Muslims who do not adhere to the state sanctioned Islam. Thus, state control of religion is bound up with state control of the political sphere. This is also reflected in Pew’s government restrictions index, on which Morocco and Egypt both score ‘very high’ and Tunisia scores ‘high’. State control can also be seen in that turning to the MENA region, we find far less developed civil society organisational involvement in de-/counter-radicalisation work in collaboration with the government (a result of mass repression), along with a less expansive governmental institutional response, which instead relies on existing structures and institutions.

Egypt’s counter-radicalisation responses have so far been fully state-dominated. The Egyptian state is involved at every level, and political freedoms are limited, under a deep securitisation model emanating from an Egyptian specific type of ‘war on terror’, under which religious diversity receives little protection or support and any groups critical of the state face harsh and restrictive measures. The accusation of deviancy made in Egypt is aimed particularly at those connected to the Muslim Brotherhood movement, if they are also anti-Egyptian state. Following the eruption of the Arab Spring, between 2012-2013, the Muslim

Brotherhood, Salafis and other Islamist groups struck deals with the military to expedite national elections and opened dozens of news outlets and channels, many of which openly incited violence against Muslims who were not supportive of the Brotherhood, the Copts and other opponents, resulting in an uptick in sectarian tensions and violence. After the military suspended the democratic experiment in 2013 and arrested then President Mohammed Morsi, it launched a widescale crackdown on a number of different types of Islamists and political opponents; the Muslim Brotherhood has had its assets stripped and seized, alongside being condemned as a terrorist movement. These events set off a chain reaction of terror attacks across mainland Egypt at a range of targets including tourism, religious minorities (Christians), and the country's chief prosecutor was assassinated in June 2015, which have only hardened the response by the state.

The current regime uses the pretext of terrorism to extend and expand the limits of exception, blaming civil society groups (as terrorist sympathisers and Western agents) and therefore targeting them for oppressive measures. Religious institutions are carrying out other projects, such as presenting counter-narratives to ISIS propaganda, but they are less well-known. They also include initiatives to deploy imams to schools nationwide as part of an initiative called "School of Knowledge" to inoculate youth against radicalisation. However, these efforts have been undermined, according to critics and many imams on the ground by the public image crisis that these institutions have, which has so far not been addressed by the state. These efforts are also limited due to the lack of financial support from the state. Another obstacle that stands in the way of these programmes is that many among the top brass in all the religious institutions of Egypt are, in private, resistant to change, considering the non-religious establishment unqualified to make these changes. In North Sinai and more remote areas away from the Nile Valley, the state has also rolled out small-scale socio-economic development programmes but activists and journalists on the ground say these efforts yielded effectively no results because they were small and lacked genuine political will.

The Ministry of Endowments, Al-Azhar and Dar al-Ifta (House of Edicts, under the authority of the Ministry of Justice) jointly lead most non-security-related efforts to push back against the tide of radicalisation. Their main order of business was to reclaim the country's vast network of unregistered small mosques, known locally as *zawaya*, which allowed radical groups to spread their ideologies, particularly outside of Cairo. Nearly 20,000 *zawaya* mosques were closed since then and thousands more were forced to register. As part of the new campaign, the only imams allowed to deliver sermons during Friday prayers must, as of 2014, have authorization from Al-Azhar. Security officials monitor all mosques closely to ensure adherence to the new rules. But critics say the state over-corrected by standardising the sermons, which considerably reduced their appeal to the public. The state's religious institutions similarly lost considerable public credibility due to their closeness to President Sisi and their vocal support of his policies, thus undermining their ability to influence those on the cusp of radicalisation, who tend to be anti-government.

