

Indicators Assessment- Unitary States

Bulgaria

Center for the Study of Democracy

May 2020

This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eu.eu>



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640

The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

For further information about the GREASE project please contact: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou, anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu

<http://grease.eui.eu/>

GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: Bulgaria

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

The current state-religion relationship is constructed upon the legal premises of the [Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria](#), and the [Denominations Act 2002](#).

Bulgaria's Constitution without explicit reference to the term "secularism", proclaims **separation between religious institutions and the state** in Art. 13(2). In the same Article, it provides that religion must not be used for political ends, complemented by Art. 11(4) on **the prohibition of, *inter alia*, religious parties**. Art. 37(1) of the Constitution, on the other hand, states that **the freedom of religion shall be inviolable** (qualified). The **state guarantees the freedom of religion by establishing conditions for free exercise** (Denominations Act (DA), Art. 4(3)). The [Denominations Act 1949](#) has similar provisions as to religious freedom recognition, but does not mention any positive state responsibilities. The issue of state non-interference is set out in the two Denominations Acts. Unlike the 1949 Act, Art. 4(1) of DA 2002 provides that **state interference in the internal organisation of the religious communities and religious institutions is prohibited** (qualified). The Act also provides for **non-interference in funds use-up and personnel appointments** (Art. 17). Under DA 1949, religious institutions are given some degree of independence (internal regulation, and appointments), but all financial matters are controlled by the state. Education is another area subject to change between the two Denominations Acts: under the 1949 Act education was an exclusive realm of the state, while the 2002 Act provides that registered religious communities **can take up educational activities** within the public school system, or outside with special mandate. As to religious media, both the 2002 Denominations Act (Art. 6(1)) and the 1949 Act (Art. 15) **allow denominations to disseminate religious publications**. The current law does not make any provisions on "religious media" *per se*, but the [Radio and Television Act 1999](#) states that the Bulgarian National Television and Radio may allow **broadcasting time** on the request of registered denominations.

In practice, the Orthodox Christian majority enjoys freedom of religion as prescribed by law, while minority religious groups **often face discriminatory practices** (e.g. bans on proselytising, religious clothing, schools access, public religious activities). Additionally, noteworthy instances of **divergences from the dual autonomy principle** exist – a public body governs state-religion relations, and **religious narratives have often been employed by politicians** to justify decisions or influence public opinions. This is further exemplified by the **existence of political parties with ties to religious prerogatives and communities** (e.g. the [Movement for Rights and Freedoms](#)). In the educational sphere, **minority religious groups exhibit lower levels of participation**, while elective classes on Christianity and Islam in public schools are common. As to religious media, most are Orthodox Christian, although some evidence of Evangelical, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim periodicals exists. TV channels and online platforms also can be found - e.g. the [Bulgarian Christian Television channel](#). **Secular coverage of minority religious groups** has been primarily negative with peaks around certain political events (e.g. election campaigns) characteristic to the whole period of interest (2000-2020).

The *modus vivendi* of state-religious relations in Bulgaria is defined by **a legislative expansion of rights for religious communities** after the DA 2002, which has **resonated positively in the practical aspect**, but has **failed to harmonise** both dimensions.

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion	Medium	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Very High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Very High	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Medium	2020
4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation (e.g., personnel, financial matters) of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, financial, etc.) of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Low	2020

7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020

8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	High	2020

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

The status of religious minority groups is currently governed mainly by the [Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria](#), and the [Denominations Act 2002](#).

The **sole constitutionally recognised denomination is the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC)**, as Eastern Orthodox Christianity is declared the **traditional religion** in the Republic of Bulgaria (Art. 13, 3). The Constitution, however, **grants freedom of religion without reference to a specific denomination**. Both the 2002 (Chapter III) and the [1949 Denominations Acts](#) (DA) (Art. 6) provide for the **registration of all religious groups**, and the gaining of legal personhood. **Registered denominations, as legal entities**, are allowed to own places of worship, and access public funding under DA 2002 (Arts. 25, 28) – the latter a substantive change from the DA 1949. Members of religious minority groups **face no prohibitions in terms of their civil rights**, and are granted equal rights to social security (Constitution, Art. 6). Furthermore, the Constitution, and DA 2002 (Art. 2) and 1949 provide that the religious denominations can practice their **right to freedom of religion in public and private**. There are no prohibitions on the access of any religious groups to public spaces. No mention is made of accommodation/prohibition of cultural practices in the aforementioned legislation, but the [2016 Act](#) on the **ban of face-covering garments** is relevant to this.

