
Radicalisation and Resilience Case Study

Indonesia

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This case study is part of a series of in-depth reports on religiously motivated violent radicalisation – and resilience to it – in 12 countries. The series examines periods in which religious radicalisation and violence has escalated and analyses relevant policy and political discourses surrounding them. While seeking to identify factors that drove radicalisation and violence in each country, the case studies also critically assess programmes of prevention and resilience-building, identifying good practices. This series was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.

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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

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Introduction

This report examines religious radicalism in Indonesia, looking at how it has evolved over time, especially during post-New Order period to the present. The New Order of Indonesian politics began in 1966 and lasted more than 32 years. It was an authoritarian political system that created many restrictions for Indonesian people over the course of its rule. The regime was finally toppled by mass and student demonstrations which were partly triggered by the regional economic crisis across most of Southeast Asia in 1997. In the wake of the regime's collapse in 1998, a new phase of Indonesian politics started. It is called *Era Reformasi* (the Reform Era) and spans the period from the fall of Suharto's regime until now. This timeframe is selected as this period marked a new phase in Indonesian democracy that has brought significant impacts in both political and religious life. One of the most important manifestations has been the proliferation of various Islamic religious groups that offer different and often contradictory understandings of and orientations towards many aspects of life.

Considering the very complex nature of Indonesian Islam, describing Islamic religious orientations in Indonesia is not an easy task. Although many typologies have been identified and employed by scholars, in this article, Zulian's category of three classifications of radical-conservative, moderate, and liberal-progressive¹ will be used as an entry point for describing those contesting and contradictory understandings and orientations. Based on this categorization – and considering how the terms 'radical', 'conservative', and 'extreme' are used – we present a conceptual discussion on terms and concepts commonly used to describe radicalism. This is also meant to avoid semantic confusion and ensure clarity on how those terms are employed.

The diversity of Islamic religious orientations in Indonesia has been manifested in many important issues. Despite the fact that democracy has been adopted in Indonesian political life, debate has emerged over forms of government and the relations of Islam and the state. Radical-conservative groups who aspire to the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia condemn democracy as 'infidel' and argue the inevitability of adopting Islam as the political system. At the same time, moderate and progressive-liberal groups who embrace more moderate views believe the political system and form of government currently practiced in Indonesia has proven suitable for the country and Muslims. Moreover, the position of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia – and worldwide – is a contested issue within the Muslim population itself. These dissenting views spring from the shared views that Muslims lag Western society but differ on the causes. Radical-conservative

¹ Pradana Boy Zulian, *Fatwa in Indonesia: An Analysis of Dominant Legal Ideas and Mode of Thought of Fatwa-making Agencies and Their Implications in the Post-new Order Period* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).

Muslim groups view Western imperialism as the root cause of Islam's perception as backward and thus approach the West as the enemy. Moderate and progressive-liberal Muslims, on the other hand, basically share this opinion on the cause of Muslim backwardness. They do not, however, attribute it to Western imperialism alone, but also to Muslims' attitudes and mentality. Interestingly, views on Western imperialism also correlate to beliefs on government. Radical-conservative groups perceive the Indonesian form of government as a part of Western imperialism; thus, since the West is the enemy, government is also seen as an enemy. Fawaz A Gerges (2009) describes this situation very comprehensively, revealing that those who perceive the West and their respective government as an enemy label them as 'far enemy' and 'near enemy' respectively.

Moreover, contesting and contradictory understanding and orientations can also be found in how Islam should be practiced within the wider context of society. The process of society's Islamisation is a notable example. In general, two major orientations are competing. We would call these two orientations formalist (followed by radical-conservative groups) and substantialist (adopted by moderate and progressive-liberal wings). The formalist groups propose that Islamic law be adopted formally as way of life for Muslims in Indonesia. In fact, the formalisation of Islamic teachings has been taking shape in the regional legislations of some provinces and regencies, a wave known as the formalization of Sharia. The substantialist groups, on the other hand, believe that Islamic values have actually been part of Indonesian life and are practiced by its citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims. One example is the Indonesian state philosophy of *Pancasila* (literally, five pillars). *Pancasila* was a national consensus among the country's founding fathers who were religiously diverse. As *Pancasila* is fully compatible with Islamic teachings, it is seen as the crystallization of Islamic values and therefore there is no urgent need for its formalisation at any governance level.

Islamic radicalism is actually one among many religious trends in the post-New Order period. In such a context, the association of radicalism with Muslim groups is inevitable since Islam constitutes Indonesia's largest religious group. This report's main focus will thus be radical Muslim groups or radicalism based on Islam and practiced by Muslims. As briefly mentioned earlier, one of radicals' most fundamental rhetorical orientations is that they are the enemy of infidel groups, which are perceived as preventing the formal implementation of sharia law. In addition, the governments of modern polities are also seen as enemies. However, Muslim radicals are basically a threat for all citizens regardless of religious traditions. From what has been taking place so far, it is very evident that radicalism has posed a serious threat for the whole of society in Indonesia. Indeed, Muslims in general do not feel secure from the threat of radicalism, although they embrace the same religion as those radicals. This situation is natural, since those radicals

profess a religious doctrine that is different, if not unique, and in many cases even contradictory to the mainstream majority of Indonesian Muslims. Apart from the spectrum of religious orientations in Indonesia, ranging from those who adopt liberal interpretations to those who embrace a more radical religious stance, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderate in the sense that they follow a non-extreme position.

Considering the huge impact of radicalism on society, the Indonesian government has taken variety of actions to deal with radicalism, violent extremism, and terrorism. Some of these have proved to be effective. But other government policies have ignited controversy across a wider spectrum of society. Among the most controversial is the violent suppression of those who have committed radical actions. In an attempt to identify and eradicate radical groups, government authorities have used armed security forces, including both the police and the military. For example, the security forces have raided sites suspected of being a base where radicals formulate, arrange, and strategize their actions. In many cases, those police actions are often seen as violations of basic human rights and do not respect the principle of *praduga tak bersalah* (presumption of innocence). It is a principle of Indonesian law that nobody is presumed guilty before the law until it is proven that they have committed a violation or crime.

Methodology

In preparing this report, we used several methodological tools. First, in gathering data, we undertook fieldwork which included observation, formal and informal discussions, interviews, and media monitoring. Observations were initially made by visiting research sites which so far have shown radical tendencies and where the trends are projected to parallel those of the past or show even greater tendency for the future. Observation included visits and informal personal communication with radicals who have transformed their view from extreme narrow-mindedness in dealing with religious doctrines to more open and progressive visions of religion and religiosity.

Interviews were conducted with prominent local leaders involved in radicalisation-prevention efforts in their respective areas, or those who have become sympathetic to radical ideologies due to intensive encounters with radicals, or those who have shifted their views after being approached by radicals. Interviews with those respondents resulted in authentic and exclusive data as their information is based on daily experience of local leaders.

Media monitoring and documentation are two steps we took to ensure the vibrant dynamic of religiously-motivated radicalism in Indonesia can be

followed in proportional ways. As in other parts of the globe, the media in Indonesia are influenced by their ideologies. In such a case, media coverage of religiously-motivated radicalism has been fundamentally diverse. However, beyond their divergence and potentially contradictory analyses, this report focused only on data presented. This step was taken in order to avoid analytical biases.

All data gathered was analysed using existing theoretical frameworks. However, the analysis offered in this report is solely our responsibility and unless otherwise quoted, all analyses and interpretations of data are drawn from our insights.

Conceptualisations of Radicalisation: Radicalism, Extremism, and Terrorism

Like other controversial terms, radicalism, especially in its relation to Islam, is a highly contested concept. It is frequently confused with other labels such as Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revivalism, militant Islam, Islamist, Islamism, extremism, and even terrorism. Unsurprisingly, radicalism can also have diverse meanings such as extremism, revolutionary acts, and utopia. Similarly, associations with different contexts such as the Left, liberalism, and socialism are also common. 'But since the term is relative, any fundamental criticism of or assault on existing practices can reasonably be termed radical'. (Smelser and Baltes , 2001: 12723).

In relation to fundamentalism, radicalism cannot be distinguished from it along a clear-cut line. Qiantan Wiktorowicz defines fundamentalism as a combination of political and religious radicalism. It 'constitutes a distinct, specific, modern social movement and ideology promulgating adherence to a strict and intense interpretation of a scripture or holy text'. This definition underlines a radical element of fundamentalism. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism is also a 'political-religious movement which explicitly rejects all forms of secularization and which aspires to social order whose "fundament" is Islamic law'. Similarly, radical Islam is also described as 'irrational zealots inspired by a warped interpretation of Islam that transmogrifies edicts of peace into demands for violence' (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 45). Considering this varied understanding of the term, what I refer to as radical Islam groups in this paper are those who use religious reasons for political purposes, adhere to strict meanings of the scripture, and are politically assertive, utopian, and exclusive in thinking, aspiring to the formalisation of Islamic law and the founding of an Islamic state.

