

## Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

# France

Author(s) Thomas Sealy and Tariq Modood

May 2020

This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

### **Countries covered in this series:**

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eu.eu>



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640

**The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.**

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

For further information about the GREASE project please contact: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou, [anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu](mailto:anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu)

<http://grease.eui.eu/>

GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

## Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: France

### I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

#### Overall Assessment:

Article 1 in the current [Constitution](#) (1958) states “France is an indivisible, **secular [laïc]**, democratic and social Republic. It ensures the equality before the law of all its citizens, without distinction as to origin, race, or religion. It respects all beliefs”, thus emphasising a rigorous principle of separation between state and religion.

The 1905 law (enshrined in the current constitution) further states in Article 2 that “The Republic neither acknowledges, nor pays for nor subsidises any form of worship”. Formally, religious groups are strictly separate from political authority and processes. Nevertheless, **representative bodies** consult with the state on the management and regulation of religious life. But, relating to the 1905 law on separation, the state exercises a **high degree of control**. Official affairs to do with religion are the responsibility of Bureau of Religious Affairs ([Bureau des Cultes](#)).

Obtaining the **officially recognised status** of a ‘religion’ is difficult and “a substantive review” of the religion. The state maintains a high degree of **interference**. Before the pope appoints new Bishops, for example, the Minister checks that the values of the nominees are not incompatible with those of the Republic. It is also heavily involved in making decisions about employees and the curriculum in schools it funds. State interference has taken on a larger role in appointing members when it comes to Muslim people during the period.

There are a few **exceptions** to the dominance of state laïcité. For historical reasons, an agreement is in place for the region of Alsace-Moselle, where the state pays the salaries of the clergy of these religions and religious instruction is taught in schools, an arrangement upheld in 2013 by the Constitutional Council. Six overseas colonies have also not had the secularization laws imposed on them.

**Confessional parties** are not banned, although there are no major confessional parties. There is current political debate about the status of religious political parties, raised by the right wing ‘The Republicans’ party over concerns about a Muslim confessional party (Democratic Union of Muslims) in municipal elections.

**Religious courts** are not recognised under French law, although many may exist informally. French law stipulates that a civil **marriage** must precede a religious marriage, although this is not always abided by.

Article 1 “assures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religious worship, limited only by the exceptions... in the interest of public order”. **Freedom of religion** is restricted to freedom of individual conscience and public manifestations of religion have become increasingly restrictive during the period, notably principally concerned with Islam.

**Public schools** in this period are a place of ‘emancipation’ and mise á distance, where community identities and ties are left at the door. They are strictly secular going back to the Ferry Laws of 1882. **Private schools**, in contrast, maintain more freedom when it comes to the manifestation of religion. These schools receive public funds subsidising the majority of the schools’ budgets; the Debré law of 1959, reinforced by the Guermuer Law of 1977, secured state financial support for private schools which sign particular contracts and meet certain conditions.

In practice Catholic schools dominate the private school sector, which is small in comparison to the public sector in any case. The first private Muslim high school under state contract was established in the summer of 2003.

**Media**, including religious media both print and online, enjoy substantial freedoms within the bounds of general laws, going back to the Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 July 1881 with amendments since to protect against types of hate speech. Religions have their own media outlets in print and online.

<b>1. State autonomy from religion</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	Very High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion	High	2020
<b>2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Very High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	High	2020
<b>3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Low	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Medium	2020
<b>4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020

(4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020
<b>5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020
<b>6. State recognition of freedom of religion.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	High	2020
<b>7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Low	2020
<b>8. Autonomy of religious media</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	High	2020

## II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

### *Overall Assessment:*

*Representative bodies consult with the state on the management and regulation of religious life. Obtaining **officially recognised status** of a 'religion' is difficult and requires "a substantive review" of the religion. Few religions have this status. Muslim people only gained this status in 2003 after previous failed attempts.*

*More have status as 'associations' and come under laws of freedom of association. France has been highly restrictive of religious associations, particularly New Religious Movements that are not officially recognised.*

*Officially religion is not a factor in the **political sphere** going back to Articles 1 and 2 in the [constitution](#). Thus, there are no restrictions on individuals based on religious belief when it comes to holding political office, voting and so on. There are practical issues of discrimination and bias against minorities when it comes to gaining office.*

*Officially, owing to the strict separation of religion and state, the state does not favour any religion so there are no **special social security** rights or restrictions for minorities.*

