

## Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

# Italy

Tina Magazzini

May 2020

This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

### **Countries covered in this series:**

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eu.eu>



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640

**The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.**

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

For further information about the GREASE project please contact: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou, [anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu](mailto:anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu)

<http://grease.eui.eu/>

GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

## Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: Italy

### I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

*Overall assessment:*

The [Italian Constitution](#), at its article 7, ensures **mutual autonomy between state and religion**, asserting the **political autonomy of the state** relative to religion, even though the **term secular or secularism** are never employed. Yet, **Catholicism remained the State religion** until 1985, since Article 7 incorporates the existing concordat between Italy and the Holy See: [originally signed in 1929](#), it was [revised in 1985](#), in which Roman Catholicism lost its status as the **official religion**.

While art. 8 of the Constitution states that **all religious denominations are equally free** before the law, different provisions are in place for the Catholic church, and for other confessions.

The Italian Constitution, the Lateran pacts and the 1985 Concordat protect the participation of the Catholic institutions in **political decision-making** by granting **legal personality** to ecclesiastical bodies. In practice, this translates in the Catholic church playing a tangible formal role in political decision-making, particularly with regard to **civil liberties** (non-recognition or performing of same-sex marriages, and the issue of euthanasia has been criminalized), **education** (Catholic classes in public schools), **welfare and public holidays**, etc. The **participation of all religious groups in public life** is nominally 'equally free' (art. 8 Italian Constitution), but the self-organization and public expression of non-Catholic groups is subject to specific **agreements** between the Italian state and representatives, which translate in a series of **restrictions and limitations**, particularly in the absence of formal recognition (Muslim religious groups). There is no legislation nor provision that forbids the participation of **religiously-based political parties** in political life. Yet, the only such have been Catholic parties.

The degree of **State interference in the regulation of religious institutions**, and the type of **state support and control** over religious courts, councils, religious family law, etc., shows inequalities between denominations. The Catholic church enjoys **privileges** that range from military and tax exemptions, the civil effects of marriages under canon law, the state recognition of the "significance that Rome has to Catholicism", to state-religion cooperation in interpretation and application controversies. The relations with other denominations are regulated by ordinary law subject to legal limitations. The lack of a formal agreement with the Italian government results in obstacles in accessing places of worship and cemeteries, as well as a lack of recognition for **religious practices**. Only religious groups that are granted official recognition have **access to funds** (recipients of 0.8% from the annual income tax return).

There are **no legal restrictions on religious media**. However, Italy recognizes, sponsors, funds and promotes the media produced only by the Catholic religion (e.g. Radio Maria and the TV channel TV2000). In addition to this, secular media afford vast attention to the Catholic religion, including on ethical debates.

Overall, while freedom of religion is officially ensured in Italy in its Constitution, the current legislative and administrative framework of religious governance is such that **not all minority beliefs are tolerated in the same way**. This comes across in sub-indicators 1, 3, 6 and 8, in which the legal dimension appears to be more "generous" towards religious minority than its application in practice is.

| <b>1. State autonomy from religion</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| (1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular                                                                                                                                                                                 | High         | 2020                          |
| (1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion                                                                                                                                                                 | Medium       | 2020                          |
| <b>2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.</b>                                                                                                                                        | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |
| (2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.                                                          | Medium       | 2020                          |
| (2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.                                                                                                                    | Medium       | 2020                          |
| <b>3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                              | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |
| (3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.                                                                                           | Very low     | 2020                          |
| (3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.                                                                                                                                              | Medium       | 2020                          |
| <b>4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).</b>                                                | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |
| (4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.                                               | Medium       | 2020                          |
| (4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.                                                                                             | Medium       | 2020                          |
| <b>5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).</b>                                                                                         | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |
| (5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities. | Medium       | 2020                          |
| (5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.                                                 | Medium       | 2020                          |
| <b>6. State recognition of freedom of religion.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                           | <b>Score</b> | <b>YEAR<br/>(Most Recent)</b> |

| Italy                                                                                                                                                                            | Indicators Assessment | GREASE                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| (6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.                                                                  | Very high             | 2020                      |
| (6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.                                                                                   | Medium                | 2020                      |
| <b>7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.</b>                                                                                | <b>Score</b>          | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions. | Medium                | 2020                      |
| (7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.                                                                               | Medium                | 2020                      |
| <b>8. Autonomy of religious media</b>                                                                                                                                            | <b>Score</b>          | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.                                                       | High                  | 2020                      |
| (8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.                                                                                                  | Low                   | 2020                      |