Therefore, defining radicalism, especially in relation to its corresponding religion and in a specific context, is not an easy task. If religious radicalism refers to any acts of violence inspired by and or based on religious reasons

and motivations, it is not an exaggeration to state that radicalism exists in Indonesia. As stated earlier, Muslims are the largest religious group in the country, so it is sociologically evidenced that radicalism is mostly related to Muslims. Although other religious groups have the same potential to commit radical acts, in the Indonesian context an association between religious radicalism and Islam is unavoidable. However, if numbers matter, radicalism is a narrow practice with huge impacts. Therefore, if a comparison of the total number of Muslims in Indonesia to those who are radicals is made, radicalism basically is an orientation adopted by a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a prominent Muslim scholar in Indonesia, strongly holds this view. He illustrates that those who follow radical ideology are desperate individuals who do not have a more positive attitude towards life.²

Among the many definitions of radicalism, it is important to present a formulation proposed by *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (Indonesian National Agency for the Eradication of Terrorism) as an entry point. It defines radicalism as 'an attitude aspiring for total and revolutionary changes by drastically confusing existing values through violent and extreme actions'. Similarly, Turmudi and Sihbudi (2005: 1) identify that some religious groups are called radical because compared to 'normal' behaviour, their actions are considered harsh, rude, and violent. In general, their actions are based on a perceived incompatibility between practices and the religious doctrines they embrace. In specific relation to religion, E Sivan (1990) views religious radicalism as 'a mode of thought and actions'. Furthermore, Sivan maintains that one of motivation of such actions by radicals is the rejection of cultures and values perceived as non-indigenous or inauthentic (*ibid.*: 1).

Despite the nuance they carry, these definitions are basically in agreement on two pivotal points. Firstly, religious radicalism emerges out of narrow- and even close-mindedness on religious doctrines. The perception that some actions are inauthentic (in Sivan's term) or incompatible (in Turmudi and Sihbudi's identification) as forms of incompatibility with religious doctrines are clear indication of unwillingness to accept plurality of understanding of certain doctrines of religion. While religious doctrines are divine in origin, they are human in interpretation and understanding. McLaughlin (2012: 9), who explores radicalism from a philosophical point of view, identifies the primacy of this point: 'radicalism is bound up, theoretically, with simplistic, dogmatic, and reactionary world views (religious or ideological)'.

Secondly, an important feature of radicalism is that it is revolutionary and extreme or involves elements of revolution and extremism. Such an

² <https://www.solopos.com/buya-syafii-penganut-radikalisme-adalah-kaum-putus-asa-yang-patut-dikasihani-895389>, accessed on 05/07/2020.

association is not unique. McLaughlin (2012: 9) sees synonymity between radicalism and extremism. In his words, 'radicalism and extremism are ascribed to others...' This means that extremism is an inextricable element of radicalism. We believe that extremism and violence are two unique features of radicalism setting it apart from other religious orientations. It is possible that people subscribe to narrow- and close-mindedness in religious orientations. But as long as this orientation is deterred on a cognitive level and not manifested in the form of extremism and violence, it is not considered radicalism.

The logic behind these explanations is that radicalism and violent extremism involve not only ideology, but also actions. A.M. Hendropriyono, the former Head of National Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara*) of the Republic of Indonesia, believes that radicalism and terrorism are actions based on value system and worldview. As an example, Hendropriyono (2009: 1) argues that the radicals or the perpetrators of terror mostly see themselves as holy subjects and agencies, and as such also believe that the acts of terrorism they have been committing are endeavours to uphold humanity. Likewise, Zuhairi Misrawi asserts that acts of terrorism cannot merely be associated with the actors themselves. In his view, terrorism is closely related to theological beliefs. This conveys a meaning that although actors of terror and radicalism can be tackled (i.e. through imprisonment and or capital punishment), the ideology of radicalism cannot easily be eradicated (Misrawi, 2009: vii). More specifically, Ansyad Mbai, former head of the Indonesia National Agency of Terrorism Eradication (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*), informs that terrorism in Indonesia is religiously motivated and committed by followers of hard-line Islam aspiring to the founding of an Islamic state through violent means (Mbai, 2014: 23).

The Republic of Indonesia, via the *Badan Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme* (National Agency for Eradication of Terrorism, BNPT), describes terrorists and their activities as: a) a group of individuals committing violent acts to break the law in planned and measured ways; b) acts committed by groups or professionals or both against the state or individuals in order to achieve the goal of a political and ideological shift in the name of religion; c) groups that intimidate individuals, groups, or the state to create fear and feelings of insecurity; d) acts that motivate or intimidate people to leave their families and adopt terrorist organizations as their new families; e) individuals or groups seeking to create fear and insecurity and promote radical ideas by publishing and publicly acknowledging the violent acts they commit.³ Based on this description, BNPT further identifies terrorist targets as including physical infrastructure such as houses of worship, objects of pilgrimage,

³ Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia and Badan Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme, *Modul Pencegahan Terorisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI and BNPT, 2018), 12.

shopping centres, government offices, foreign embassies, hotels, and public facilities such as stations, airports, or other public areas.

Country Background

For a very long time, Indonesia has been known as a home for moderate Islam (Madjid, 1994; Hefner, 2011; Menchik, 2016). Conceptually, moderate Islam is a contested term (Benkin, 2017; Zulian, 2007). However, an academic discussion on the nature of moderate Islam through a review of all scholarly debates on the subject is not within the scope of this study. Here, moderate Islam is understood as a 'middle path' in understanding and practicing Islam (Kamali, 2015). While middle path has many meanings, its most important are adoption and practice of non-extreme religious orientations and the principle of moderation. In one way, moderation can be implemented by combining two extremes. For example, being moderate in Islam refers to a balance between antiquity and modernity, between authenticity and change – that is, not completely rejecting progress while clinging steadfastly to the past. In other words, moderation requires open-mindedness and tolerance.

In an Indonesian context, there are at least two manifestations of this moderateness. First, Muslims' social acceptance of people of other religions and faiths. Although Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, other faiths are recognised by the state as official religions and have coexisted harmoniously for decades. The fact that different religious communities live peacefully in Indonesia shows that in terms of religious diversity, the Indonesian case is very interesting. Second, Indonesian Islam is linked to the acceptance of the Indonesian state philosophy *Pancasila*, which can be literally translated as 'five principles'. This acceptance is fundamental in explaining the nature of harmony and tolerance in Indonesian religious life. As a state philosophy, *Pancasila* has served as a common platform for the Indonesian people and has played the role of 'social glue' for Indonesia's religiously and ethnically diverse society.

However, moderateness and harmony are not the sole characteristics of religious life in Indonesia. As all facts and realities have a binary-opposition element, this is also the case with the country's religious life. Recent developments, especially in the post-Suharto period, require special attention. During the more than 30 years of Suharto's rule (1966-1998), Indonesia was under an authoritarian style of governance. In 1998, student demonstrations with widespread public support toppled the Suharto regime. This paved the way for a more democratic and open Indonesia. More specifically, one consequence of this new political phase has been the lifting of political restrictions and greater political openness. Thus, as William

Liddle (1996: 323) predicted, in a more open political climate, religious groups that were suppressed will emerge into the public sphere. Combined with other factors, this has led to the appearance of more radical religious groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Anshorut Tauhid, and Front Pembela Islam.

The emergence of Islamic radical groups has challenged both Indonesia's image as a home of tolerant Islam as well as the peaceful and harmonious relationship among religions. Bomb attacks on various sites across Indonesia, including non-Muslim and Muslim places of worship, can be seen as indicators of the existence of Southeast Asian militant Islam networks in Indonesia. Although this radical orientation (which means adherence to ideology of violence) is only a marginal manifestation among Indonesian Muslims in general, it has inevitably changed the image and landscape of religious life in the country. These attacks can also be seen as a pivotal moment for the re-emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. An interesting point related to these radical actions is that almost all perpetrators are connected. The Indonesian government has responded to this challenge very dynamically. However, radicalism has not been fully eradicated and active cells remain that may still pose a threat to religious moderateness and tolerance in Indonesia at any time.

Hand-in-hand with religious radicalism, recent developments suggest the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia, a phenomenon seen around the world (Hadiz, 2018; Rahmat, 2018). One indicator is the deeper involvement of religion in politics and its use as an instrument for achieving political ends. Based on this brief description of recent developments in Indonesian religious life and political dynamics, Indonesia is currently facing some important challenges, namely: a) the growing trend towards Islamic conservatism; b) the latent threat of radicalism; and c) the penetration of Islamic populism into broader society. The latter is affecting almost all walks of life, especially the political domain, including the public debate over the relationship between Islam and the state as well as the re-examination of secularism in an Indonesian context. These challenges underline the importance and significance of understanding the dynamics of radicalisation and secularization in contemporary Indonesia.

