

## Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

# Indonesia

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

### **Countries covered in this series:**

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eui.eu>



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**The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.**

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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<http://grease.eui.eu/>

GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

## Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: \_\_\_\_\_Indonesia\_\_\_\_\_

### I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

#### Overall Assessment:

The Indonesian state philosophy endorses the Principle of One: The Oneness of God as its basic element, thus suggesting the important role of religion in state affairs. Over the past twenty years there has been no legal basis for the prohibition of religious institutions and religious groups in **political decision-making and policy-making**. While there may be some restrictions on this, religious institutions and religious groups take part in the formal decision-making process and on political decision-making. Along these lines, Indonesia's legislation does not prohibit the **participation of religiously-based political parties in political life**. Practice over the past twenty years shows that religious groups actually play the role of pressure groups which greatly influence the political decisions made by the Indonesian government.

When it comes to **the interference of the Indonesian state in the regulation of the religious and administrative matters of religious institutions/religious communities**, there are not only laws introduced to regulate such aspects, but there is also the presence of the Ministry of Religious Affairs specially established to regulate such matters (through Law No.3 from 2006 on the Islamic Court). In practice, over the past 20 years there has been strong state interference in these dimensions of the functioning of religious communities and religious institutions.

There are several pieces of legislation which recognize **freedom of religion** in the country to all groups (with some restrictions), including the Indonesian Constitution (Verse 28 and Verse 29), Law 39 on Human Rights (1999) and the Indonesian Criminal Law (Verse 175). Practice over the past twenty years shows that some religious communities enjoy freedom of religion while there may be some restrictions on religious freedoms for other religious groups.

Religious groups/communities generally have **freedom to set up and manage educational institutions** as regulated by the Constitution (Verse 31), the Law on the National Education System, Regulation 3 by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (2012) and Law 17 (2010).

There has been a high level of **autonomy of religious media** over the past twenty years. There is no specific law which regulates religious media, but Law 40 (1999) recognizes the existence of religious media in Indonesia.

| 1. State autonomy from religion   | Score  | YEAR<br>(Most Recent) |
|---|--------|-----------------------|
| (1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular                 | Medium | 2020                  |
| (1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion | Medium | 2020                  |

| <b>2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|---|--------------|---------------------------|
| (2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.  | Low          | 2020                      |
| (2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.  | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.   | Low          | 2020                      |
| (3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.  | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.   | Low          | 2020                      |
| (4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.   | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).</b>   | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities. | Low          | 2020                      |
| (5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.   | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>6. State recognition of freedom of religion.</b>   | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.   | High         | 2020                      |
| (6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.  | Medium       | 2020                      |
| <b>7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.</b>   | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |

| Indonesia  | Indicators Assessment | GREASE |
|--|-----------------------|--------|
| (7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions. | High                  | 2020   |
| (7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.   | High                  | 2020   |

| <b>8. Autonomy of religious media</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|--|--------------|---------------------------|
| (8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media. | High         | 2020                      |
| (8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.  | High         | 2020                      |

## II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

### Overall Assessment

The State Philosophy of Oneness of God endorses that religion is a basic element of political life in Indonesia, suggesting the possibility for recognition of all religious minority groups. In practice, though, there have been general restrictions on the **recognition of the legal status** of certain religious minority groups in the country over the past ten years. Similarly, when it comes to **religious minority group participation in political life**, national legislation (incl. the Indonesian Constitution, Law 39, Law 12), with some caveats, grants all religious minority groups rights to participation. However, in practice this is not always the case as exemplified by the imprisonment of a Jakarta candidate for governor who was sued by the majority conservative Muslims on the account of blasphemy.

A number of laws (incl. the Indonesian Constitution, Law 40, Law 39, and Law 12) provide religious minority groups with a **special social security status**. However, practice shows that over the past twenty years only some religious minority groups receive special social security benefits, with some restrictions.

Access of religious minority groups to **public spaces** has been provided to some religious minority groups with certain restrictions and such has been practice. The **cultural practices of religious minority groups** have been well-accommodated by the state over the past two decades, including through formal performances such as national ceremonial events. From a legislative standpoint religious minority groups have access to calls for public funds. However, in practice there is political segregation for religious minorities in accessing **state funds** due to ideological considerations. But even among the Muslim majority there are segregation practices among certain Muslim sub-groups which adhere to a particular ideology.