In Morocco, the religious sphere is managed closely by the state and upholds the preservation of the king's authority and overarching religious role. Under the king's umbrella, the Minister

of Habouss and Islamic Affairs (MHIA) is responsible for the management of the religious sphere and, under its authority, the role of ensuring that youth and the population as a whole follow the 'right path' is fulfilled by the Council of Ulama. The state controlled MHIA, along with the High Council of Ulemas, exercises control over the majority of mosques in the country and large parts of the education system. A programme of religious reforms starting in 2004, in response to the 2003 bombings as well as political challenges to the king's authority from Islamic movements, and included amongst other measures institutional reorganisation, an extensive training and education programme for preachers and imams, integrating traditional 'Quranic schools' into the modern school system, strengthening control of mosques (and closing some), and emphasising Morocco's Maliki school of thought (El-Katiri, 2013). For instance, a state program trained 100,000 imams to go into the country's more than 50,000 mosques to theoretically counter the message of ISIS by preaching normative Sunni Islam, with a strong sympathy for and backing of the country's political elite.

In the fight against religiously-inspired radicalisation and violence, these state institutions and services – along with security and policing bodies – generally and largely marginalise civil society organisations, even religious associations are not consulted on this matter. Some NGOs are nonetheless involved at different levels in addressing radicalisation within Moroccan society, working either with prisoners or in the school environment, and are mainly funded locally or by international organisations. This is particularly the case with the Centre for the Rights of the People (*Centre des droits des gens*, CDG), and most civil society groups intervene sporadically or locally, but their action is so limited and very marginal.

Tight state control of religion has been the dominant mode of governance since independence in Tunisia, and this has produced problems with regard to radicalisation. Before 2011, Ennahda used to criticize the state control of Islam. However, the religious chaos that accompanied the Tunisian uprising – together with political pressure from secular groups – led the Ennahda leadership to change its position. Since 2016, while Ennahda agreed to differentiate between the political party and the preaching activities, the Tunisian authorities have been trying to regain control over the religious sphere as was the case prior to 2011. Since 2013 successive ministers of religious endowments have been determined to extend the ministry's control over all mosques and imams and close all illegal mosques in order to prevent radical voices from controlling them. The Ministry also relieved several unlicensed Salafi preachers from their duties and appointed other imams affiliated to its administration in their place. These measures even went beyond the Salafi preachers to include religious figures close to Ennahda, including a former minister of religious affairs (Noureddine Khadmi). The ministry also suggests themes for Friday sermons and has employed 600 people tasked with ensuring that the imams' rhetoric is in accordance with the law.

At the governmental level Tunisia has no programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism, training for frontline practitioners, platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders, or programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings. However, Tunisia has

been working with international partners on reforming and improving the capability of its security sector. Nevertheless, unlike state institutions, civil society organizations enjoy a better knowledge of the local context, as well as higher level of social trust among local communities than state institutions and their activities have increased considerably since 2015. It has included a wide range of projects in different fields, such as cultural activities, community work, capacity-building, art therapy, awareness-raising and dialogue sessions between youth and police forces (Lestch, 2018: 176). However, the lack of state support for these civil society organizations has led them to look for external funds to support their activities. As preventing violent radicalization is one of their main objectives of international donors, these funding opportunities have led many Tunisian civil society organizations to add a PVE dimension to their work even if it was not originally there, as is the case with those engaged in gender equality and culture governance, to keep receiving funding from external donors and survive economically (Lestch, 2018: 181).

Referring back to our points from section 4.1, we can see a greater fit in relation to the MENA region cases, where attacks are from within the dominant religion rather than from the minority and responses from the state target the dominant religion (as well as minorities). They also restrict (some but not all) religious political groups, where the control of the political sphere is a key focus, and weak state institutions following political upheaval provide a context in which radicalised groups can flourish.

4.5 South and South East Asia

<p>Malaysia Indonesia</p>	<p>6. Pluralistic ('unity in diversity') Nationalism (can become a form of communalism where the national citizenship framework is weak or allows one community to dominate the others)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiculturalising moderate secularism • Difference-sensitive identity recognition • Institutional accommodation of religious diversity • 'Respect all, Positive Cooperation, Principled Distance' • Active and present in public and political life • Policy cooperation - religious reasons in political sphere • accommodative of differentiated legal status, religious personal laws • primacy of group autonomy and social support for deep diversity
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Turning to our two cases from South and South East Asia, they are firstly characterised by deep diversity and religion in society and politics is considerably pronounced and significant. Secondly, they are Muslim majority countries. This has become increasingly important as the most significant political trend in recent years has been a shift towards majoritarian nationalism, asserting the Muslim character of the state with restrictive results for religious minorities, whether non-Muslim or Muslims who do not follow the official state form of

Islam. This shift has been bound up with debates and responses linked to radicalisation and is further reflected in Pew's government restrictions index, where both countries score 'very high', and for Indonesia this represents a significant increase over the last decade. While we can see a greater civil society engagement than in MENA, this is still with significant government control.

