

## Indicators Assessment – Non-Unitary States

# The United Kingdom

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

### **Countries covered in this series:**

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eu.eu>



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**The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.**

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

## Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: The United Kingdom

### I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

#### *Overall Assessment:*

*Overall, the UK can be considered 'moderately secular'. Although the UK is de facto secular with autonomy between political and religious spheres, there are several ways in which they are connected. Since 2010, freedom of religion is guaranteed under the [Equality Act 2010](#), but although quite recent, this act consolidated existing legislation rather than ushering in new freedoms with regard to religion and on these grounds does not represent a large change in this area. The act also contains 'religious clauses' which allow religions certain exemptions from equalities legislation where this is in conflict with doctrinal teachings, again, something that had existed previous to the 2010 act.*

*In England, the Anglican Church of England is established, although best characterized as a 'weak' in that the political and religious spheres are autonomous and the state secular. Although this autonomy was largely a result of longer historical processes, a few instances of historic ties as well as of their gradual loosening occurred during the focus period. In terms of state interference, parliament applied pressure on the Church in relation to the ordination of women bishops, the first female bishop being ordained in 2014. In terms of loosening ties, since an announcement in 2007 by the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister no longer plays an active role in Church appointments of bishops. In Scotland, the Church of Scotland is a national but not established church and so lacks these more specific connections (and interferences). As a further note, the Queen and senior members of the government participate in state religious services and pay courtesy visits to the places of worship of minority faiths.*

*In terms of religion's involvement in politics, the established church retains a privileged position in some respects. There are reserved seats in the House of Lords for 26 bishops. Church of England ecclesiastical courts are recognised as part of state law and have certain jurisdictional autonomy in church affairs, such as over discipline of the clergy. While minority faiths do not have their own courts with a similar legal status, Catholics, Jews and Muslims do have bodies that adjudicate on areas mainly to do with family law that interpret and apply religious and cultural norms according to the faith community. These are subordinate to state law and decisions made do not have the same legal status. Sharia councils in particular have attracted attention and controversy and in 2018 a government commissioned independent review into their operation submitted its report.*

*There are no major confessional parties in British politics, and few minor ones. There have been increasing numbers of elected members of parliament from minority faith backgrounds; Jews from the 1960s, and more recently Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs also, including in key government cabinet positions. The last general election (December 2019) saw the most diverse parliament yet.*

*Institutionally, a number of government departments consult with faith groups on various policies and department officials attend meetings at national umbrella networks for faith and inter-faith organisations. This is, however, subject to political fluctuations over which groups are consulted.*

*Since the late 1990s there has been a general expansion of faith school provision for minority faiths, including Muslim, Sikh, Seventh-Day Adventist, Greek Orthodox, and Hindu schools. There are over 6800 state funded faith schools in total in England and Wales (incl. CofE), around 37% and 18% of the total schools at primary and secondary level respectively. In Scotland, state funded faith schools make up around 15% and in 2018 the government [pledged its commitment](#) to maintaining them. In general, having faith school status (of whatever kind as exact types vary) means that schools may have different admissions criteria and staffing policies allowing them (to an extent) to discriminate along religious lines if they are oversubscribed.*

*Religious media is permitted and subject to legislation in the same way as media in general. The major faith traditions in Britain all have a variety of print and online media outlets.*

<b>1. State autonomy from religion</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion.	Medium	2020
(1b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/ independence from religion	High	2020
<b>2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
<b>3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Medium	2020
(3b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Medium	2020
(3b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Medium	2020
<b>4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>

(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
<b>5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
<b>6. State recognition of freedom of religion.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	High	2020
<b>7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
<b>8. Autonomy of religious media</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020

(8b) **UNIT 1:** Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.

High

2020

(8b) **UNIT 2:** Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.

High

2020

## II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

### Overall Assessment:

*Although there is no formal list of recognized religions as such, a **variety of religious minority groups are recognized** through a number of institutional and policy arrangements.*

*There are no specific limitations on government jobs/running for office/right to vote on religious grounds. Minority faiths are **represented in politics** principally through a range of bodies and actors that serve as representative interlocutors with government at national and local levels. Since the late 1990s the government has partnered with faith-based organisations much more systematically, although these relations and partnerships can vary and be subject to (political) change.*

*Religious groups are **not directly funded** by government as such, even the established church. Rather, religious groups can gain financial benefits, such as tax exemptions, through having charitable status. The vast majority of religious organisations and churches are charity organisations, and mostly overseen by the Charity Commission (OSCR in Scotland), thereby mixing financial support (through tax exemptions and so on) with conditions and oversight in so far as the organisations meet the criteria for charitable organisations. Chaplains' salaries are paid for in the armed forces, education and healthcare institutions (where they are authorized but not required), and prisons (where they are required by law), although it is the state that provides for these services and salaries come from the requisite budgets.*