In practice, there are **180 recognised and registered denominations** in addition to the BOC. Prior to DA 2002 the process of registering had been lengthy, non-transparent, and subjective. The state had been accused of discriminating against some non-Orthodox groups by lengthening the period for registration, and thus curtailing their rights of practicing religion. Under DA 2002, which has **shifted the responsibility for scrutinizing registration requests from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Sofia City Court**, the procedure is deemed to have improved, and **discrimination reports have become rarer**. Nevertheless, Muslims, Jews, and Jehovah's

Witnesses often report **incidents of slow adjudication** of their ownership claims, **vandalism**, and **difficult requisition** of confiscated property. As to financing, in 2018 the **national budget for the denominations was five million levs** for the construction and maintenance of religious facilities, of which over **75% were allocated to the BOC**, and the rest were distributed among some **ten other denominations**. With regard to the individual rights of the members of religious minority groups, there is no evidence that their participation in political life or their access to public spaces have been constrained. As to the accommodation of cultural practices of religious minority groups, the requirement of registration **curtails the rights of unregistered religious groups**. The **ban on the face veil**, **hate crime incidents**, **restrictive municipal policies**, **negative media coverage** of minority religious groups' work are some examples of divergence between the legal and practical dimensions.

With respect to the status of minority religious groups, the Bulgarian case brings forward the issue of practical **differential treatment among religious groups**, **legal-practical divergences**, and **lack of in-depth data on certain civil rights** of individuals as members of minority groups. The assessment of the legal dimension has remained **generally stable throughout the whole period** of interest (2000-2020), as there have been **no major legislative changes** affecting the status of religious minority groups for most sub-indicators, while the **practical evidence has also been either homogenous** or, in several cases, not comprehensive enough to inform the scoring.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	High	2020
(1b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	Very High	2020
(2b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Insufficient Information	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Very low	2020
(3b) Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Not applicable	n/a
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	Very High	2020
(4b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	Very High	2020

5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Medium	2020
(6b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Medium	2020
7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

Structural factors: The most concerning trends of deteriorating scores of Bulgaria are in relation to the indicators **government restrictions on religion** (from moderate level in 2007 to high in 2017, in line with the overall trend in Europe in the aftermath of major terrorist incidents) and **group grievances** (remains at moderate level, but worsened since the country's EU accession and most notably during the European refugee crisis 2014-2015). **Rule of law** scores for the past 5 years have been among the lowest in Europe with no significant improvement, where sub factors such as corruption, criminal justice and constraints on government powers are particularly concerning. **Wealth disparity** is also increasing. Improving scores since 2006 include **uneven economic development**, **human rights** and **state legitimacy**, which can be attributed to institutional and economic reforms since the country's EU accession in 2007. The country scores well on civil liberties and political freedom without any major changes for the past 10 years.

Perception-based indicators:

Political grievances in the form of distrust in institutions or dissatisfaction with democracy, the country's direction or the national economy remains high at over 50%, and is above the EU average on most indicators, although satisfaction with democracy has increased since EU accession. More than half of population expresses **economic grievances** related either to their own financial situation or the national economy. **Perceptions of the spread of discrimination** overall, and among Roma in particular, has doubled since 2008, but remain well below the EU average. **Experienced discrimination** overall and among Roma in particular has also increased by a few % points, but remains among the lowest in EU. The rich national and EU data on prejudices and social distances shows **high level of overall intolerance**, distrust or hateful stance towards Roma, polarization along ethnic lines is high. **Discomfort with minorities** (religious, sexual, ethnic) at the workplace or in other social situations is notably higher among Bulgarians than the EU average and has increased since 2012. Almost a quarter of the population believe there is **religious extremism** in the country. There is no data on societal support for violent extremist ideas/actions.