In Malaysia, as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy against violent extremism and terrorism, the government has set up various programmes and institutions to develop effective communication strategies and counter-narratives against violent extremist groups. One of these initiatives has been the Jihad Concept Explanation Action Committee which was set up by Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM, Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia) in 2015 'to address misconceptions about jihad at different social groups and institutions'. The initiative designed a series of engagements with communities at various levels, including mosques, and *suraus* (community prayer areas) as well as schools, universities, and via the internet (Muhammad Haziq 2017, 7). The Malaysian government has also initiated the Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Centre aimed at synchronising efforts to counter radical social media messages and present a more inclusive narrative of Islam in the region.

The Rehabilitation or Deradicalisation Program in Malaysia also reflects the particular way in which religion, and Islam, is held in society, and takes particular care of the spiritual aspects of deradicalisation, premised on the idea that a radicalised person needs to be 'cleansed' from a flawed/dangerous Islamic narrative and have it replaced it with a 'moderate' understanding of Islam before re-joining society. While the programme is a joint effort between the Ministry of Home affairs, Royal Malaysian Police and religious institutions, it is still mainly led by the police and in particular by Special Branch. The general nature and tone of the programme are mostly religious, with great emphasis on the principle of re-education and rehabilitation, based on the 'Ahl al- Sunnah Wal Jamaah' approach to countering the extremist interpretations of Islam (Ahmad Zahid 2016: 13). Zamihan Mat Zin, a JAKIM official seconded to the Prisons Department to take charge of rehabilitation of Islamist extremists under detention, sees the approach adopted by JAKIM as contrasting with Salafism/Wahhabism, on the one hand, and liberal Islam, on the other. Zamihan has commented that "Our narrative of Islam is about peace, kindness and love. Our session involves long hours of dialoguing with the detainees to clear their distorted understanding of Islam. When they told us that Malaysia is not an Islamic state (hence the need for jihad), we told them to refer to Article 3 of the Constitution. The provision clearly shows that Malaysia is an Islamic state".

As this last example already indicates, in Malaysia, the rhetoric of anti-extremism has sometimes been used to enhance the Islamic character of the country as well as control it. In this way, it is the surgent forms of majoritarian nationalism, rather than the pluralistic nationalism that has characterised the country, that is most in evidence in the implications for the governance of religious diversity stemming from Malaysia's approach to radicalisation. Countering radicalisation and extremism has provided a justification to exert pressure on and silence the voices of some Islamic movements in Malaysia and to dismiss the secular nature

of the Federal Constitution. This is particularly evident in the state-sponsored Islamisation policy (a form of interventionist and regulatory modes of governing religion, particularly Islam) conducted in an increasingly intolerant and chauvinist manner to the extent that it directly challenges freedoms of religion, expression, and association.

The Indonesian government's approach has hardened as time has gone on. The security approach is characterized by special anti-terrorism units within the police force and army. The BNPT outlines strategies for dealing with both counter-radicalisation, addressing the general public who have not been involved in radical or terrorist activity, and deradicalisation, directed at those engaged in radical and terrorist activity, and both emphasise the instilling of Indonesian values and non-violent practices. Deradicalisation programmes aim to persuade those who are involved in radical activity to avoid violence and terror for achieving their goals.