*Laws from [2004](#) and [2011](#) **ban certain religious signs and symbols** from certain public spaces on grounds of either freedom or public order. Although the legislation was indiscriminate between religions, it has disproportionately affected Muslim people. In the years following, veiled women and girls have been forbidden access from a host of public and semi-public spaces, including universities, swimming pools and public transport. Following the above laws, Burkinis were also banned in some areas by local authorities, although these bans were overturned.*

*Article 2 of the constitution states that "The Republic does not recognize, **finance**, or subsidize any religious group". Nevertheless, recognition comes with tax exemptions. There are state-paid chaplains who operate in public schools, prisons, hospitals and the military. Faith-based hospitals and institutions for care can also get state funding in recognition of their 'utilité publique', providing they meet appropriate criteria. Owing to historical reasons, the state also maintains a large number of religious buildings.*

*Recognition comes with assistance in **building places of worship** and there are a number of places of worship for minority religions. There has been great variance of official attitudes towards mosques in different areas of France from different mayors, with at times a supportive and accommodationist stance, and at other times and/or in other regions severe opposition accompanied by a consistent general lack of support among the non-Muslim population. In fact, minarets are seldom included as, although not illegal, they are strongly discouraged.*

<b>1. Legal status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	Low	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	Medium	2020
<b>2. Religious minority group participation in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
<b>3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
<b>4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
<b>5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Very Low	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Low	2020
<b>6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Low	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Low	2020
<b>7. Ownership of houses of worship.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>

(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	Low	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Low	2020

### III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

*Overall assessment:*

*France is classified as **free** but civil liberties have been restricted related to the response to terrorism and handling of the yellow vest protests. During the period France has been involved in **conflicts** abroad, including the conflict in Iraq and Syria and in the 2010s France has experienced some of the most high-profile attacks in Europe.*

*France is also the country with the highest total for **foreign fighters** in Europe. Notably, most of the attacks in 2015 were by returnees. France's Global Terrorism Index score has accordingly risen since 2015 and during the 2010s there was a high number of violent extremist actors, although this has since dropped.*

***Social hostilities** related to religion, and particularly Muslim people, has risen during the period. From a low level in 2007, it has been at a high level since 2010 and is currently at a high for the period. Hate crime figures have also risen since 2015, with the most bias against Christians, and then along lines of racism/xenophobia.*

*On **political indicators, distrust in national parliament and national government** are high but have improved since 2015 – notably, during the period, the gap between the two has narrowed such that they both scored equally in 2018. The percentage of people who think **things are going wrong** in their country is also high and slightly worsened since 2015, and the number of people who thought the **situation in France** was bad or very bad was just under two thirds in 2018. **Satisfaction with democracy** has increased since 2010.*

***The economic situation** is seen as bad although generally not as the highest priority. People rating their **household income situation** as bad or very bad has remained fairly steady since 2010, following the financial crisis, although the view of the national economy greatly worsened between 2010 and 2015 and although has improved since, is still far above 2010 levels.*

*When it comes to **discrimination**, 23% of people oppose further diversity in the country. While overall levels of tolerance have improved in recent years, Muslim people are still seen negatively and face significant discrimination and three quarters of those polled in 2015 thought discrimination was widespread for religion and belief. A poll of minorities in 2016 found just over a third of people from Sub-Saharan Africa or North Africa said discrimination was fairly or very widespread for religion/belief. While only 4% of people polled in 2015 said they had directly experienced discrimination owing to religion or belief, this figure was 30% across Sub-Saharan African and North African minorities according to a separate poll in 2016.*

*When it comes to discomfort with working with people of other faiths, 4% said they would be uncomfortable with Christian colleagues, 4% with atheist, 8% with Jewish people, 9% with Buddhists, and 12% with Muslim people; For a family member being in a love relationship these figures were 7% uncomfortable with someone in their family being with a Christian, 10% with an atheist, 19% with a Jewish person, 21% with a Buddhist, and 35% with a Muslim person.*

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: <b>Free</b> Freedom score: <b>90</b>	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: <b>20/128</b> Overall score: <b>0.73</b>	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: <b>4.9</b> Level: <b>High</b>	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: <b>1.5</b> Level: <b>High</b>	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: <b>1.6</b> Level: <b>High</b>	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: <b>7</b> Level: <b>High</b>	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: <b>3.4</b> Level: <b>Low</b>	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: <b>32.6%</b>	2014