Indonesia: A unification of complexities

Indonesia is officially known as *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). As its name indicates, it is basically a unification of complexes: islands, regions, religions, cultures, and languages. Its total area is 1,916,862.20 square kilometres spanning the Sabang, Aceh in the west to Merauke, Papua in the east. Indonesia is an 'archipelago state' as it is composed of around 16,065 islands (Indonesian Statistical Agency, 2018: 9-10) commonly grouped into five major islands –

namely Java, Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua – and four main archipelagos – namely Riau, Bangka Belitung, Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku. Indonesia's 34 provinces are spread over those main islands and archipelagos: Java Island covers six provinces (DKI Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Yogyakarta, Central Java and East Java); Sumatera Island and Riau Archipelago includes ten provinces (Aceh, West Sumatera, North Sumatera, South Sumatera, Lampung, Bengkulu, Riau, Kepulauan Riau, and Bangka Belitung); Kalimantan, the largest main island, covers five provinces (West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and North Kalimantan) as well as the eastern part of Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam; the Island of Sulawesi hosts the provinces of South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and Gorontalo; the Nusa Tenggara Archipelago consists of three provinces (Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara); Maluku covers two provinces, Maluku and North Maluku; and, Papua, includes two provinces, Papua and West Papua.

Politically, Indonesia is one of the largest democracies in the world today. Having experienced authoritarianism under Suharto, Indonesia has transformed into a democratic country following the regime's collapse in 1998. With political restrictions lifted and legal reforms enacted, political parties mushroomed. The first democratic elections, held the following year, saw 48 parties participating, including some that are Islam-based. In the 1999 elections, voters cast ballots for members of the lower and upper houses who then voted for president. The system changed, however, and in 2004, Indonesia experimented with the first presidential election through direct popular vote. In addition to the president, governors, and other executives, local leaders are also elected by direct ballot. This has created another layer of complexities in Indonesian society as legislative representatives are also elected the same way.

The governance of religious diversity

Religion is one important element that adds to Indonesia's social and cultural diversity. A recent report by PEW Research Center reveals that Islam is the second largest religion in the world, followed by some 24.1 per cent of the total world population. Muslim communities are spread across all continents: Africa, America, Asia, Australasia, and Europe (Pew Research Center 2017). Indonesia is home to an estimated 209 million Muslims, or 12.7 per cent of all Muslims worldwide. However, this does not make Indonesia an exclusively Islamic state. While Islam is the religion with the largest following, other faiths also exist in the country. Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism), Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are all officially recognised by the state. According to Indonesian Statistical Agency data for

2018, Indonesia's population numbered 237 million with Muslims representing the largest religious group (87.18 per cent), followed by Protestants (6.9 per cent), Catholics (2.9 per cent), Hindus (1.69 per cent), Buddhists (0.72 per cent), and followers of Confucianism (0.05 per cent).

As a major religious group, Islam influences almost all aspects of Indonesians' way of life, from culture, tradition, and social interaction to politics. However, it should be noted that Islam in Indonesia is a non-monolithic entity. Two major denominations of Islam, Sunni and Shia, are both present and within each denomination there are also groups with different orientations. Sunni is the Islamic denomination followed by most Indonesian Muslims, but it is not a single entity as it encompasses many religious subgroups and orientations. The two most important Sunni groups in Indonesia are the modernists and traditionalists. The former is associated chiefly with an Islamic movement called Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, while the latter is represented by Nahdlatul Ulama', popularly known by its acronym NU and established in 1926. Both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama' are major moderate Islamic groups that shape dominant orientations of Indonesian Islam in general. In terms of schools of Islamic law, Nahdlatul Ulama' follows Imam al-Shafii's or Shafiite teachings, while Muhammadiyah does not rigidly and exclusively declare its affiliation to a specific Islamic school (*mazhab*). Aside from these two major Islamic groups, smaller Muslim groups also exist such as *The Persatuan Islam* (Unity of Islam) known as Persis and based in Bandung; Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), which is based in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, and Mathlaul Anwar; and Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah Indonesia. Shiism and Ahmadiyah, on the other hand, are tiny minority Muslim groups with a presence only in some parts of Indonesia.

In addition to these Islamic organizations, it is also important to note *Majelis Ulama' Indonesia* (Indonesian Council of Ulama'). As briefly indicated above, Indonesian Muslim groups are subdivided into many groups and organizations that can be broadly categorized as civil society groups. It is interesting that these civil society groups are then united within a body founded and sponsored by the state called *Majelis Ulama' Indonesia* (MUI). Established in 1976 by the New Order administration, MUI was intended as a forum for all Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Sunnism's two main trends – modernist and traditionalist – also merit further examination. The emergence of these movements in Indonesian Islam can be seen as stemming from its dialectical nature. The founding of both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama' did not occur in a vacuum from socio-political conditions at the time of colonization. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, established the organization as a response to what was happening both globally and locally. At the global level, Ahmad Dahlan's attempt was part of a reform movement taking place across the Muslim

world. Leading reformers such as Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh were very influential in shaping Dahlan's mindset for Islamic reform in Indonesia. In other words, Muhammadiyah was founded as an attempt to deal with the intellectual and cultural backwardness of the Muslim world at the dawn of modernity. Likewise, at the local level, Muslim backwardness was also experienced in Indonesia – which at the time was known as Netherlands East Indies – in the framework of colonialism, as Indonesia was heavily dependent on its Dutch colonial master for regulating and observing its social, political, and religious activities.

State-religion relations

Given the complexity in the sphere of religion, identifying the nature of the relationship between state and religion in Indonesia is fundamental. Since the beginning of the modern period of Indonesian history, the interplay between politics and religion has been pivotal in shaping the political dynamics and religious landscape. Theoretically, the relationship between politics and religion is not monolithic. Din Syamsuddin (1993: 6) argues that this relationship can be identified in three categories: integral, secular, and symbiotic. The first view believes that state and religion are inseparable. The second view argues that state and religion each have their own role and domain, and that both are independent and separate. The latter view argues that state and religion basically operate in their own domains, but that the domains of state and religion are interconnected.

Using this categorisation, neither the integral nor the secular view is relevant to the Indonesian case. Constitutionally, Indonesia does not have a state religion, but it is not a secular state either and adopts a consensus between these two positions through a paradigm called *Negara Pancasila*. Thus, it is not solely governed on the basis of religious principles nor is it a secular state where the term 'secular' has an anti-religious connotation rather than the meaning of separation between religion and state. Historically, in the pre-independence period, the discourse on the type of government that Indonesia would adopt took place among the republic's founding fathers. On the one hand, Muslim leaders such as Muhammad Natsir, Kahar Muzakkir, and Wahid Hasyim aspired for Indonesia to be an Islamic state or a state based on Islamic law; nationalist leaders such as Sukarno viewed the secular state as a suitable model for Indonesia. According to Mahfud MD, the tension between these two diametrically-opposed positions was inevitable. However, it could only be resolved by taking a middle ground. Both sides agreed to a compromise: Indonesia would not be a religion-based state as Muslims were not the only ones struggling for independence and Indonesia has a religiously diverse population; however, Indonesia would not be a secular state either

(Republika, 2019). As an alternative, the *Pancasila* state was the most rational middle path adopted by these two opposite orientations.

The late Munawir Sjadzali (1993), the long-serving Minister of Religious Affairs during Suharto's administration (1983-1993), explained that *Pancasila* state is not religion-based state. He described a religion-based state as defined by several traits, namely: a) a state that has an official religion; b) the source of law is the scripture of the respective official religion; and, c) the power of the state is held by religious leaders. All three conditions cannot be found in Indonesia. Although Islam is the religion with the biggest following in the country, it is not the state's official religion. In terms of law, Indonesia does not take any scripture as a source of its laws, although some may be inspired by the scripture of the several religions recognised in Indonesia. And lastly, religious leaders in Indonesia are not the holders of state power. At the same time, it is not a secular state as in a secular state, politics or affairs of the state are totally separate from any religious affairs. Thus, while the government is present in the citizen's religious life, it is not too deeply involved in personal religious affairs, but only to the extent needed to govern and enhance the quality of citizens' religious life.

The governance of religious diversity

From the above description of the complexities of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, it is obvious that Indonesia is indeed the result of multicultural consensus. For this reason, the government has set some regulations to govern religious diversity and almost all aspects of religious life in the country. Religion is that important an element.

This section describes some of the practices set by the Indonesian government to govern this dynamic. Diversity of religion is not unique to Indonesia; the country's status as a neither a religion-based nor a secular state, however, is unique. Despite this constitutional formulation, the government regulates religious diversity and life in the country as, in the Indonesian context, being a non-religion-based country refers to the fact that Indonesia is not governed according to certain religious principles exclusively. At the same time, it is mandatory for all Indonesian citizens to profess a religion of their preference. In this context, the term 'secular' also comes with its specific meaning: it does not signify separation of state and religion or autonomy of religion from politics and state; rather, it indicates a detached but definite presence of religion in the country's general affairs.

This last statement may raise a question: how do people know that somebody is atheist or religious? As religious preference or orientation is something very private, how does it come to the state's attention? The

answer is that religious identity is publicly declared because it is recorded on the national identity card, or *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP). A citizen may be denied a national identity card if he or she does not explicitly state his or her religious affiliation.

Referring back to Indonesian identity as *Negara Pancasila*, it is clear that *Pancasila* is a crystallization of the religious identity of the Indonesian people. The first principle of this state philosophy is '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*', which can generally be translated as the unity of Godhead. This serves, first and foremost, as the Indonesian national principle regarding religious diversity. The phrase 'unity of Godhead' at the same time signifies the primacy of professing a religion – an obligation to embrace one of the country's six official religions as well as a guarantee that the government will protect the citizen's religious preference given that it complies with the state's principle.

