

## Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

# EGYPT

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

### **Countries covered in this series:**

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eui.eu>



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**The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.**

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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<http://grease.eui.eu/>

GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

## Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: EGYPT

### I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

#### *Overall Assessment:*

The overall picture of the Arab Republic of Egypt when it comes to the relations between the state and religious institutions is a complex one. In successive constitutions since the beginning of the Republic in 1952, Egypt has recognised freedom of belief (article 64 of the [current constitution](#)), while at the same time, this in practice is only fully realised when it comes to the Abrahamic faiths. In the current constitution, Islam is specified as the religion of the state (article 2), and the principles of Islamic law as the primary source of religion (article 7). The constitution, at the same time, prohibits the exercise of political activity or the formation of political parties based on religion. It results in an interesting phenomenon, as political figures often engage in religious discourse, and instrumentalise religion for political purposes.

The government appoints, monitors and pays the salaries of imams who lead prayers in recognized mosques, through the Ministry of Religious Endowments – those that preach or give religious lessons without a license from the ministry may be penalized by imprisonment and/or fines. This is only one example of how the state directly intervenes in the organization of religious communities and religious organisations; indeed, it is the norm that the state would intervene, rather than otherwise. Law 157 of 1960, for example, stipulates wide-ranging management of mosques by the ministry.

The Azhar receives significant financial backing from the state, and is deeply significant in a country where Islam plays an important role in public policy. Law 13 of 2012, article 2b, stipulates the Azhar is the main reference for Islamic affairs and its interpretation. In the current religious administration setup, the Azhar, the most renowned institution of Islamic learning worldwide, is led by the ‘Imam al-Akbar’ (the grand imam), who is supposed to be appointed by the scholars of the Azhar. This is a relatively new development; the current Imam al-Akbar was appointed by the Egyptian president of the time, as was his predecessor.

This does not mean that al-Azhar actually engages directly with public policy – that is left to political figures, the judiciary and so forth. The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, for example, has historically acted as the ‘de facto’ interpreter of religious norms when it comes to law.

Representatives of different religious institutions, from both the majority Muslim and minority Christian communities, often take public stances that justify state policies. On some limited occasions, usually from the majority Muslim community, there may be objections to state policies when such policies are deemed to be in contradiction with received wisdom about the way in which the state should or should not engage in deliberating about religious affairs beyond the accepted norms.

As such, while Egypt is far from being a theocratic state, it must be clearly outlined that Egypt is one that regulates the organisation of religion in a complex and interventionist fashion.

<b>1. State autonomy from religion</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	LOW	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion	LOW	2020
<b>2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	LOW	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	MEDIUM	2020
<b>3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	VERY HIGH	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	VERY HIGH	2020
<b>4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	LOW	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	LOW	2020
<b>5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	MEDIUM	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.	LOW	2020

<b>6. State recognition of freedom of religion.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	MEDIUM	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	MEDIUM	2020
<b>7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	HIGH	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	HIGH	2020
<b>8. Autonomy of religious media</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	MEDIUM	2020
(8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	MEDIUM	2020

## **II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups**

### *Overall Assessment:*

Religious minorities are recognised by the state, but in a limited fashion. Religious minorities from among Christians and Jews are established as having the right to establish places of worship; the constitution does not give this right to other communities. If denominations wish to be recognized by the government, they must make a request to the Ministry of Interior, which will then engage in a process that includes leading religious institutions, and then puts it to the presidency of the republic to decide. Registration is important, as it gives the denomination the ability to be governed by its own religious laws in specific areas, establish houses of worship and other items.

Religious minority communities such as Christians reported discrimination by local political authorities, particularly in rural levels. Government officials also regularly encourage participation in 'reconciliation' sessions to address incident of sectarian violence, which are often described by rights groups as bypassing the judicial system.

Christian groups do complain of being minimally represented in law enforcement and other state apparatus, and of being socially discriminated against in the workforce on the basis of their religion. It is unclear what the size of the minority actually is, but the most accepted range is between 10% and 15%, when counting all Christian denominations. In recent years, the procedures for establishing and opening new places of worship for Christians have been streamlined and relaxed. Sectarian opposition to Christians in some areas, particularly rural, has not been met with sufficient action by the state in those areas, even though, according to the penal code, using religion to

promote extremism with the aim of inciting strife, demeaning or denigrating Judaism or Christianity, carries imprisonment penalties.

There is a very small population of Baha'is, who are not officially recognised, and an even smaller population of Jews. Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court in 2006 made a clear legal distinction between 'recognised' religions and others, with the latter not enjoying the full organizational rights as the former.

The legal status of recognized religious minorities is theoretically quite positive – as seen above, however, the question of how this works out in practice is less so. On some levels, this has improved in recent years from state officials. As a result, one can note that religious minority participation in political life is fully accepted – but political life itself is significantly constrained as a result of Egypt's political setup since 2013, and its ongoing 'war on terror'.

There does not appear to be any restrictions on religious minorities when it comes to the provision of social security support, public spaces, accommodation of cultural spaces, or access to funds.