## II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

### *Overall assessment:*

*The Italian Constitution states at art. 8 that “Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to self-organisation according to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law. Their **relations with the State are regulated by law**, based on **agreements** with their respective representatives.” In practice, however, such agreements are stipulated based on the state’s requirements, modalities, and initiative, which has so far meant that Muslims, who constitute the most numerous religious minority, are not legally recognized as a religious organization having a religious status. The Italian Constitution (art. 8) guarantees the **right of minority religions to self-organize**, but there is no provision explicitly addressing the groups rights **to participate in the political life of the state**. In practice, there has never been an Italian **political party ties to a minority religious group**. This might also be tied to the fact that most religious minorities in contemporary Italy have a strong **migrant component** (or of persons with migrant background), which combined with Italy’s restrictive **citizenship laws** means that many (if not most) members of religious minority groups do not have the right to participate in the political life of the country.*

*The Constitution (art. 7) and the 1985 Agreements between the Holy See and the Italian State grant the Catholic Church **special social security benefits**, but they do not do the same with religious minority groups. In practice, based on bilateral agreements between the Italian state and some religious minorities, the **tax deductibility** of the contributions to certain religious groups are allowed. Until 1986 the Italian state paid a **monthly salary** to the Catholic clergymen. Such ‘allowance’ was replaced by the so called “eight per thousand” in the late eighties: nowadays, taxpayers devolve a compulsory 0.08% of their annual income to an organized religion recognized by Italy. While in 1986 this percentage went directly to the Catholic Church, over the years the number of choices for taxpayers to choose other recognized religions has broaden to include 12 possibilities (as of 2020). Among these there is however no Muslim option, since Islam is not a recognized religion in Italy.*

*Regarding religious minorities **access to public spaces, political participation**, the establishment and **ownership of houses of worship**, there are no Italian laws expressly prohibiting nor obstructing minorities’ right to any of the above, but neither is there a legislation that explicitly addresses the issue or protects the rights of minorities. In the case of Muslims, the **non-recognition of Islam** as a religion by the state translates in the fact that many mosque constructions are blocked by the opposition of local residents. It is estimated that there are about 800 cultural centers and musalla in Italy, which are informal prayer rooms, often housed in garages, basements, and warehouses. They function as a place of worship, and a cultural and educational meeting place, but are not subject to the same protection that recognized houses of worship are.*

*Overall, as noted by the **discrepancies between the legal and practical dimensions** in sub-indicators 1 and 4, while in principle “all religious denominations are equally free before the law”, the right of religious minorities to express their cultural practices in public is limited by their access to resources and by the cumbersome administrative processes, particularly for those minority religions that are not recognized by the state.*

| <b>1. Legal status of religious minority groups.</b>                                                                                                                                                 | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.                                                                  | High                     | 2020                      |
| (1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.                                                                       | Medium                   | 2020                      |
| <b>2. Religious minority group participation in political life.</b>                                                                                                                                  | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.                 | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.                                                                                                                   | Low                      | 2020                      |
| <b>3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.</b>                                                                                                                               | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.                           | Very low                 | 2020                      |
| (3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.                                                                                    | Low                      | 2020                      |
| <b>4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.</b>                                                                                                                                      | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.                                     | High                     | 2020                      |
| (4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.                                                                                                                   | Low                      | 2020                      |
| <b>5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.</b>                                                                                                            | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities. | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.                                                                                | Low                      | 2020                      |
| <b>6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.</b>                                                                                                          | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
| (6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.               | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.                                                                                                       | Low                      | 2020                      |
| <b>7. Ownership of houses of worship.</b>                                                                                                                                                            | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |

Italy

Indicators Assessment

GREASE

(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.

Insufficient information

2020

(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.

Low

2020

### III. **Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels**

*Overall assessment:*

**STRUCTURAL:** Over the past two decades, Italy consistently scored as 'free' in **levels of freedom and adherence to the rule of law**. The country scores for **levels of legitimacy, groups grievances and human rights protection** worsened slightly around the economic crisis, due to negative consequences on vulnerable groups, but then slowly improved. This is mirrored by the scores in **uneven economic development and wealth disparity**, which went up during those same years, but then returned to previous values. In January 2015 the Council of the Lombardy Region (Italy's most populous region, with Milan as its largest city) passed [amendments to a Regional Law that regulated the planning of buildings and other structures for religious purposes](#). These amendments made it extremely cumbersome to build new places of worship for all non-established religious denominations, particularly Muslims – while the Catholic Church remained exempted from the regulation. Such amendments were eventually declared unconstitutional and void in 2018, but it is telling of an increasingly vocal anti-Muslim measures and attacks that increased particularly since 2015 (when migration flows rose with the humanitarian crisis).