In addition to outlining the state philosophy in governing its affairs, the Constitution also stipulates how religion operates within Indonesian society. This is stated in Article 29, paragraph 2: 'The state guarantees the freedom of its citizens to profess religion of their preference and to perform rituals based on their religions and beliefs'. It is obvious from this Article that the State of Indonesia grants freedom to embrace any religion and that the exercise of the respective religion's rituals will be protected by the state. As an implementation of this principle, houses of worship of all religions are built in Indonesia. However, as people of different faiths live side by side in the community, the building of houses of worship often creates strains among them. A 2006 decree, signed jointly by the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs, sought to prevent such horizontal tension.

Another important element of governance of religious diversity in Indonesia was the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In many countries, it may seem peculiar that religious affairs are regulated by the government, as many people might also believe that religious activities are a private domain of human life. As the majority is Muslim, this Ministry deals mostly with administering Muslims' religious life. However, proportional sections for all other religions were also created.

The governance of diversity of religion in Indonesia can also be seen from the designation of public holidays, which include religious observances. For Muslims, the days of the feasts of Idul Fithri and Idul Adha are considered public holidays. The same is also the case for Christians, who enjoy a holiday for their sacred day of Good Friday and the celebration of Christmas Day. The Indonesian government also shows respect to Hindus, Buddhists, and the

followers of Confucianism by recognising their holy days as a national holiday for all Indonesian citizens.

From a normative point of view, the governance of religious diversity in Indonesia has been well reflected in the Constitution and formal regulation issued by the state. The question of how these normative rules are implemented is outside this narrative's scope.

Drivers of Religiously-Inspired Radicalisation and Assessment

Indonesia has been widely recognized as a Muslim-majority country that is relatively moderate, inclusive, and tolerant compared to other Muslim countries mainly in the Middle East (Madjid, 1994; Hefner, 2011; Menchik, 2016). Some argue that Indonesia, as the country with the world's largest Muslim population, has been able to perpetuate the notion and practice of the national principle of 'unity in diversity' (Steenbrink, 1998; Ramage, 2002; Intan, 2006). The reality of Indonesia's multiculturalism has been taken into account by those recognizing it as the Muslim country that tends to abandon any kind of devastated religious conflict and terror (Abdullah, 2003; Suparlan, 2003; Wahid, 2009; Mas'udi, 2010). However, in the post-Suharto era, different realities of the surge of violent religious radicalisation are often depicted. Although in terms of number, cases of terrorism have been gradually declining in the period of the second decade of reformation, the cases of religious intolerance have remained steady in the same period. Consequently, the future trend of radicalism still needs to be considered very seriously.

Radicalism

As stated earlier, the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 paved the way for the re-emergence of religious groups that had been long suppressed by the regime. Among the inevitable consequences of this easing of the repression is a rise in religious conflicts generated by political contestation, for instance some of the turmoil in Ambon, Sulawesi and Poso, Maluku (Schulze, 2002; Sukma, 2005; Van Klinken, 2007; Schulze, 2017). In 2002, as part of the global impact of the September 11, 2001, attack in the US, Indonesia experienced the Bali bombing (Ramakrishna and Tan, 2003; Singh, 2004; Magouirk et al., 2008; West, 2008; Galamas, 2015; Zora, 2015) that left 202 dead; responsibility for the blast was claimed by Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the al-Qaeda branch in Southeast Asia. This was followed by other major acts of terrorism: in 2003, a JI cell exploded a bomb at J. W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, leaving 11 dead and 152 severely injured (Oak, 2010); in 2004, five people were killed and hundreds seriously injured by a bomb in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (Subhan, 2016); a year later, another bombing

destroyed Kuta, Bali, killing 22 and injuring more than 100 (ibid.). The latter was the most traumatic and significantly shook the country's national security.

Terrorism experts believe that all these attacks were committed by JI networks. Indonesia was not struck by other attacks until 2009, when bombs went off at the J. W. Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta (Sukma et al., 2011; Subhan, 2016), leaving seven dead and injuring 50. The destruction and trauma marked this as the darkest period for Indonesia, placing it under the threat of terror in the first decade after reformation.

In the second decade of the post-authoritarian era (2010-2017), the number of terrorist incidents motivated by extremist religious ideology decreased dramatically despite several smaller attacks attributed to the global activity of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Southeast Asian ISIS branches such as Jamaah Anshar al-Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Anshar al-Tauhid (JAT) have claimed responsibility for attacks during this period. On January 14, 2016, for example, an ISIS network launched an attack in Thamrin Street, Jakarta, that killed eight people (Fenton and Price, 2016; Suratman, 2017; Sundoko et al., 2018). Other smaller attacks took place in Surabaya (June 8), Surakarta (July 5), Medan (August 28), and Samarinda (November 13) (Subhan, 2016). There were no fatalities from these incidents. In 2018, however, three churches in Surabaya were targeted by terrorist attacks on May 13, May 16, and June 3; 11 people were killed and 50 injured in the first (Irawan, 2018). In 2019, there was one incident in Sukoharjo, on June 3 (The Jakarta Post, 2019). There were no victims in this latest attack.

However, there is another critical issue influenced by the phenomenon of ISIS. The Indonesian Police headquarters (Mabes POLRI) in Jakarta released an official document listing Indonesian terrorist leaders and other international actors (POLRI, 2017). At the same time, Mabes POLRI, through the head of its public relations division, General Setyo Wasisto, informs that there are 671 Indonesians who have participated in terror acts in Iraq and Syria (Movanita, 2017). The latest data from the head of the presidential office, Moeldoko, list 590 Indonesian fighters in Syria; this does not include 103 dead, 86 returned to Indonesia, and 539 being deported to Indonesia (Kumparan, 2018). In addition, 57 Indonesian radical Islamists have gone to the Philippines; 5 are known to be alive, 32 have been killed, and 7 were deported (ibid.).

Religious intolerance

Religious intolerance refers to any intolerant acts conducted in the name of religion. It may be considered a kind of manifestation of violent religious

radicalisation because it involves violence. Intolerance deals with the instances of 'sweeping raids on places considered contrary to sharia law, attacks on houses of worship of other faiths, demonstrations against groups perceived as tarnishing the sanctity of Islam, and being active in groups that explicitly work to impose sharia law' (The Wahid Foundation, 2017: 10).

For an extensive period, there had not been a serious problem with the existence of Shiism in Indonesia. However, in 2005, a fatwa was issued by Indonesian Council of Ulama' denouncing Shiism as a deviant Muslim group. This fatwa is an important factor in fuelling hatred and social discrimination towards Shiis in Indonesia. Other Muslim minority groups also exist. Ahmadiyah and Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII) are known for their 'unique' understanding and practice of Islam, which to a certain extent, marginalizes them. Globally, Ahmadiyah split into two groups, the Lahore and Qadian. Both are present in Indonesia. The former is known in Indonesia as Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), while the latter is popularly known as Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI). As with the Shiis, Ahmadis also experience social discrimination and exclusion due to their beliefs. The fatwa on their deviance, also issued in 2005 by Indonesian Council of Ulama', has further marginalized these groups.

Before 2008, the number of cases of religious intolerance in Indonesia had been relatively stable, never surpassing 50; from 2008 to 2010, their number fluctuated from 55 to 93 (The Wahid Institute, 2008; 2009; 2010). The actors of intolerance were the state apparatus, Islamist organisations, Muslim hardliners, and others. The victims of intolerance were primarily religious minority groups such as Ahmadiyya, Shia, Christian, and local-indigenous believers. In 2011, the number of cases doubled to 185, falling to 110 in 2012, then doubling again to 245 in 2013; this number has since steadily risen, with 158, 190, 204, and 213 cases in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively (The Wahid Institute, 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017).

In 2018, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat), the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, and Convey Indonesia conducted research on the issue of intolerance and its relationship to the discourse of jihad and terrorism. The study involved 1,859 students and university students and 322 teachers and lecturers in 34 provinces and 68 cities in Indonesia (PPIM and Convey, 2018); 86 per cent of students and university students and 87.89 per cent of teachers and lecturers agree that the government should ban minority religious groups accused of deviating from Islamic teaching. Among all respondents, 91.23 per cent agree that sharia law should be imposed at the state level; 37.71 per cent agree that jihad means '*qital*' or waging war against non-Muslims; 37.71 per cent agree that suicide bombings carry a meaning of the Islamic jihad; and, 61.92 per

cent understand that the caliphate system is the recognised Islamic polity (ibid.).

Despite the gradual decline in the number of terrorist incidents in the second decade after reformation, the steady rise in the number of cases of religious intolerance suggests that the level of violent religious radicalisation in Indonesia has remained high and may lead to negative impacts on the state and society.

In 2016, groups of Islamists from across Indonesian regions travelled to Jakarta to protest against the then-Jakarta Governor, Basuki Thajaja Purnama, who was accused of alleged blasphemy. This accusation was related to one of Purnama's speeches in which he urged the public not to believe those who use the Quranic verses for political purposes. While Purnama said that this was not meant to disrespect the scripture of Islam, this statement was, nonetheless, perceived differently by some Muslim groups.