In this vein, a key part of the Indonesian government's response has been to attempt to shore up the principles of Pancasila in order to preserve the pluralistic order and promote moderation of religious doctrines among radicals (BNPT, 2018.: 2-3). Hand-in-hand with religious radicalism, recent developments suggest the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia (Hadiz, 2018; Rahmat, 2018) and the state has taken measures that link these two trends. To protect against groups that oppose Pancasila and sought to Islamise the country, in the first term of Joko Widodo's presidency, important policies focussed on the mainstreaming of moderation of Islam (wasathiyat al-Islam). Following on from the *High Level Consultation of World Muslim Scholars on Wastiyat*, the Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila (Center for the Strengthening of Pancasila Ideology) was established to revitalize Pancasila as way of life for all Indonesians and to counter the Islamist campaign for its abolishment. This approach aims to ensure that Pancasila as the sole ideology is made compulsory for Indonesians. The counter-radicalisation strategy is implemented through education, both formal and informal and is largely carried out by inviting the involvement of local leaders, religious leaders, education practitioners, and cultural agencies. The government is aware that eradicating radicalism in an Indonesian context also requires the involvement of civil society groups and works with prominent Indonesian Islamic civil society organisations regarded as the main pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. However, the government's initiative to eradicate radicalism has prompted a severe backlash from religious groups, especially Islamic groups.

Recently, Joko Widodo's administration issued a bylaw called *Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme* or National Action Plan for Prevention of Extremism based on Violence Leading to Terrorism called RAN PE for period of 2020-2024. One of the factors that led to the issuance of this bylaw is the escalation of extremism based on violence which potentially leads to terrorism. The National Plan is aimed at improving the protection and assurance of Indonesian citizens from violent extremism leading to terrorism, but this plan has been

criticised for also reflecting an increasing tendency of the Indonesian government to shift from regulation to control and with it the restriction of freedom of religion⁷.

In Malaysia and Indonesia, state control and regulation of mosques has not, unlike elsewhere, been a prominent strategic response to radicalisation in the countries. The Indonesian government has undertaken a couple of measures to monitor mosques more closely, one to conduct a census of mosques in the country (estimated at some 700 000+) and government sponsored covert research to uncover mosques supporting and preaching ISIS ideology has also been conducted. The Malaysian government took measures in the early 2000s to remove funding from private schools believed to teach Islamic ideologies that lead to militancy.

Again, in reference to 4.1, as with the MENA region and in contrast to Europe and Australia where this has not been a central issue, control of the political sphere by religious groups, and restrictions on them by the state, has been an important part of the context and patterns of radicalisation in the region.

4.6 Points of comparison

The table below (Table 2) presents in summarised form the important comparative features that have emerged from the discussions in previous sections. The table and discussion of it aims to capture the key comparative features of governance that we have seen working through the modes and responses above. This section outlines the main points from the table with particular reference to two lines of comparative analytical consideration. The first is Muslim majority contexts compared to those where Muslims are a minority, which roughly breaks along the lines of our European (with Australia)/non-European countries. BiH is an exception, with a slim Muslim majority population but quite a different state and governance formation. The second is along the lines of our modes of governance, where particular attention is trained on a broad distinction between those modes where the state exerts a large degree of control over the religious sphere (secularist statist, majoritarian nationalism) and those where this is less the case (moderate secularism, freedom of religion). The colour coding represents European countries, with Australia, (blue) and non-European countries (grey) and the shading represents the different modes within those two groupings.

The first column shows the main targets of violent attacks, whether primarily civilians or 'state', the latter indicating government buildings, government officials. It also indicates whether these attacks have primarily targeted the majority population (including indiscriminate attacks) or a minority population. Whereas in some countries attacks have targeted the majority, elsewhere significant attacks may also have targeted other minorities (whether minority to minority (Muslims targeting Jews (Belgium, Germany) or Christians (Egypt), for instance) or majority to minority (far-right attacks on Muslims, for example), or in some countries attacks are from one section under the majority religion on another. As we have seen, this has a significant effect on how strategies are applied in practice and the level

⁷ <https://www.republika.id/posts/13575/catatan-untuk-perpres-ran-pe>

of top-down control exerted by the government. MENA stands out as the region where the state is most likely to be the target of attacks. While the precise reasons for this are difficult to discern with any confidence, we might note that these countries combine being Muslim majority with majoritarian nationalism, meaning the state's strong identification with and control over the majority religion might be important factors.