**PERCEPTION-BASED:** In terms of perceptions, **trust** in the Parliament has been steadily declining in the past decades. Distrust in the government follows closely that of the Parliament, but tends to be steadily 1-3% higher (so the government is trusted even less than the parliament). Close to 50% in 2019 declared to be **dissatisfied** with the way in which **democracy** works in Italy, but **expectations of economic performance** have gone up over the last decade. Close to half of the population believes that **discrimination is widespread**, but while discrimination based in ethnic origin and sexual orientation is generally acknowledged, **attitudes vary significantly** towards different ethnic and religious minorities. While, for instance, the almost all of the survey respondents over the years claimed more discrimination is present towards people of African descent, Asians, and Muslim people, together with the Roma minority.

Regarding the **perception of terrorist and extremist threats**, concerned peaked in 2015 and remains high (even though it is unsubstantiated by the number of deaths caused by violent extremist attacks).

**INCIDENCE-BASED:** Over the past years, the **level of social hostilities** involving religion have gone from 'moderate' to 'high'. The level of social hostilities towards both Muslim and Jewish communities and individuals has been going up over the past decade, but a peak can be noted from 2015, when **right-wing parties** started making religious diversity of **migrants** the main focus of their political agenda.

According to the GTI report of 2019, together with Montenegro, Lithuania, Netherlands, and Denmark, Italy had the most **severe deterioration** in 2018. In 2018 Italy recorded 14 attacks, but no deaths. Eight of the 14 attacks were by unaffiliated attackers, while one was attributed to anarchists, two to anti-fascist activists, one to neo-fascists, and one to anti-Semitic extremists. Overall, over the past years we can observe a steep **rise in hate-crimes aimed at minorities** (both ethnic and religious), rather than of crimes carried out by religious minority members (which remain few).

The number of violent extremist incidents provided relates to hate crimes recorded by the police. Of these, however, the **number of convictions is incredibly low** (40 in 2017, 31 in 2016, no data available for other years). This reflects a serious problem in the justice system (rather than baselessness of the claims brought to the police).

| 1. Structural factors/environment                                                             | Score/Level/Percentage                                    | YEAR (Most Recent) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| (1a) Level of Freedom                                                                         | Level: <b>Free</b><br>Freedom score: <b>89</b>            | 2020               |
| (1b) Level of adherence to rule of law                                                        | Overall rank: <b>27-128</b><br>Overall score: <b>0.66</b> | 2020               |
| (1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions                                       | Score: <b>2.9</b><br>Level: <b>Moderate</b>               | 2017               |
| (1d) Level of state legitimacy                                                                | Score: <b>3.4</b><br>Level: <b>High</b>                   | 2019               |
| (1e) Level of protection of human rights                                                      | Score: <b>1.4</b><br>Level: <b>High</b>                   | 2019               |
| (1f) Level of group grievances                                                                | Score: <b>4.9</b><br>Level: <b>Moderate</b>               | 2019               |
| (1g) Uneven economic development                                                              | Score: <b>2.3</b><br>Level: <b>Low</b>                    | 2019               |
| (1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share) | Percentage: <b>29.4%</b>                                  | 2016               |

| 2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances) | Percentage (%)                                                                                                                                                                                         | YEAR (Most Recent)           |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (2a) Distrust in national institutions             | Distrust in Parliament: <b>65%</b><br>Distrust in Government: <b>66%</b><br>Other: <b>No data</b>                                                                                                      | 2019<br>2019<br>n/a          |
| (2b) Political discontent                          | Dissatisfaction with country direction: <b>25%</b><br>Dissatisfaction with overall situation: <b>24%</b><br>Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: <b>48%</b><br>Other: <b>No data</b> | 2019<br>2019<br>2019<br>n/a  |
| (2c) Economic discontent                           | Dissatisfaction own financial situation: <b>29%</b><br>Dissatisfaction national economy: <b>25%</b><br>Economic situation is the most serious problem: <b>No data</b><br>Other: <b>No data</b>         | 2019<br>2019<br>n/a<br>n/a   |
| (2d) Discrimination                                | Discrimination is widespread: <b>47%</b><br>Opposing diversity: <b>45%</b><br>Discomfort with minorities: depending on the minority<br>Experienced discrimination: <b>SSA: 23%; NA: 34%; SEA: 37%</b>  | 2015<br>2018<br>2015<br>2016 |

| Italy                           | Indicators Assessment                                                                                                | GREASE             |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
|                                 | Other: <b>No data</b>                                                                                                | n/a                |
| (2e) Views on violent extremism | VE is a serious problem/threat: 80%<br>Endorsement of VE actions/ actors:<br><b>No data</b><br>Other: <b>No data</b> | 2018<br>n/a<br>n/a |

| 3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict) | Score/Level/Number                                     | YEAR (Most Recent) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| (3a) State-based armed conflict                                 | Yes/No: <b>No</b>                                      | 2020               |
| (3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion             | Level: <b>High</b><br>Score: <b>4.9</b>                | 2017               |
| (3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism                          | Score: <b>Low</b><br>Number of Incidents: <b>3.109</b> | 2019               |
| (3d) Violent extremist incidents                                | Number: <b>1111</b>                                    | 2018               |
| (3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks              | Level: <b>Insufficient information</b>                 | 2020               |