<b>1. Legal status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	HIGH	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	MEDIUM	2020
<b>2. Religious minority group participation in political life.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	HIGH	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	HIGH	2020
<b>3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	VERY HIGH	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	VERY HIGH	2020
<b>4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	VERY HIGH	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	VERY HIGH	2020

<b>5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	HIGH	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	HIGH	2020
<b>6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	HIGH	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	HIGH	2020
<b>7. Ownership of houses of worship.</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	MEDIUM	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	MEDIUM	2020

### III. **Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels**

*Overall assessment:*

#### **Structural factors:**

It is commonly thought by analysts, human rights activists and academics on contemporary Egyptian politics that following the end of the democratic experiment of 2011-2013, the level of freedom as it pertains to civil liberties in particular, has deteriorated a substantial amount, at least in comparison to the pre-2011 period. I am unaware of anyone who disagrees with that assessment; the disagreement, which is more of an ideological one more than an evidence-based one, is pertaining to whether such restrictions are justified according to the security situation or not. But no one disagrees the situation is considerably worse, even though there is significant disagreement about how and why. Egypt's score on the Rule of Law index diminished as well following 2013, and according to that measure is the lowest in the MENA region – again, corresponding with the post 2013 period. When it comes to religious-related government restrictions, the country's Government Restriction's score has been rated 'very high' since 2007, although the level of state legitimacy (according to the Fragile States Index is difficult to critique in terms of change. Overall, the Fragile States Index identifies Egypt as getting generally worse in terms of the human rights protection, from 2006 onwards, with the exception of a short period between 2009 and 2011 (though still rather poor). Group grievances, likewise, worse over the past couple of decades, with small variances, according to these measuring tools. On the other hand, there is a discrepancy when it comes to economic development – the tools provided indicates that the situation has improved over time, which I find it difficult to explain. One possible reason might be the demographic changes – a progressively younger population over time, after all. As for wealth disparity, the World Inequality Database indicates not much a difference over time, although it is still quite bad (half the wealth is in the hands of the top 10% and about 1% has 20% of the wealth).

#### **Perception based factors:**

Over time, Egypt has become more and more difficult to conduct open opinion polls on sensitive political questions, owing to legal quandaries. It's illegal, for example, to conduct face-to-face interviews without permission from a state agency, and that permission includes a process of reviewing questionnaires. There was a time in 2011-2013 where this was far easier to do – but generally, it's been very difficult for the last decade, which explains why there is so little reliable data on it. The tool provides indicates distrust in the council of ministers, which isn't really the same as 'government' particularly in terms of perceptions. The same when it comes to general discontent with politics – not a great amount of detail, and frankly, I'd be wary about relying on what does exist, because of the methodological issues involved in engaging in polling in countries where people are concerned about being reported to the security establishment for dissent. Even so, what was shown in the tools indicates a significant number of Egyptians thinking the country is heading in a wrong direction (24.6%), and significant numbers also unsatisfied with government performance. There was data that indicates that large numbers of Egyptians (more than half) considered the current economic situation as very bad or bad. When it came to discrimination, there was some data, but it jumped too much in a small period of time. There's some qualitative work on this – analysis, media reports – which show the discrimination file as being poor, but better than 2011-2013 – but it is difficult to directly compare, and very little reliable data. On extremism, there was data relating to support for violent extremism, but I question the reliability of it based on the unclear methodology. It seems to be generally

going down, and I'd presume that's at least partly due to ISIS phenomenon, which shocked Egyptians generally.

**Incidence based factors:**

The state has been involved in armed conflict within its borders for the past 5 years, particularly in the Sinai and the western desert on the border with Libya. Those conflicts are generally – maybe even exclusively – with extremist Islamist groups, predominantly ISIS-linked, but also al-Qa'eda ones. In terms of the western desert, there are other factors that are cross-border too, but that's out of our scope. Terrorist acts are generally aimed at state actors (army, judiciary, police); but there are also sectarian motivations against civilians from these extremist Islamist groups, focusing primarily at Sufis and Christians. The sources provided did not give data for the increase of violent extremism in Egypt or hate crimes; I know from media reports that this did, however, increase from 2011 onwards (as compared to pre-2011) and intensified following 2013. For different reasons, these extremist groups were active from 2011 onwards as compared to 2013, but it is important to note they are not simply the result of the military removal of Morsi in 2013. They existed before that, and they changed following the coup due to the rise of ISIS which was not related to Morsi's removal. Such groups are generally local, but they definitely have links to transnational actors like ISIS and al-Qa'eda.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: NOT FREE Freedom score: 21/100	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 125/128 Overall score:0.36	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: 8.7 Level: VERY HIGH	2015
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 3.3 Level: HIGH	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 10 Level: LOW	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score:8.9 Level: HIGH	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 5.7 Level: MODERATE	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 48.5%	2016
2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	NOT MUCH TRUST AT ALL 17.2 NO TRUST AT ALL 15.2	2018
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: WRONG DIRECTION: 24.7 Do you agree that the government does all it can to provide citizens	2018

	with necessary services: Strongly disagree 10.6%; Disagree 33.1%; Agree 44.7%; Strongly agree 8.8%	
(2c) Economic discontent	How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? “Bad” 35.3 %; “Very bad” 16.8 %	2018
(2d) Discrimination	Dislike neighbors from minority groups: 13.9 % “Strongly dislike”; 26.4% “Dislike”	2018
(2e) Views on violent extremism	How concerned are you about Islamic extremism in our country these days? 34% very concerned; 41% somewhat concerned; 13% not too concerned; 9% not at all concerned	2014