The second column shows the main targets of the state response, whether this is a minority or the majority. Minority in this sense refers to Muslims as a minority ethno-religious group, as is the case throughout our European cases. Latterly other groups have also been targeted (extreme right wing groups, for instance), but it remains that strategies were devised and implemented with Muslims as the focus and in many ways remain so. BiH is the exception here, where Muslims are the majority group, although the population as a whole is only very slenderly majority Muslim. For our Muslim majority countries, in our MENA and South Asia cases, Muslims and Muslim organisations have also been the focus of state responses. On the one hand, this is a case of targeting the 'majority religion', but it is important here to note, as was discussed above, that this is at those perceived to be a deviant minority or political challenge and threat within the majority religion.

Column three shows if new legislation has been brought in that specifically targets and effects religious diversity. This column is more concerned with, for example, bans on religious practice, worship or clothing emanating from security concerns or securitised discourses, rather than general terrorism legislation. We can observe an initial general break here between Muslim majority countries and countries where Muslims are a minority, and where levels of this kind of legislation are lower in the former. A closer look, however, suggests that modes of governance are also important. France (secularist statist) and BiH and Russia (majoritarian nationalism) show higher levels than elsewhere in Europe, for instance. We might expect Indonesia and Malaysia (pluralistic nationalist) to be lower, but this might be explained by a combination of being majority Muslim, and therefore taking a stronger line towards deviant forms, and the increasing trend of Muslim majoritarian nationalism in these countries.

Column four shows increased institutional regulation of one or many religious groups and might be seen as the more practical brother/sister of column three, and we see a very similar pattern emerge through the table.

Column five indicates the main targets of this regulation, whether majority, minorities or both. In many ways, this unsurprisingly tells a similar story to column 2. Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia, nevertheless, present cases where both majority and minority religions have been targeted and affected by new or stronger institutional regulation and control.

The sixth column shows interference in religious political parties, with 'N/A' appearing rather than 'no' where religious parties are not a notable part of the political landscape. As such N/A indicates that this is not a 'live issue', so to speak, whereas 'no' would indicate the presence of religious political parties and that there is not extra state interference as a result

of radicalisation inspired security measures. As we can see from the column, where political parties are an important part of the political scene in a country, in our MENA region and South Asian cases, interference has followed.

The final column shows the level of participation of civil society organisations in partnership with the state as part of the general governance approach. This is not, however, simply about the presence of civil society organisations or the fact that there are partnerships between the state and these organisations as part of the state's strategy. It also includes consideration of the scope and flexibility that civil society organisations have in running programmes or projects, that is the degree of autonomy and state control over these activities. High indicates that these actors are a highly significant and central part of the strategy and that they operate with high levels of flexibility on the types of understandings and approaches they adopt, which has an impact on the governance that is exerted through this involvement. Medium and low indicate lower levels of involvement and tighter government control. Absent indicates that this kind of involvement is not a part of state governance strategies in this area (even if civil society organisations operate in the area, this is wholly separate from the state), and so a state controlled basis is extremely high. As can be seen from the table, there is a general break between Muslim majority countries and those with a Muslim minority population, where in the former civil society involvement is, on the whole, higher. Yet the exceptions here are just as if not more telling. What consideration of these suggests is the importance of majoritarianism and state control. BiH and Russia, for example, are both characterised by majoritarian nationalism, unlike our other European country cases. France is also interesting in this regard as it is characterised by secularist statism, and the control it seeks to exert over ~Muslim organisations has intensified in the last year. Our two South Asian cases also contrast with our MENA cases. Notably, the former are characterised by pluralistic nationalism in contrast again to majoritarian nationalism in the case of our MENA countries. And between Indonesia and Malaysia, the recent tilt towards majoritarian nationalism has been stronger in the latter.