Charges filed against Purnama resulted in his imprisonment for two years and also the loss of the gubernatorial election to another candidate, Anies Baswedan, who was promoted by Islamist groups. Although many believed that the politicization of Islam would end with Baswedan's victory, this case suggests the reverse. The victory is even used by Islamists as a precedent for introducing a deeper influence and role of Islamic doctrines into political practices. Obviously, this extended to the presidential election of April 2019. The fact that there were only two presidential candidates brought sharper polarization of religious and non-religious groups or the pious and non-pious Muslim groups, deepening Islam's politicization in contemporary Indonesia. Moreover, the debate over Islam and secularism has reignited.

Future trends of radicalism

Since acts of terrorism and radicalism are closely related to ideology and worldviews, they cannot develop in a time where ideologies of religion and religious expressions are confined to those approved by state, although the potential of being radical remained latent. In this context, therefore, the escalation of religious radicalism in Indonesia has significantly arisen in the post-New Order period with the lifting in 1998 of Suharto-era political restrictions. This opened the way for diverse expressions of Islam in the country, including more scripturalistic, conservative, and radical versions of religious expressions and manifestations. Since then radicalism has emerged as a major threat for Indonesia's governance. Although some groups and individuals identified as radical have been captured, the threat of radicalism has not been fully tackled. Ansyaad Mbai (2014) notes that five major

terrorist attacks since 2002 were all associated with Jamaah Islamiyah: the Bali bombing in 2002, the bomb at J.W. Marriot Hotel Jakarta in 2003, the Australian Embassy bombing in 2004, a second Bali bombing in 2005, and the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton blasts in 2009. The same group was also linked to several minor attacks on houses of worship and some governments' vital objects (ibid.: 7).

Mbai also analyses shifts that have taken place in the nature of the radicalism movement in Indonesia over time. Firstly, in terms of targets, radical groups have switched focus from global and foreign subjects to local and domestic subjects (ibid.: 20-21). Fawaz A Gerges (2009) notes a similar reorientation of Indonesian radicals from 'far enemy' (*al-aduwwu al-baid*) to 'near enemy' (*al-aduwwu al-qarib*). The former refers to foreign subjects seen as threatening Islam, such as Western political actors showing hostility to Islam, while 'near enemy' identifies domestic subjects (including government and its agencies) perceived as posing a threat to Islam, whether in the form of support to those foreign agencies or by holding views contrary to the radicals' beliefs. Secondly, since 2010 acts of terrorism have been perpetrated by small jihadi cells (Mbai, 2014: 9). This shift is in line with strategies terrorist groups adopt in response to intensive campaigns by state agencies aimed at eradicating radicalism. The involvement of former participants in attacks in police efforts has forced active cells to reorganise.

Mbai furthermore warns that the purpose and forms of network cells are also changing very dynamically, giving cells the flexibility to unite and split according to the pressure applied by security forces (2014: 23). From this point, Mbai concludes that understanding the shifting nature of terrorism cells is pivotal for gaining more comprehensive insight into the nature of radicalism, including possible trends that could help prevent future attacks.

Here it is worth examining data that could help project how radicalism trends in Indonesia may unfold. A survey by Lazuardi Biru reveals that 3 out of 33 provinces in Indonesia are the most vulnerable for radicalism. These are: Aceh, with highest vulnerability index at 56.8 per cent, followed by East Java and Banten, both indexed at 46.6 per cent.⁴ The BNPT also released figures on the number of Indonesians who joined ISIS. There are 515 Indonesian citizens involved in ISIS, of whom 106 people have been deported to Indonesia. These figures show that radicalism's potential threat to Indonesia is quite high. This conclusion is supported by a recent survey by *Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat* (PPIM, Center for the Research of Islam and Society) of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta.

⁴ <http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/survei-ri-masih-rawan-aksi-radikalisme-dan-terorisme/12056>

According to the survey, 51.1 per cent of Muslim student respondents showed intolerance towards the followers of minority Muslim groups such as Ahmadiyah and Shia, while 34.4 per cent of this group also showed intolerant attitudes towards people of other religions. This survey uncovers important findings regarding jihad. Among respondents who are teachers and university lecturers, 82.30 per cent believe that the true meaning of *jihad* is fighting against non-Muslims; this view is shared by 62.29 per cent of student respondents. However, 93.17 per cent of lecturers and teachers in the survey, and 76.65 per cent of student respondents do not agree with the notion that bombings or suicide bombings in the name of religion are the true meaning of *jihad*. Although from this figure, it can be seen that the percentage of those who believe in jihad as a doctrine and tool to be hostile to non-Muslims is lower than those who believe that bombing is not related with doctrine of religion, this figure is alarming for the future trend of radicalism in Indonesia.

State and Non-state Approaches to Religiously-Inspired Radicalisation

Government policies in countering terrorism

The Indonesian Government has paid very serious attention to radicalism, which has showed an increasing tendency over time. However, its efforts to eradicate radicalism have varied in their effectiveness. Under Megawati's presidency (2001-2004), the government issued a two decrees, or *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang*, known as Perpu Number 1 and Perpu Number 2, in response to the Bali bombing in 2002. This was passed into legislation the following year as Law (*Undang-undang*) Number 15 Year 2003 and serves as the basis for Indonesian security authorities to deal with radicalism and terrorism (Purwawidada, 2014: 23).

Subsequently, actions to prevent the spread of radical ideas were also taken. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, for example, many special units dealing with terrorism were formed, from both police and military units. This counterterrorism policy is manifested in the formation of *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (National Agency for the Eradication of Terrorism). Ansyad Mbai, an important government counterterrorism analyst, cites the Yudhoyono's government approach to eradicating terrorism as harder than approaches employed in previous periods. This policy comprises four derivative strategies: a) 'making the war on terror as Indonesia's own'; b) 'enlisting former terrorists in the anti-terrorism campaign'; c) 'letting the elite police force rather than military lead counterterrorism operation'; and d) trial of the terrorists has to be carried judiciously and transparently (Mbai, 2014: 138).

Expansion of civil society approach by government

The development and application of policies towards radicalism continues in Joko Widodo's era. There are two important policies that emerged in the first term of Joko Widodo's presidency; these can be classed as security and non-security approaches. The security approach is characterized by revitalizing an elite unit within the Indonesian military forces named *Komando Operasi Khusus Gabungan* (Combined Command for Special Operation). This unit combines special forces for terrorism within Army (Detasemen Khusus 81 Kopassus), Navy (Detasemen Jalamangkara), and Air Force (Satuan Bravo 90). This joint special force was formed on June 9, 2015 by General Moeldoko. However, it was deactivated not long after its formation due to technical reasons, for instance the existence within the police force and army of special anti-terrorism units. However, due to the rising trend of terrorism attacks, and high potential of radicalism among youth, in 2018 this joint force was reactivated but has only 90 members.⁵

As radicalism involves ideology, a non-security approach was taken during Joko Widodo's first term. This approach mainstreamed moderate Islam (*wasathiyat al-Islam*) and established the *Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila* (Center for the Strengthening of Pancasila Ideology). The programme resulted from *High Level Consultation of World Muslim Scholars on Wastiyat Islam* and its main message is to bring back Islam as a religion of peace and as a religion of civilization based on teachings of love and passion, harmony, unity, equality, freedom, and peace among fellow Muslims and human beings. The High Level Consultation also launched *Bogor Messages* which consists of four points, namely: a) reactivation of the moderate Islam paradigm; b) upholding the moderate Islam paradigm as values of life at both the individual and communal levels; c) strengthening endeavours to prove to a global audience that moderation is a basic value of Islam in all walks of life; and d) inviting Muslim countries and communities to promote moderate Islam paradigm globally (NU Online, 2018).

The establishment of *Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila*, on the other hand, is aimed more at local levels and contexts. *Pancasila* is the state philosophy for Indonesians and consists of the five principles of Godness, Humanity, Unity, Consultation or Representation, and Social Justice. Adopting Pancasila as their sole ideology is compulsory for Indonesians. The establishment of the Centre is aimed at revitalizing Pancasila as way of life for all Indonesians to counter the Islamist campaign for its abolishment on the basis that Pancasila is a human creation and thus does not represent Islamic values. Moderate Muslim leaders, however, believe that Pancasila is distilled from

⁵ <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180514202206-20-298176/lima-pasukan-elite-anti-teror-di-indonesia>

religious values. Din Syamsuddin once an Indonesian Presidential Envoy for Dialogue of Religion and and Cooperation among Civilizations, for example, maintains that Pancasila is compatible with the basic values of Islam and even of all religions.⁶

In the midst of endeavours to revitalize *Pancasila* as a state philosophy, some Islamist groups, championed by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, conducted a widespread campaign to reject it.⁷ In this context, while the meaning of radicalism may still be similar to previous administrations, it has been extended to organizations or religious groups seen as having potential to become radical. Therefore, Hizbut Tahrir's opposition to Pancasila as a state philosophy has resulted in HTI's labelling as radical and culminated in the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Although widely criticised, this was a clear indication how anti-radical policy was upheld in administration's first term.