According to legislation, some religious minority groups can own **houses of worship**, but in practice all religious minority groups can do so.

| 1. Legal status of religious minority groups.  | Score  | YEAR (Most Recent) |
|--|--------|--------------------|
| (1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.  | High   | 2020               |
| (1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.   | Low    | 2020               |
| 2. Religious minority group participation in political life.   | Score  | YEAR (Most Recent) |
| (2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state. | High   | 2020               |
| (2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.   | Medium | 2020               |
| 3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.  | Score  | YEAR (Most Recent) |

|  |              |                           |
|--|--------------|---------------------------|
| (3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.                           | High         | 2020                      |
| (3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.  | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.                                     | Low          | 2020                      |
| (4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.   | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities. | High         | 2020                      |
| (5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.  | Low          | 2020                      |
| <b>6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.               | High         | 2020                      |
| (6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.   | High         | 2020                      |
| <b>7. Ownership of houses of worship.</b>  | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.                                | Medium       | 2020                      |
| (7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.   | High         | 2020                      |



III. **Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels**

In 2020 Indonesia’s **levels of freedom** reach a freedom score of 61, which defines the country as only partly free. This ambiguous evaluation is due to the recent political developments in the country. On the one hand, Indonesia is politically democratic and adopts democracy as the only legitimate form of government. On the other hand, it does not sustain unchallenged and absolute freedom in public life. There has been a negative tendency, observed under the latest government, which has been applying more **restrictions to the civil liberties** in public life (in comparison to the previous political government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono). These governmental factors for diminishing civil liberty are also coupled with the rise of radical religious groups in Indonesia. The popularity of Islamic populism has been demonstrating a trend of increase in recent years.

This political situation has led to a decrease in the public’s **adherence for the rule of law**. The country’s overall ranking in the Rule of law index from 52<sup>nd</sup> in 2015 to 59<sup>th</sup> in 2020 (coupled with overall scores of 0.52 and 0.53 respectively) is indicative of an established trend of the public’s perception of the Indonesian government as discriminative in enforcing the law. This tendency is also illustrated by the worsening trend in the **level of state legitimacy**, especially during the second term of Joko Widodo’s presidency, when the Fragile state index rapidly dropped from 5.6 in 2015 to 4.5 in 2019. The most prominent driver of these public attitudes relates to the higher levels of corruption – a practice recently implemented by high level state politicians and high-profile businessmen. The uneven distribution of such privileges has fostered a public attitude toward disregarding the authority of the Indonesia rule of law, as it is perceived as discriminative and unfair.

This unequal treatment of societal layers has particularly affected religious groups strongly, as evidenced by the dynamics of religious-related **government restrictions**. The government restrictions index has risen from low (2.1) in 2010 to moderate (2.4) in 2015 and reached its peak of very high (6.6) in 2020. These socio-political developments are also captured by the low levels of **protection of human rights** in Indonesia (Human rights index score of 7 in 2020). The most striking example of this trend is the Ban of Hizb Tahir and the counter-pandemic measures in 2020, which restricted the use of houses of worship. The latter has been severely interpreted as a governmental hostility against Muslims by the Indonesian Muslim population.

Most Indonesia people are generally in favour of diversity and no significant religious-based hostilities in the public attitude have been detected by the year of 2020 (when only 5% of people opposed diversity).

This result is countered by rising extreme views on radical interpretations of religion and high level of **social hostilities** involving religion. 81% of Indonesians view ISIS as a major threat. At the same time, 48% of Indonesian people are not concerned by religious extremist violence, although only 1% endorse ISIS. Perhaps those public attitudes result from the fact, that Indonesia has been affected by terrorism (GTI score 5.07) mostly in 2018, when 20 terrorist accidents were registered by the Global Terrorism Database.

| 1. Structural factors/environment | Score/Level/Percentage                  | YEAR (Most Recent) |
|-----------------------------------|---|--------------------|
| (1a) Level of Freedom             | Level: Partly Free<br>Freedom score: 61 | 2020               |



| Indonesia   | Indicators Assessment                    | GREASE |
|---|--|--------|
| (1b) Level of adherence to rule of law  | Overall rank: 59<br>Overall score: 0.53  | 2020   |
| (1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions                                       | Score: 6.6 or higher<br>Level: Very High | 2017   |
| (1d) Level of state legitimacy  | Score: 4.2<br>Level: Moderate            | 2019   |
| (1e) Level of protection of human rights  | Score: 6.7<br>Level: Low                 | 2020   |
| (1f) Level of group grievances  | Score: 7.4<br>Level: High                | 2020   |
| (1g) Uneven economic development  | Score: 4.9<br>Level: Moderate            | 2020   |
| (1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share) | Percentage: n/a                          | n/a    |