#### IV. Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures

*Overall assessment:*

*STRATEGIC APPROACH:* Previously to the 2000s, **special anti-terrorism police squads** were trained to combat political and ideological forms of terrorism, as well as organized crime (mafia), since those there the prevalent forms of terrorism/ organized crime in the country.

Law 438/2001 includes two **references to prevention**, and there is one decree of May 6, 2004 which refers to a **National plan for the management of terrorist events**. This, however, is not publicly available and not a written document, but rather a **coordination instrument** among police and intelligence forces.

Despite there being **no national action plan** available, in 2015 Italy adopted a Law Decree (D.L. 7 of 18 February 2015) concerning "Urgent measures to combat terrorism, including those of an international nature (...) aimed in particular at targeting the **phenomenon of foreign fighters**, the so-called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF).", later converted into Law no. 43 of 17 April 2015. With law 43/2015 the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor was renamed "**National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Prosecutor**". The Law 43/2015 adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 of 2014 aimed at addressing the issue of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF), and Italy participates in the **anti-Daesh international coalition** promoted in 2014 by the US (and which includes the UN, NATO, INTERPOL and the Arab League). Within this framework Italy co-chairs, together with the United States and Saudi Arabia, the **Working Group on Countering Daesh Financing** (Counter-ISIS Finance Group - CIFG).

While, to date, there is no publicly available specific strategy nor action plan to counter extremism, the European Court of Human Rights and other international bodies have repeatedly condemned Italy for its 41-bis article of the Prison Administration Act (the so called '**hard prison regime**'). Initially introduced to deal with domestic terrorism and Mafia bosses through an exceptional regime of isolation, the 41-bis empowered the Minister of Justice to censor all of a prisoner's correspondence, including that with lawyers and human rights organisations. It became a permanent fixture in the **Penal code** in 2002 for cases of terrorism.

*MEASURES:* In terms of **protection of victims**, law No. 206 of 3 August 2004 established that compensation for the victims of terrorist acts should also be of an **economic nature**. Regarding **training for frontline practitioners**, some initiatives exist at a local level, generally promoted by NGOs, particularly in prisons. There is however no national/standardized training provided. Italy's Ministry of Justice Penitentiary Police finances **counter-radicalization programs** in the Italian prison system. Prison employees are **trained to recognize signs of radicalization** among the prison population. These programs also focus on identifying high-risk inmates and separating them from other prisoners who are likely to be susceptible to radicalization.

Within the Ministry of Interior, a Comitato di Analisi Strategica Antiterrorismo (Casa) exists since 2015 to address racialisation, but no information on **state-commissioned research** is available. This was envisioned by a proposal of a put forward in 2016 and that passed at the Lower House in 2017, but it was never approved by the Senate.

Regarding **programmes and measures to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism** more generally, some initiatives exist, but they are limited by **scarce access to funding** and are unevenly distributed across the Italian territory. The difficulty is gaining access to data is reflected in sub-indicators 1f, 1g, 2b, 2g, 2i, 2j e 2k.

| <b>1. Comprehensive strategic approach</b>                                                                                | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan                                                               | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan                                                                 | No                       | 2020                      |
| (1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation                             | No                       | 2020                      |
| (1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination                                     | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law                 | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan | Not applicable           | 2020                      |
| (1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan             | Not applicable           | 2020                      |
| (1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan                                                   | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan                                | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan                   | No                       | 2020                      |

| <b>2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects</b>                                                         | <b>Score</b>             | <b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| (2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism                            | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (2b) Training for frontline practitioners                                                                                              | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation. | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth                                                  | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women                                              | No                       | 2020                      |
| (2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders                                               | Yes                      | 2020                      |
| (2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.      | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention                                                             | Limited level            | 2020                      |
| (2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns                                                                                     | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons                     | Insufficient information | 2020                      |
| (2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism                                          | Insufficient information | 2020                      |

Italy

Indicators Assessment

GREASE

(21) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings

Yes

2020

Project name: Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Project Acronym: GREASE

Project Coordinator: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou

Contact: [anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu](mailto:anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu)

May 2020

Document series reference: D3.2 Indicators Assessment



This document can be downloaded from the publications section of the GREASE website at <https://www.grease.eui.eu/>

The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the authors. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640