In his second term as president, Joko Widodo focused even more intensely on the issue of radicalism: 'There must be serious attempts to prevent the wide spread of radicalism', the president affirmed.⁸ According to the Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, radicalism should not be associated with certain groups, such as Islamic groups.⁹ Furthermore, he advised that association of radicalism with a specific religion should be avoided. He defines radicalism as 'an ideology willing to replace the state's ideology by means resisting rules of law, infiltrating young generations' thought'. Regardless of religion, anyone committing such acts is called 'radical'.

As the national agency responsible for eradicating radicalism, the BNPT outlines two strategies for dealing with radicalism, namely, counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation. The former refers to the instilling of Indonesian values and non-violent practices. The object of counter-radicalisation is the general public who have not been involved in radical or terrorist activity. This strategy is implemented through education, both formal and informal. Furthermore, counter-radicalisation is carried out by inviting the involvement of local leaders, religious leaders, education practitioners, and cultural agencies. Deradicalisation, on the other hand, is directed at those engaged in radical and terrorist activity. Its main aims are

⁶ <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/85788/12/din-syamsuddin-pancasila-sudah-final-jangan-diutak-atik-lagi-1593497214>

⁷ <https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2018/05/07/337/1895377/hti-terbukti-rancang-uu-khilafah-islamiah-dan-melenceng-dari-pancasila>

⁸ <https://www.suara.com/news/2019/10/31/151739/jokowi-harus-ada-upaya-serius-untuk-mencegah-paham-radikalisme>

⁹ <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191031200409-20-444673/mahfud-md-sebut-radikalisme-tak-identik-dengan-agama-tertentu>

to persuade those who are involved in radical activity to avoid violence and terror for achieving their goals. In addition, this approach is also directed at promoting moderation of religious doctrines among radicals (BNPT, 2018.: 2-3).

However, the government's initiative to eradicate radicalism has prompted a severe backlash from religious groups, especially Islamic. The effectiveness of this policy, nevertheless, is questionable. Amidst all kinds of rules and policies taken by the Indonesian government to eradicate radicalism, terrorist attacks have frequently taken place.

Civil society-led approaches to countering religiously inspired radicalisation

The government is aware that eradicating radicalism in an Indonesian context also requires the involvement of civil society groups. The most notable among Indonesian Islamic civil societies are Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama' (NU).¹⁰ The former is widely known as a modernist Islamic movement with a national network across the archipelago. Muhammadiyah operates within the realm of social welfare, providing health and education facilities for public. NU, on the other hand, is identified as a traditional Islamic movement and is also involved in education, mostly in traditional religious education through its nationwide network of *pesantren* (boarding schools). Although Muhammadiyah and NU operate within different social bases, they are united by moderate religious orientation. In this context, both are regarded as main pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia.

From Muhammadiyah's perspective, deradicalisation is an urgent action to be taken. However, the group objects to the use of the term 'de-radicalisation' as it potentially has a dehumanization connotation for targeted individuals. As an alternative, Muhammadiyah propose the term 'moderation', which is more positive and conjures an image that humanizes former 'radicals'. The general secretary of the Muhammadiyah Central Board, Abdul Mu'ti, stated that by moderation the group means inviting people to moderateness: 'In principle, those who have been radical can be transformed into better individual by adopting tolerant views without losing their identities'. Furthermore, Mu'ti confirmed that Muhammadiyah is open to any social groups willing to engage with it as Muhammadiyah is convinced that moderation is not a theory, but a practice. As an example, Mu'ti cited interreligious tolerance, stating it is not a theory, but can only be achieved through cohabitation. Radicalism, in Mu'ti's view, is not merely a theological problem, but also caused by social and economic disparities. In this context,

¹⁰ <https://www.tempo.co/abc/1677/nu-dan-muhammadiyah-dan-program-deradikalisasi-di-indonesia>

Muhammadiyah believes that a social approach should be seriously considered. In a more practical way, building awareness of otherness and intimacy are two elements that should be taken into daily life. People learn to live by side and accepting differences through habitation and proximity.¹¹

Muhammadiyah general chairperson, Haedar Nashir confirmed Mu'ti's position. He argued that Indonesia is a moderate nation comprised of diverse ethnic and religious groups. Indonesia has been successful in building common ground for those diversities through its state philosophy of Pancasila, which he sees as a meeting point for any ideologies and orientations;¹² 'this fundamental capital should be transformed into force to build a moderate Indonesia, through moderate ways'. In such a context, Haedar also believes that in dealing with radicalism, moderate ways are inevitable.¹³

Nahdlatul Ulama', on the other hand, believes that although it has an important role in deradicalisation, its involvement in such a government programme has not been adequate. Imdadun Rahmat, a prominent researcher and activist of Nahdlatul Ulama', argues that the government has not fully engaged NU. ¹⁴ In a practical context, NU has launched a campaign on moderateness through online discussions. Its website "nu-online" has been very active in promoting moderate and tolerant orientations of Islam.¹⁵ This activity is seen as promising in terms of its effectiveness among Indonesian Muslim youth who are very active users of the internet. According to *Kompas* records, in 2015 the NU website was visited by 1.6 million users – a 19 per cent rise over 2014. In 2015, the website was accessed as many as 6.9 million times, or about 800 visits daily.¹⁶

Crisis Case Study: The Limits of Deradicalisation

Deradicalisation is a difficult task. Its difficulty does not only relate to the complexity of dealing with radicals, but also the conceptual level. Many see deradicalisation as a pejorative term, and that rather than denouncing radicalism, it basically has the potential to invite the response of radicals. Therefore, it is not only criticized by certain Islamic organizations such as

¹¹ <https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/416004/millennials/muhammadiyah-kunci-redam-radikalisme-ada-di-pendekatan-sosial>

¹² <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/haedar-nashir-moderasi-beragama-bukan-deradikalisasi/5203018.html>

¹³ <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/haedar-nashir-moderasi-beragama-bukan-deradikalisasi/5203018.html>

¹⁴ <https://www.tempo.co/abc/1677/nu-dan-muhammadiyah-dan-program-deradikalisasi-di-indonesia>

¹⁵ <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/65279/NU-Online-dan-Deradikalisasi>

¹⁶ <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/65279/NU-Online-dan-Deradikalisasi>

Muhammadiyah, but it also prompts a more systematic backlash from radical groups. It should also be noted that the special counterterrorism force within the police engages in violent combat with radical groups, and while it may be effective, violent deradicalisation imposed by state has only a temporary effect and does not deal with the root cause of radicalisation.

As a case study example, we focus here on the perpetrators of the Bali bombing in 2002, who were sentenced to death in 2009. At that time, capital punishment was believed by many scholars, including the authors, to be an effective means for curbing radicalism among youth. At that point of time, one of the authors raised a speculative question: after the execution of three Bali bombers (Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudera), how is the future of radicalism and terrorism in the birthplace of those radicals alike? Will the execution be taken as lesson learned by Muslim youth to turn away from radicalism and terrorism? Or could the execution have the reverse effect and strengthen the younger generation's aspiration to be radical like the three bombers?

On this set of questions, I proposed my hypothesis: I believe that the execution was an effective event to ease the radicalism tension and aspiration among Muslim youth in the region. However, my hypothesis has proved to be false and ineffective. Rather than eradicating or slowing the pace of the radicalism movement, the reverse has taken place. Amrozi and Mukhlas were praised as martyrs. A Muslim youth activist from Lamongan, Nu'man Suhadi, informed that people in Lamongan and surrounding areas were impressed by the so-called martyrdom of Amrozi and Mukhlas, overlooking that their terrorist acts had resulted in hundreds of casualties and was actually inhumane in nature. Suhadi also shared a story with me that the burial process of the Lamongan-born radicals (Amrozi and Mukhlas) was followed by *takbir*. The burial became a celebration of their boldness in fighting the West and an Indonesian government seen as *taghut*.¹⁷

Several elder religious leaders share the same views. Mohammad Thohir, a local leader of a prominent Islamic organization, believes that Amrozi and Mukhlas are martyrs. He extolls their religious heroism in a way that to me rings like a false consciousness. Thohir clearly said: '*Sebagai seorang Muslim, rugi jika tidak mengikuti prosesi penguburan Amrozi. Dia benar-benar mujahid. (As a Muslim, for me is a big lost if I missed the process of Amrozi's and Mukhlas's burial. They are really shahid)*'.¹⁸ I was thus not surprised when another leader in Lamongan informed me regretfully that the threat of radicalism in the region in the future is more visible. 'The execution has

¹⁷ Interview with Nu'man Suhadi, in Lamongan, December 20, 2019.

¹⁸ Conversation with Muhammad Thohir, in Lamongan, East Java, December 21, 2019.

strengthened the aspiration of young Muslim generation to be more radical', he said, sharing his anxiety.¹⁹

As for me, it is not difficult to establish connection between the execution and the rise of radicalism in the region. Rather than viewing those radicals as a threat, many people believe that the execution is clear indication of the Indonesian government's arrogance and hostility to Islam. Furthermore, some radical activists also try to establish connections between Amrozi's execution with the killing of Osama bin Laden. Referring back to Nu'man, he informed me that many youths believe that Amrozi, Mukhlas, and bin Laden are united by their struggle in the name of Islam to fight the United States of America. Nu'man himself is a progressive-minded activist. Therefore, the trend among youths towards becoming more radical has given him concern about the future of moderate Islam.