Table 2 Comparative indicators of radicalisation targets and responses

Indicator → Country ↓	1. Targets of attacks	2. Targets of response	3. New legislation specifically targeting religious diversity	4. Increased institutional regulation	5. Targets of increased institutional regulation	6. Religious political party interference	7. Civil society involvement in governance
The UK	Civilians (maj and mins)	Min	No	Low	Minority	N/A	High
Belgium	Civilians (maj and mins)	Min	Low	Med	Minority (some indiscriminate effects)	N/A	High
Germany	Civilians (maj and mins)	Min	Low	Med	Minority	N/A	High
France	Civilians (maj and mins)	Min	Med	High	Minority (some indiscriminate effects)	N/A	Low/Medium
Australia	Civilians (maj and min)	Min	Low	Low	Minority	N/A	High
BiH	Civilians	Maj (just)	Med	High	Maj (just)	N/A	Medium
Russia	Civilians	Min(s)	High	High	Minority	N/A	Low
Egypt	Civilians and state (maj and mins)	Maj	High	High	Majority/minority	Yes	Absent
Morocco	Civilians (maj)	Maj	High	High	Majority	Yes	Absent
Tunisia	Civilians and state (maj and mins)	Maj	High	High	Majority	Yes	Low
Indonesia	Civilians (maj)	Maj	High	High	Majority/minority	Yes	High
Malaysia	Civilians (maj)	Maj	High	High	Majority/minority	Yes	Medium

5. Conclusion

The discussions of the preceding sections provide little reason to think that a particular mode of governance of religious diversity means (violent) radicalisation is more likely to occur. Countries characterised by quite different modes and norms have faced issues of terrorism and violent radicalisation and we have also seen that some challenges are shared across different cases. If we are to look for drivers of radicalisation, we must, therefore, look elsewhere. Our main focus of analysis, however, points to some similarities in understandings and response while also noting significant differences that bear on the governance of religious diversity across our cases.

We can point to some very general similarities in understandings of radicalisation, the centrality of ideology, and responses, a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, as these responses have matured (for want of a better word) that cut across most cases looked at here. Nevertheless, there are clear and significant differences in response and how these relate to the ways in which religious diversity is governed more generally. What the preceding discussions have allowed us to show then is not that a mode of the governance of religious diversity affects *whether* (violent) radicalisation will occur, but rather *how* this might take shape. The key differences and comparative points that bear on trends as well as state responses relate to two features: whether Muslims are a minority or majority, and the political order of the country.

Whereas state understandings can all be seen to privilege ideology, there is variance in which ideologies are seen as the biggest threat, although there is some common ground on Salafism/Wahhabism, and what counter-ideology and counter-narratives, often employing the notion of (national) shared values, are emphasised as in need of promotion. Signally important for this latter point is whether the country is Muslim majority or whether Muslims are a minority population. Where the former, the particular interpretation and dynamics of Muslim religious discourse and its relation to the political order shapes this ideological and narrative feature. A further difference is between those that focus on violent radicalisation and those that also emphasise non-violent radicalisation.

With regard to our modes of the governance of religious diversity, what we can see is that the more diversity restricting features become enhanced and emphasised. That is to say that responses to radicalisation occur in particular contexts that are already shaped by particular features, tendencies and trends. Radicalisation does not cause or evolve out of any particular mode, but how it manifests and is responded to will be shaped by that mode in particular ways. Thus, in countries characterised by moderate secularism, means of regulation become stronger, whereas in countries characterised by secularist statism or majoritarian nationalism, state control becomes far more pronounced, and in the case of majoritarian nationalism, state control over the religious sphere is bound up with state control over the political sphere.

An important issue arises here that this report has not said much about as the focus has been on state understandings and responses. One of the key criticisms of state policies regarding

radicalisation is that they can create a, perhaps already existing, sense of alienation and exclusion. Indeed, for some this is an important part of the drivers of radicalisation in the first place. What becomes important then is how far the responses of states, and the measures and norms that become enhanced in those responses, can offer inclusive narratives and practices, or whether they instead rely on exclusionary measures.

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About the GREASE project

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Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE has been investigating how religious diversity is governed in over two dozen countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

Project Coordinator: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou

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