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust in Parliament: <b>63%</b> Distrust in Government: <b>63%</b> Other: <b>No data</b>	2018 2018 n/a
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: <b>70%</b> Dissatisfaction with overall situation: <b>65%</b> Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: <b>45%</b> Other: <b>No data</b>	2018 2018 2019 n/a
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: <b>32%</b> Dissatisfaction national economy: <b>84%</b> Economic situation is the most serious problem: <b>12%</b> Other: <b>No data</b>	2018 2018 2018
(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: <b>75%</b> Opposing diversity: <b>23%</b> Discomfort with minorities: <b>4%-35%</b> depending Experienced discrimination: <b>4%</b> Other: tolerance levels in IT	2015 2018 2015 2015

France	Indicators Assessment	GREASE
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: <b>87%</b>	2018
	Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: <b>No data</b>	n/a
	Other: Favourable view of ISIS: <b>16%</b>	2014

<b>3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)</b>	<b>Score/Level/Number</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Yes/No: <b>No</b>	2019
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: <b>High</b> Score: <b>6</b>	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: <b>5</b>	2019
	Number of Incidents: <b>30</b>	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: <b>1838</b>	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: <b>Moderate</b>	2020

#### IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

The **key Act** dates from 1986, updated and added to during the 1990s and the period. A number of laws are relevant and cover various areas - **specific laws against terrorism** were also introduced in 2008 and 2013. A **state of emergency** was declared in 2015 following the Paris attacks, and lasted until 2017 (through 5 extensions) and new counterterrorism legislation in 2017 replaced and codified certain aspects of the expired state of emergency, and will expire in 2020 unless extended.

In general France's strategic approach has been characterised by treating terrorism as a form of crime and investigations are pursued in the same way as general criminal investigations and thus is managed through legislation, law enforcement and so on. **Radicalisation** was specifically mentioned in a white paper in 2013. In 2006, France published a white paper internal security facing terrorism, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive approach than previously. **National action plans** to combat terrorism and radicalization have been developed since 2014 and updated in 2016, 2018 and 2019, and in 2018 a plan specifically for radicalisation was launched. Vigipirate, created in 1978 and updated since sets **the threat level**.

UCLAT (founded in 1984) ensures the **coordination** of all departments involved and coordinates the sharing of operational information from all relevant authorities and services, including anti-terrorist judges and the prison administration. It is directly attached to the Office of the Director General of Police. A range of government ministries, police and intelligence agencies are involved. Strategy development tends to be centralised from within the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of the Interior.

Concern with **human rights** has been a feature of the plans since at least the 2006 white paper, although France's breaching of human rights has been questioned in a context of heightened security and state of emergency, especially with regard to civil liberties.

Some measures that can be applied to **foreign fighters** have been in place for a long time, but not as part of counter-terrorism policies, which gained attention in action plans from 2014.

The need to address **terrorist financing**, and various measures, and **counter-narratives** have been features since the early 2006 white paper. **Training** for practitioners and **improving preparedness** have also been a constant, and expanded during the period.

France has, since the inception, of its strategies, placed an emphasis on **young people**. **Victim support** was similarly mentioned in the white paper of 2006, and the 2014 strategy document outlined support measures. The Centre National d'Assistance et de Prévention de la Radicalisation (CNAPR) linked to UCLAT was formed. At the centre of the plan was a nationwide hotline that individuals, families or community members could call to seek advice or notify authorities on anything of concern. This would be followed up by localised and tailored assistance programmes working in partnership with local NGOs. Family Listening and Support Units (cellules d'écoute et d'accompagnement des familles), which are **multi-agency** bodies open to all stakeholders, whether institutional or from the volunteer sector, working locally on social issues, child protection and urban policies.

The 2014 document mentions the role of faith leaders and there has been **inter-faith dialogue** through formal connections between bodies and the state as well as at the local levels. Direct work with **civil society** tends to come through funding provided to local authorities and is focussed on poorer areas. There are some civil society organisations and networks active but there is less emphasis on this from the state.

Strategies for **prisons** were also a focus of the 2014 strategy and involve various measures both during and after imprisonment, when follow up is multi-agency.

<b>1. Comprehensive strategic approach</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	Yes	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	Yes	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	Yes	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Limited Participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020

<b>2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	Yes	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	High	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	Yes	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	Yes	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Yes	2020

France

Indicators Assessment

GREASE

(21) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings

Yes

2020

Project name: Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Project Acronym: GREASE

Project Coordinator: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou

Contact: [anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu](mailto:anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu)

March 2020

Document series reference: D3.2 Indicators Assessment



This document can be downloaded from the publications section of the GREASE website at <https://www.grease.eui.eu/>

The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the authors. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640