*As well as faith schools (see above), in **welfare provision**, since the 1980s faith-based organisations have played an increasing role as part of the growing plurality and competition among service providers in the 'third sector'. This gained prominence in the 2000s under New Labour and then the so-called 'Big Society' under the 2010 Coalition government. A national review of faith organisations in 2007 identified 48 categories of community activities and thousands of projects in each region across the country. The Scottish government too funds a variety of faith and inter-faith organisations involved in welfare and equality work.*

*There are no particular restrictions on **access to public spaces** other than general laws that govern what can and cannot be done in such spaces. There are no bans on religious dress in public equivalent to those found in other European states. The **accommodation of religious difference** in school uniform policy is left to individual schools, in consultation with parents. Halal and kosher slaughter are permitted, as is circumcision of infants for religious reasons. Exemptions have been granted to, for example, Sikhs to carry a kirpan and to not wear motorcycle helmets or hard hats (if they wear a turban). Uniforms and dress codes of, for example, the military, the police, barristers and judges allow for suitably matching turbans for Sikh men and headscarves for Muslim women. On the whole, pragmatic accommodations have generally won out on an ad hoc approach rather than blanket legislation and legal provision.*

*Establishing **religious buildings** has been, on the whole, comparatively less controversial than elsewhere, although doing so either through a new building or repurposing an existing building has not always been easy. Restrictions and delays in the planning permission process tend to revolve around existing laws of building use and concerns around access and parking.*



<b>1. Legal status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	Medium	2020
(1b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
(1b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
<b>2. Religious minority group participation in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	High	2020
(2b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
(2b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
<b>3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
<b>4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
<b>5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020



<b>6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	High	2020
(6b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	High	2020
(6b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	High	2020
<b>7. Ownership of houses of worship.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) <b>UNIT 1:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) <b>UNIT 2:</b> Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020

### III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

#### **Structural indicators:**

**Level of freedom** has been stable, (mid-90s on the Freedom in the World Index), the last few years, although there has been increasing government surveillance of citizens as part of counter-terrorism measures. **Adherence to the rule of law** is high and the UK ranks and scores well in relation to other countries, and has been stable.

Levels of **government-based restrictions on religions** have generally been at the lower end of moderate (under 3) the last decade or more, and lower currently than ten years ago but higher than five years ago. The general European trend has been an increase in restrictions.

Although **state legitimacy** is and has been high, there has been a fluctuating trend since 2007. Levels of **protection for human rights** have been improving in the last decade. The level of **group grievances** has worsened since 2010 and is currently at the top end of moderate (6.4), with a notable jump in 2017, although stabilized the last few years.

**Uneven economic development** had been improving until 2014, worsening since (classed as moderate) and is currently the worst of the 4 WE countries in this series. **Wealth disparity** generally increased from the early 1980s until 2007, fluctuating in the mid to low 30% range throughout the 2000s.

#### **Perception indicators**

**Levels of distrust** are higher for government than they are for parliament, although overall trends are similar. Distrust in both increased between 2005 and 2010, and significantly so for parliament, narrowing the gap between the two (69% for both). It then decreased again, to near 2005 levels, although national parliament is more trusted than the government (57% and 64% respectively). The percentage of people who think things are going wrong in the country decreased between 2010 and 2015 to 29%, before jumping sharply to 59% by 2018, and the percentage who think the current situation is 'bad' or 'very bad' is just over half. Although returning different figures, two polls (Eurobarometer and Pew) both show that levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working are increasing.

On **economic indicators**, the outlook has improved since 2010; fewer people assess their household's economic position as bad or very bad (from 23% to 17%). Those rating the national economy as bad or very bad halved between 2010 and 2015 (from 82% to 41%), following recovery from the financial crisis, and is currently 44%.

More than two thirds of people think that **discrimination** is widespread in the country. Most perceived racial and ethnic discrimination as being more widespread than religious discrimination. 20% of people oppose increased diversity of the country and discomfort with Muslims (as work colleagues or in love relationships with family members) is notably higher than for other religious minorities. Overall, while discrimination in general has been decreasing in recent years, anti-Muslim discrimination has increased.

The number of people who perceive **Islamist extremism** as a threat has been high during the period, reaching 82% in 2015, although this has dropped off in the last couple of years. Although there hasn't been consistent polling, sympathy for violent extremism is extremely low.