<b>3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)</b>	<b>Score/Level/Number</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Yes/No: YES	2020
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: HIGH Score:6.5	2009
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: 6.794	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Not applicable	2020
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: HIGH	2020

#### IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

There is an overall rather serious issue when assessing Egypt's approach on preventing violent extremism. On the one hand, it is eminently clear that Egypt faces a significant problem; objective analytical works and media reports show this quite clearly. Indeed, the government itself raises the issue of combatting violent extremism regularly, both domestically as well as internationally, and cites it as justification for many policies that restrict the public sphere and civil liberties. It's not a baseless fear.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to evaluate the approach of the Egyptian state in this arena, as it is almost exclusively a security apparatus-led approach, and thus very little transparency. So, there are a number of media reports that discuss a legislative foundation for combating violent extremism, parliamentary discussions, presidential committees and so forth. But the question is whether these are effective or not.

Some legislative and state-level information here that is of interest – since 2018, as the result of a parliamentary bill following Sisi's call for the creation of an independent council, there is a Supreme Council on Terrorism and Extremism, which is supposed to have been concerned with mobilising the country in general against extremism, and supposedly has the authority to make decisions on existing counterterrorism and counter-extremism policies to expedite terrorism cases in the court system. ([Egypt Today, Egypt Independent](#)). The 2014 state constitution itself (article 237) committed Egypt to “fighting all types and forms of terrorism and tracking its sources of funding....”, while the aforementioned 2015 law overrides previous legislation on counter-terrorism. (It's been widely criticised by rights groups. In 2015, the US State Department, claimed Egypt had set out “a series of executive initiatives, new laws and judicial actions that severely restrict” such freedoms as expression, press, association, peaceful assembly, and due process. Malinowski further accused Egyptian counterterrorism legislation of failing to distinguish between “peaceful dissent and violent extremism.” ([U.S. Department of State](#)). There is also the 2014 ‘Terrorist Entities Law’ which employs a broad definition that human rights groups fear could be applied to civil society far beyond terrorist groups. ([U.S. Department of State, Al-Monitor](#))

It is clear that Egypt has a wide and broad definition of terrorism, which is clear from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring that ‘Egypt's approach to counter-terrorism bypasses the false dichotomy of “violent vs. nonviolent” extremism, recognizing that extremism by its very nature is a stepping stone towards violence and subsequently refusing to allow radicals to operate under different guises in service of the same goals’. The approach also ‘relies on comprehensively and categorically refuting and countering all forms of extremism and radicalism, rather than making distinctions and categorizations which may lead to acceptance of and leniency towards radicals and extremists whose actions are less headline-grabbing but just as dangerous as any others’.

We then come to the notion of assessment, and this is where it is very difficult. There is no independent way to assess the success of any of these strategies. So, there is clearly a strategy and national action plan, as laid out above – but what monitoring mechanism exists? There is the Council, but does it actually coordinate activity? Is it possible to measure the level of prevention and countering? I'm not sure it is, and the alternative is therefore to rely on rights activists and external organisations like the European Union – and their assessments have not been positive when they do speak (usually off the

record). It is also clear that there is not a wide range of actors involved in this field – it is generally a security field, and heavily dominated by the security sector. Egypt does not have an official plan about foreign fighters – if they do return (and I am not sure we have many reports of them returning) they would almost definitely be arrested on arrival.

There is a communication strategy (one which I believe WP4 of the GREASE project will go into in some detail), but it is not regarded as having been terribly successful. Again, it is difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy. Support for victims of terrorism seems to be insufficient and limited to some financial support. If there is training for frontline practitioners, it would seem to be very limited, but it would be difficult enquire about this if it is not already published and widely available.

In terms of effectiveness more widely, there is no evidence to suggest that the state has placed a great deal of importance on anything but a strict security approach – and so, I would not assess that there is evidence available to really evaluate other forms of PVE work. There are projects aimed at supporting women more generally, as well as interfaith dialogue – but those exist independently more often than as part of counter-extremism initiatives.

What may be newer and more developed is the religious establishment trying to engage more directly in counter-messaging, particularly over the past 5 years – but again, it is difficult to assess the impact. The religious establishment is after all a part of the state, and the target audience may not view it very positively. In general, the securitisation of this field makes it difficult to give much reliable information.

<b>1. Comprehensive strategic approach</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>YEAR (Most Recent)</b>
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	YES	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	YES	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	NO	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	YES	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	NO	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	NO	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	VERY LIMITED PARTICIPATION	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	NO	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	YES	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	YES	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Insufficient information	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Not applicable	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Not applicable	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	YES	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	YES	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	NO	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	Insufficient information	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	YES	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	NO	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Insufficient information	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	YES	2020

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