| <b>2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)</b> | <b>Percentage (%)</b>   | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|---|---|---------------------------|
| (2a) Distrust in national institutions                    | Parliament: n/a<br>Government: n/a<br>Other: 75.2%  | 2019                      |
| (2b) Political discontent                                 | Dissatisfaction with country direction: 58.8%<br>Dissatisfaction with overall situation: n/a<br>Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: 33%<br>Other:  | 2020                      |
| (2c) Economic discontent                                  | Dissatisfaction own financial situation: n/a<br>Dissatisfaction national economy: n/a<br>Economic situation is the most serious problem: n/a<br>Other:  | 2020                      |
| (2d) Discrimination                                       | Discrimination is widespread:<br>Opposing diversity: 5%<br>Discomfort with minorities:<br>Dislike neighbors from minority groups:<br>Experienced discrimination:<br>Discriminatory rhetoric of leaders: 58.5% | 2020                      |
| (2e) Views on violent extremism                           | VE is a serious problem/threat: 48%<br>Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: 1%<br>Consider ISIS a major threat: 81%   | 2020                      |

| <b>3. Incidence-based indicators<br/>(religious violence and conflict)</b> | <b>Score/Level/Number</b>              | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|--|--|---------------------------|
| (3a) State-based armed conflict  | Yes/No: No                             |                           |
| (3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion                        | Level: High<br>Score: 5.9              |                           |
| (3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism                                     | Score: 5.07<br>Number of Incidents: 20 |                           |
| (3d) Violent extremist incidents   | Number: 8                              |                           |
| (3e) Significant violent extremist actors/<br>networks                     | Level: Insufficient Information        |                           |

#### IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

In 2018, the existing government regulation on eradication of radicalism and violent extremism was elevated as official law. The new Law Number 5 (2018) has become a legislative and legal basis for the executive government to take action to prevent violent extremism. In addition, as violent extremism in recent years was addressed by police forces, a new Law was introduced in 2019, namely Law Number 77, establishing terrorism as a criminal act. The Indonesian government formed a special agency called "Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme" (National Agency for the Prevention of Terrorism). This agency, along with a special department of the police force called "Densus 88", are part of the national action plan to prevent terrorism. **Civil society organizations** such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have been very active in giving advice and relevant input to the government in designing the **national action plan**. The Indonesian National Agency for Eradication of Terrorism acknowledges that it will not be able to deal with de-radicalization processes, unless supported by other state institutions. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is active in supporting de-radicalization programs, especially on an ideological level. Much research on radicalism is also funded by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs is also involved in these efforts.

Despite some ministries' involvement in the de-radicalization program, its **comprehensiveness** remains questionable. Furthermore, since terrorism is an extraordinary crime, the government has decided, that it sometimes requires extraordinary treatment. In such cases, human rights have been disregarded.

Although there have been some developed programs for **support of the victims of terrorism**, the government's actions in this regard have been very limited. On the other hand, the government (through some respective agencies) has been active in providing training to upgrade the capabilities of security forces and legal institutions. In implementing such initiatives, the government also engages with some international and foreign agencies, including some embassies. In cooperation with civil society groups as well as with government agencies (such as National Commission for Women Empowerment and Ministry of Women and Children Affairs), the government has remained active in promoting projects for women's rights.

Within the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, there is a special agency for interfaith relations. This agency reaches central, provincial and regency levels. The government and religious leaders have utilized this agency in promoting tolerance in approaching and practicing religion.

Civil society, NGOs, and government have been active in dealing with radicalization. Civil society groups and NGOs have been critically assessing and practically assisting the government in its dealing with those issues. Civil society groups and their wide networks have been especially instrumental in this endeavour. Civil society groups such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have been very active in preventing violent radicalism, as they have been far more effective than the government in engaging with the wider public. The initiatives, which they have developed, range from training to campaigning for moderation and assistance to the families of people, who have been associated with terrorism.

#### 1. Comprehensive strategic approach

Score

YEAR  
(Most  
Recent)

| Indonesia | Indicators Assessment  | GREASE                   |      |
|-----------|--|--------------------------|------|
| (1a)      | Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan   | YES                      | 2020 |
| (1b)      | Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan   | YES                      | 2020 |
| (1c)      | Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation                             | NO                       | 2020 |
| (1d)      | Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination                                     | YES                      | 2020 |
| (1e)      | Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law                 | YES                      | 2020 |
| (1f)      | Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan | YES                      | 2020 |
| (1g)      | Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan             | High Participation       | 2020 |
| (1h)      | Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan   | Insufficient information | 2020 |
| (1i)      | Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan                                | Insufficient information | 2020 |
| (1j)      | Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan                   | Insufficient information | 2020 |

| <b>2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects</b> |   | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|--|---|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| (2a)   | Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism                            | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2b)   | Training for frontline practitioners  | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2c)   | Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation. | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2d)   | Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth  | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2e)   | Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women  | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2f)   | Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders   | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2g)   | Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.      | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2h)   | Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention   | Limited level            | 2020                      |
| (2i)   | Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns   | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2j)   | Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons                     | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2k)   | State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism  | YES                      | 2020                      |
| (2l)   | programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings                           | Insufficient information | 2020                      |

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