*In 2017 the UK reported the highest number of **terror-related** fatalities, arrests, and foiled, failed and successful attacks of Western European countries and arrests and convictions for terrorism related offences have risen in the last few years. State-based violence in the country has mainly been related to Northern Ireland. Violence in relation to religiously attributed extremism became prominent following 7/7. Low level attacks have been a recurring feature and in 2017 a suicide bombing became the most deadly attack for a decade. The UK has been one of the main source countries for **foreign fighters**, although this is now falling. The UK's Global Terrorism Index score has slightly decreased since 2015.*

***Social hostilities** have risen during the period from moderate levels in the 2000s to high levels in the 2010s, particularly affecting Muslims in the context of concerns over terrorism and radicalization. Police figures show a year on year increase in hate crime incidents since (at least) 2012 and racially and religiously motivated incidents spiked following the 2017 EU referendum result. Nevertheless, crime survey figures, which use a different measurement, have shown a decrease.*

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: Free Freedom score: 94	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 12/126 Overall score: 0.8	2019
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: 2.6 Level: Moderate	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 2.3 Level: High	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 1.5 Level: High	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: 6.4 Level: Moderate	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 4 Level: Moderate	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 34%	2016

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Parliament: 57% Government: 64% Other:	2018
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: 59% Dissatisfaction with overall situation: 51%	2018 2018

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	Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: 44% Other:	2019
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: 17% Dissatisfaction national economy: 44% Other:	2018 2018
(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: 68% Opposing diversity: 20% Discomfort with minorities: 6-31% Experiencing discrimination: 4% Other: IpsosMori/yougov/Comres	2015 2018 2015 2015 2018
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: 64% Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: 7% (ICM poll) Other:	2018 2014

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Yes/No: Yes	2018
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: Very High Score: 6.8	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: GTI 5.4 Number of Incidents: 60	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: 111 076	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: Moderate	2020

#### IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

The cornerstone of the government's **national strategic response** is CONTEST, first developed in 2003 prompted by 9/11, and subsequently revised in 2006 following 7/7, and then 2009, 2011 and 2018. It is owned by the Home Office and overseen by the Home Secretary and Prime Minister with a significant role for the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), an Office created in 2006 and located within the Home Office.

CONTEST comprises four aspects, each with its own main aim: Pursue, to stop terrorist attacks, Prevent, to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists, Protect, which largely encompasses the security services working with the private sector to ensure that critical national infrastructure is physically protected and its vulnerability reduced, and Prepare, aimed at mitigating the effects and consequences of an attack in its immediate aftermath and being able to return operating as normal as quickly as possible. The number of **government agencies, departments and bodies** that are part of the counter-terrorism apparatus is large.

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), created in 2003, **coordinates** inter-agency collaboration and sets the **threat level** ('Severe' or higher since August 2014 until Nov 2019 when downgraded to 'Substantial').

In 2007 the Research, Information, Communications Unit (RICU) was established to help manage the language the government used when **communicating about terrorism**.

**Important legislation** has been introduced throughout the period, including: [The Terrorism Act 2000](#), [The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001](#), passed following 9/11; [The Terrorism Act 2006](#) responded to 7/7 and widened the scope to include **early intervention measures**; [The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011](#) included amongst other things limits to **financial services** access; [The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015](#) (CTSA) was introduced mainly in **response to foreign fighters** and includes a variety of travel restriction measures. It also places a legal duty requiring public bodies to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism"; [The Investigatory Powers Act 2016](#) focussed on **communication monitoring** measures; [The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019](#) followed a review in the aftermath of the attacks in 2017; Most recently [an emergency terror law](#) was approved by MPs in February 2020 to prevent the **early release of prisoners** convicted of terror offences following two instances of knife attacks.

The Prevent strand represents the **de-/counter-radicalisation** arm. Overall, a shift can be seen over the last couple of decades, from an initial focus on terrorist violence, to a concern with 'radicalisation' as the process towards violence, to a greater focus on pre-criminal extremism as beliefs that are associated with the radicalisation process and on developing **counter-narratives**. At the core of Prevent is working with **civil society and community actors** and organisations, and a large variety of **projects and programmes are funded** under Prevent, some **government-led** but mostly led by **NGO and community initiatives**, and many with a particular focus on **young people**. There has been considerable debate over conditions attached to such funding and while many NGOs run programmes under government funding, there are also many who run projects funded by other sources. Commentators have generally criticized Prevent's near exclusive emphasis on Muslims, and this is probably the key issue that is used to measure the government's response by civil society actors. These criticisms remain prominent and more recent iterations have purposefully broadened the scope, particularly in response to increasing **far right extremism** and violent extremism and referrals to Prevent. Recent debates have highlighted **human rights** issues and argue for a human rights centred approach as part of calls for a properly **independent review** of Prevent. **Training** to understand and deal with radicalisation and extremism is provided through Prevent and many NGO programmes include their own training elements for practitioners.

*Other measures such as **public awareness campaigns** have also been rolled out in the late 2010s, including campaigns which encourage the general public to play an active role in looking out for and reporting suspicious activity or online content they come across and are concerned about.*

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	Yes	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	Yes	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	Yes	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	High participation	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	Yes	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	Very high level	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	Yes	2020

(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	Yes	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	Yes	2020



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Project Acronym: GREASE

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