Therefore, if the capital punishment for key actors of terrorism and radicalism is seen as a success and bright starting point for eradicating terrorism, this is not borne out given the claim of martyrdom by those perpetrating violence in the name of religion. Some reasons can be presented to support this claim.

Firstly, although the main objective of radical movements is to uphold Sharia and topple global regimes labelled as infidel (*kafir*), in fact this objective can be attained by the highest aspiration, namely martyrdom. As martyrdom is the highest value in radical government hierarchy, the death of a radical activist ignites the flame of martyrdom aspiration among other activists. The implication is that the terrorist movement is becoming more intensive using many methods and diverse means and even an unpredictable modus and strategies.

Secondly, the loss of a key figure in a terrorist network or cell through government actions strengthens radicals' conviction regarding the authoritarian nature and infidelity of the respective government, in this case Indonesia. Both Western countries and governments seen having affiliations with them are viewed as the enemy based on those governments fight against radicalism while at the same time adopting governance systems seen as un-Islamic. It should be noted that excessive exposure of success in combatting key actors of terrorism will not alarm them. By contrast, such events are even seen as reasons for vengeance. Live broadcasting of raids by counterterrorism security forces is an example of such counter-productive exposure.

¹⁹ Interview with Khoirul Huda, on December 22, 2019, in Lamongan, East Java.

How to eradicate radicalism and terrorism poses a dilemma. On the one hand, the use of violence is unavoidable as a method. However, when it has resulted in loss of life, especially on the terrorists' side, this has been perceived ambiguously by both sides. In this context, violent methods as such do not promise any bright success. Another method, however, that has proved to be successful is 'enlisting former terrorists to the anti-terrorist campaign' – the so-called catching thieves using thieves technique. In this process, deradicalisation is achieved by using the experience of former radicals or terrorists.

According to Purwawidada, the policy of 'counter-ideology' can be applied through grassroots political mobilization and dialogue. Meantime, through a policy of counter-organization, terrorism's infrastructure and support basis can be fulfilled through education, the media, and by providing more welfare for people, including jobs for youth. If the formula applied in de-radicalisation is false, rather than eradicating radicalism, 'de-radicalisation' could create a massive radical backlash.

Other than the actions discussed above, another policy the government can apply is *ishlah* or reconciliation. *Ishlah* can take the form of building cooperation with and using former radical fighters to sway active cells against radicalism. The effectiveness of using this method of persuasion is evident from the deradicalisation work of Ali Imron, the former Bali bomber, and Nasir Abbas, a Malaysian national who committed several terrorist attacks, mostly in Indonesia. Nasir Abbas is a former Jamaah Islamiyah activist who had reached the rank of *Amir Mantiqi II* or the Leader of Zone III who is responsible for Southeast Asia region. He acknowledges that leaving Jamaah Islamiyah was based on a desire to save Muslims worldwide. He asserts:

'My detachment from Jamaah Islamiyah is motivated by a goal to save Muslims, to the best of my ability, so that they are not influenced by false doctrines. More specifically, my purpose is that Muslims, in particular, and human beings, in general, are not becoming the victims of bombings or attacks which are not based on true religious reason and inhumane'. (Djelantik, 2010: 109).

Ishlah as an approach can also involve social integration strategies for family members of those who have committed acts of terrorism. Being stigmatized as family members of terrorists, they often face serious problems of social integration. At the same time, in the absence of their family leaders, those family members may be economically deprived. Giving assistance and facilities both for social integration and economic deprivation will theoretically pave the smoother ways for deradicalisation.

Indonesian Best Practices of Counter-Radicalism

As a country with a very vibrant dynamic for dealing with radicalism and terrorism, the Indonesian government has made many efforts to cope with this situation. Some have proven fully effective, some less or partly effective, and others may have been completely ineffective. This section, however, will focus only on the best practices that the Indonesian government has taken. In doing so, it will not cover formalist approaches discussed in the previous section. Rather, it will present some best practices that are mostly overlooked by academics and experts on radicalism and terrorism, especially in an Indonesian context. By doing so, it is hoped that more comprehensive policies regarding counterterrorism and radicalism can be recommended.

Anti-radicalism and terrorism agent

As mentioned in the previous section, the most prominent institution formed by the Indonesian government for dealing with terrorism and radicalism is called *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (known as BNPT). It is a non-ministry governmental institution responsible for eradicating radicalism and terrorism. In performing its duties, BNPT is overseen by the Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security. BNPT's head has the rank of Minister and reports directly to the president of the Republic of Indonesia. BNPT was established by Presidential Rule Number 46 Year 2010, and was previously the *Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme* (DKPT) or the Coordinating Desk for Eradicating of Terrorism.

The agency's responsibilities and duties are: a) formulating, coordinating, and implementing policies, strategies, and national programmes dealing with terrorism in its relation to national resilience, counter-radicalisation, and deradicalisation; b) coordinating the law enforcement elements in eradicating terrorism; c) formulating, coordinating, and implementing at the international level through international cooperation; d) formulating policies, strategies, and national programmes for eradicating terrorism; d) performing the coordination of policies, strategies, and national programmes to deal with the problem of terrorism; e) implementing the programme of national preparedness, counter-radicalisation, and deradicalisation.

Based on the above normative formulation, BNPT has been very active in both curing the problem of active terrorism, but also in anticipating the possibility of the spread of radicalism in the future, especially among youth. However, considering the nature of its duty, which deals mostly with violence, many see a high potential for basic human rights violations by

BNPT.²⁰ Such a pessimistic view is understandable. However, without overlooking such potential, attempting to deal with radicalism is also important and interesting and BNPT can, in some areas, be presented as a model of best practice of counter-radicalism in Indonesia. Among rarely seen aspects of countering radicalism is the humanistic and educational approach.

Humanistic approach

For those familiar with terrorism networks in Indonesia, especially Bali Bombing I in 2002, the involvement of four siblings from Lamongan, East Java, received wide publicity. The four siblings are Ali Ghufron, Amrozi, Ali Imron, and Ali Fauzi. Due to their central roles in the bombing, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi were sentenced to death in 2008. Ali Imron was imprisoned for life, while Ali Fauzi had already been released. One story of the humanistic approach taken by BNPT relates how Ali Fauzi informed his brother, Ali Imron, that Suhardi Aluis, Head of BNPT at the time, was about to visit Tenggulun, a hamlet in Lamongan. Tenggulun is not only where the four bombers were born and raised but is also where a number of former radical fighters currently reside. Aluis's decision to visit was based on this fact, in hopes he could build an emotional connection with them. Upon hearing this, Imron responded: 'It will not happen'.²¹

Despite Imron's doubts, the visit finally took place. Aluis went to Tenggulun and met around 40 people who were involved in radicalism and terrorism. The visit proved to be effective, achieving some things that would not have been possible through a coercive approach. As Aluis reached the hamlet, the story goes, the former fighters cried from happiness and regret; one reportedly hugged Aluis, saying he wanted to return to the right path and leave behind the radical route that he had taken so far. Aluis said: 'let us not use violence. Let's build a new life with heart and honesty'.

The story of Aluis's visit is only a fragment that underlines the BNPT's new orientation in dealing with radicalism and terrorism. Ansyad Mbai, the former head of the Coordinating Desk for Eradicating of Terrorism, believes that a military approach is not suitable for countering radicalism and terrorism. The more coercive the policies against and treatment of radical groups, the more they become radical and militant.²² Mbai's statement and Aluis's initiative proved effective, as this type of approach will be able to build emotional and humanistic ties between police and combatants. In our

²⁰ <https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/314550-penanganan-terorisme-bisa-langgar-ham>

²¹ <https://www.dw.com/id/bagaimana-bnpt-memupus-terorisme-dengan-humanisme/a-45865256>

²² Ansyad Mbai, *Dinamika Baru Jejaring Teror di Indonesia*, 135.

personal communication with Ali Fauzi, the former combatant, he revealed the fact that radicals always see police as enemies. 'When we saw police on the street or in their offices, the only thing we had in mind was which part of their bodies we will shoot, head or heart'.²³

The attempts by the BNPT and police to take a non-violent and non-coercive approach is also evident from what could be called 'engagement for disengagement'. For instance, BNPT has invited the engagement of former combatants such as Ali Fauzi to help convert the still-active in terrorist networks. Alius use vaccination as a metaphor: if radicalism is a virus, using a vaccine from the same virus would be more effective in its eradication. And if this 'vaccine' was a strand from the virus, it will be more effective in curing the disease. It is very effective to invite deradicalised fighters to persuade active terrorists to pursue the same path.²⁴

Ali Fauzi, who has been completely deradicalised is not only involved in events initiated and organised by police, but he himself set up a foundation dedicated to re-educating former combatants into abandoning the radical way and adopting a more open, pluralistic, and moderate understanding of Islam. The foundation is called Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian, or The Peace Circle Foundation, and is based in Lamongan, East Java.²⁵ One of its objectives is to educate the children and families of those who have committed terrorism, including the terrorists themselves.

Through a personal and humanistic approach, former combatants and terrorists are guided to the moderate way that includes accepting the idea of nationalism and loyalty to Indonesia. A rare scene took place in Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian complex in the summer of 2019. Former combatants and terrorists gathered in a plain field for the commemoration of Indonesian Independence Day on August 17. The ceremonies included recitation of an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia. Ali Fauzi, who read the text of Indonesian Independence Proclamation,²⁶ said he felt a thrill deep within his soul after reciting the proclamation: 'I want my fellow former combatants and terrorists also experience the same'.²⁷

²³ Personal conversation with Ali Fauzi in Malang, East Java, 28 July 2020.

²⁴ <https://www.beritasatu.com/bernadus-wijayaka/nasional/552287/pimpinan-bnpt-silaturahmi-ke-yayasan-lingkar-perdamaian>

²⁵ <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-3459620/ali-fauzi-dkk-dirikan-yayasan-lingkar-perdamaian-di-lamongan>

²⁶ The original text was read by Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, the first president and vice president of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. It marked the independence of Indonesia, and since then the commemoration of Independence of Indonesia must include the rereading of the text.

²⁷ <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/08/19/09310881/sepenggal-cerita-usai-para-mantan-teroris-laksanakan-upacara-17-agustus>

It's important to note that Ali Fauzi's story is an isolated case. Among many notable radical leaders who have engaged in disengaging radicals are Ali Imron and Nasir Abbas. As mentioned, Ali Imron is Ali Fauzi's brother who set off the bomb in Bali in 2002. After a period as a fugitive, Imron reflected on his own involvement in the attack and this led him to the awareness that he had killed many people who didn't even know him. This turning point was intensified when he was imprisoned, and he later assisted police to persuade active terrorists and radicals to return to more peaceful way of life.

Nasir Abbas is a similar case. Abbas is a Malaysian national involved in several bombings in Indonesia, including the Bali attack. He was captured in 2003 in a region near Jakarta. Abbas was the leader of Mantiqi III Jamaah Islamiyah, which was active across Southeast Asia.²⁸ Like Ali Fauzi, Nasir Abbas is currently spreading moderate understanding of Islam and campaigning for peace. He stated his gratitude for being captured by the police, saying his capture marked the beginning of his turning point.²⁹

Educational approach

BNPT does not only deal with former combatants but is also active in preventing the spread of radical understanding among youth through many programmes. One example is *Jaga Kampus Kita* or Guarding Our Universities. This is a programme organized by BNPT in cooperation with prominent universities across Indonesia to prevent the spread of radicalism and, in more specific terms, radical religious understanding among students and academics. One of authors (Zulian) was involved in a series where he was invited to present a spectrum of religious understandings and how radical understanding begins.

The programme flows in two stages. In the first, seminars and workshops are organized for lecturers in Islamic Studies. It is important to note that Indonesian universities provide courses in Religious Studies to students based on their respective religions. In such a context, religious orientations taught in university classes will certainly determine students' religious orientation and attitudes. Based on this, preventing the spread of radical ideas can be achieved by educating lecturers to be more moderate and open. The second stage is from lecturers to students. In this stage, lecturers serve as campaigners and advocates of a moderate and open religious stance and orientation. However, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this method

²⁸ <https://www.antarane.ws.com/berita/547323/mantan-teroris-asia-tenggara-nasir-abbas-bersyukur-bisa-disadarkan>

²⁹ <https://www.antarane.ws.com/berita/547323/mantan-teroris-asia-tenggara-nasir-abbas-bersyukur-bisa-disadarkan>

as a counter-narrative to widespread radicalism, which previously had been unchallenged.

Returning to Ali Fauzi's successful model of deradicalisation, it can be said that the educational approach is pivotal in shaping his new orientation. The BNPT's role was fundamental in bringing Ali Fauzi to this new understanding. Among steps that BNPT took in his case was sending him to a higher education institution. With BNPT funding, Ali Fauzi was sent to the University of Muhammadiyah Surabaya to pursue a Master's in Islamic Studies. This university was chosen because of its moderate Islamic religious orientation. As mentioned earlier, Muhammadiyah and NU are two champions of moderate Islamic groups in the country.

In the session I attended with Ali Fauzi, he shared that when studying for his degree, one of his habits was to challenge professors and lecturers who mostly promoted progressive, open, and moderate views of Islam. However, over time, a newer awareness grew within Ali Fauzi's mind, and he started to shift his orientation from close-minded and radical to more open and moderate. Ali Fauzi is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in Islamic Studies at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, in addition to running his Foundation in Lamongan. His new orientation is clearly articulated in a statement made during a public forum at Gadjah Mada University: 'I am not a specialist doctor, but once I suffered from such a disease for so many years. Now, I am awake, and I want to cure [other people] who suffered from disease like me'.³⁰

Apart from BNPT's endeavours, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is also taking part in counter-radicalism initiatives. As the root of terrorism is radicalism in its broader sense, former religious affairs minister Hakim Saifuddin noted that, as one way of preventing it, moderation should be understood as a commitment to keep the balance in its perfection, where all citizens regardless of their identities and background should listen to each other, learn, and train to live in harmony. Moderation is closely related to tolerance and awareness of togetherness and mutual understanding among different people.³¹

Recommendations

Some conclusions and recommendation can be drawn from the above discussion.

³⁰ <https://www.ugm.ac.id/id/berita/18814-kisah-penyintas-bom-bali-dan-proses-panjang-memaafkan-pelaku-terorisme>

³¹ Kementerian Agama RI, Moderasi Beragama (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2019), v-vi.

Firstly, in dealing with radicalism and terrorism, the Indonesian government has shifted from a solely coercive policy to a more humanistic approach. Although these two cannot be separated as they have their own contexts and effectiveness, the humanistic approach promises greater success as it touches the very basic dimension of human beings. In this context, this approach is highly recommended and can be considered one of best practice from Indonesia in dealing with radicalism and terrorism.

Secondly, as part of humanistic approach, an interesting model has been the engagement of former combatants and terrorist in initiatives to counter radicalism and terrorism. This involvement has proven effective. In the future, this model can be developed in more systematic ways. As in the case presented above, establishing a centre for former combatants and terrorists is fundamental for shaping a new orientation for their post-radical life.

Thirdly, as higher education has been a source of ideas that influence youths' turn towards radicalism, an approach that targets education – both formal and informal – is important. The example of Ali Fauzi has shown how education has been able to transform his orientation and understanding. In the future, therefore, anti-terrorism and counter-radicalisation efforts need to seriously consider cooperation with a range of educational institutions, both in Indonesia and overseas.

Conclusion

To summarize, it is worth reiterating some points. Firstly, in an Indonesian context, radicalism has posed a serious threat to all members of society, regardless of the ideologies and religions they embrace. Although radicalism exists in all religious traditions, in Indonesia it is mostly associated with Muslim groups. While some might disagree with this, the association is inevitable since Muslims constitute the large majority of religious groups in Indonesia. However, it also should be underlined that while this association is based on the fact that terrorist and radical actions are committed mostly by Muslims, the perpetrators are a minority group and do not represent the majority of Muslims in Indonesia who are moderate.

Secondly, in dealing with terrorism, successive Indonesian governments have implemented a range of policies, although a shift can be seen under Joko Widodo's presidency towards a dual approach of security and non-security. In terms of security, special forces within the police and military have been strengthened, while in a parallel non-security approach – as radicalism and terrorism involve ideology and religious orientations – two actions have been taken, namely the mainstreaming of moderate Islam campaign and the revitalization of the state philosophy of Pancasila.

Thirdly, some policies have proven effective in combatting radicalism. However, other policies and actions need serious reformulation. In this context, deradicalisation is not always a success story. The Indonesian government needs to be more comprehensive in formulating its policies. Options that must be seriously considered are engagement and reconciliation. In fact, the Indonesian government has invited former combatants to cooperate in approaching and converting active members of terrorist cells. However, the family members of terrorism perpetrators are also important to consider. Once stereotyped or stigmatized as a family of terrorists, they often face problems of social integration. If this issue is successfully tackled, deradicalisation will become a more promising strategy than it has been thus far.

Having discussed these facts and the situation regarding radicalism and resilience in Indonesia, some recommendations and examples of best practices can be identified: a) from the perspective of the state, the establishment of special forces in charge of terrorism and radicalism, both from the police and armed forces, has played an effective role in eradicating radicalism; b) the unique strategy adopted by the Indonesian police force to involve former combatants in disengagement and deradicalisation. This latter approach has enlisted former combatants such as Nasir Abbas, Ali Imron, and Ali Fauzi to actively assist with the deradicalisation campaign; c) the founding of peace centres by former combatants; d) the involvement of and initiatives by civil society groups such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama'; and, e) the involvement of educational institutions as education is perhaps the most effective medium for spreading moderate and tolerant orientations.

Interviews and Personal Conversations

Interview with Nu'man Suhadi, in Lamongan, 20 December 2019.

Interview with Khoirul Huda, on 22 December 2019, in Lamongan, East Java.

Personal conversation with Ali Fauzi in Malang, East Java, 28 July 2020.

Personal conversation with Muhammad Thohir, in Lamongan, East Java, 21 December 2019.

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