Incidence-based indicators:

Bulgaria has not been involved in any state-based armed conflict for the past 20+ years, and the **incidence of terrorism** is very low (only one religiously-inspired terrorist attack in 2012 associated with Hezbollah against Israeli nationals, with 12 fatalities and 35 injured). Arrests and prosecutions for **terrorist-related offences** have increased since the onset of the IS-related conflict in Syria/Iraq and following tightened legislation, but are mainly related to foreign nationals transiting through the country (FTFs). There are not officially reported FTFs from Bulgaria. Less grave violent extremist acts such as **hate crimes motivated by religious or ethnic bias** are more worrying and on the increase, but official registration and reporting is problematic. Similarly, the level of **social hostilities involving religion** is moderate (higher than the EU average) and has increased over the past 10 years. There are **no known religious violent extremist organisations** active in the country, the threat of penetration of VE ideologies is mostly external and online. Isolated cases of proselytism by radical religious preachers have been prosecuted since the early 2000s.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Status: Free Total score: 80	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 53 (128) Overall score: 0.55	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	High (5.3)	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Moderate (3.9)	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	High (3.2)	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Moderate (4.8)	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Moderate (3.8)	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (level of above average wealth concentration in the top 10%)	Percentage: 31.8%	2016

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust Parliament/Government: 72%/64% <i>Other:</i> Distrust in Parliament/Government/President: 67%/62%/30%	2019 2019
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: 59% Situation in country is bad/very bad: 72% Dissatisfaction with democracy: 55%	2018 2018 2019
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: 49% Dissatisfaction national economy: 72% Economic situation is the most serious problem: no country data <i>Other:</i> dissatisfaction with national economy direction: 49%	2019 2019 n/a 2019
(2d) Discrimination	Religious/Ethnic discrimination is widespread: 27%/34% Oppose diversity in own country: no country data Discomfort with Muslim/Roma coworkers: 35%/35% Experienced religious discrimination: 1% Experienced discrimination by Roma: 14% <i>Other:</i> No friendly relations with Roma/Turkish people: 56%/28% <i>Other:</i> Acceptance of Roma/Turkish people in marriage: 13,6%/21,7% <i>Other:</i> Distrust, fear or hate towards Roma/Muslims: 80,2%/25,8% (distrust), 15%/5,6% (fear), 21,6%/3,4% (hate)	2015 n/a 2015 2015 2016 2017 2012 2020

(2e) Views on violent extremism	Extremism/terrorism are serious problem: no country data	n/a
	Justification of VE actors/actions: no country data	n/a
	<i>Other</i> : Perceived high risk of terrorist attack: 29%	2016
	<i>Other</i> : Religious extremism is present in country: 23,8%	2020

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	NO	2020
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Moderate (3.2)	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	GTI Score: 0.372 Number of Incidents: 0	2019
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Hate crimes recorded: 46	2018
	Violent incidents (against Muslims/Christians): 6	2018
	Bias crimes and crimes against religious denominations recorded: 21	2017
	Terrorism-related arrests: 14	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: LOW	2020

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Since the onset of the IS-related conflict in Syria/Iraq and globally, Bulgaria has undertaken a number of measures to strengthen its CT and P/CVE legislation and policy, in line with similar efforts across the EU. The issue emerged more urgently as a policy priority after the 2012 bus bombing in Burgas and in 2015 after major terrorist attacks in Europe. In 2015 Bulgaria has adopted a comprehensive national [Strategy](#) to prevent and counter radicalisation and terrorism, accompanied by annual action plans.

While Bulgaria **scores well on the comprehensiveness of relevant legislation and strategic approach**, development and actual implementation of **evidence-based radicalisation prevention measures and programs is limited**. The legislative and policy approach is focused mainly on preventing and countering terrorist threats and preparedness for responding to terrorist attacks, while addressing root causes and risks of radicalisation that may lead to violence through holistic, whole-of-government prevention and resilience measures remains underdeveloped. This is mainly explained by authorities assessing the risk of violent radicalisation in Bulgaria as relatively low compared to other EU countries.

There is no dedicated stand-alone **coordination body** in charge for P/CVE development of specific programs and overseeing their implementation. The coordination of the strategy and action plan implementation monitoring is designated within the Ministry of Interior, but it has not received dedicated additional resources. Major actors in P/CVE strategy adoption and implementation are the Council of Ministers and the State Agency for National Security, along with the Ministry of Interior, who are in charge of the bulk of the measures foreseen. Efforts in the CVE policy domain are still **dominated by security forces**, intelligence agencies more notably, while prevention of radicalisation is not sufficiently recognized as part of the mandate

of frontline practitioners and is not integrated in their work, while non-state actors are insufficiently involved in prevention. There are no **multi-agency cooperation platforms** or referral mechanisms at local level to monitor and prevent radicalisation, support at-risk persons. **Trainings of practitioners** (social workers, police officers, and educational staff) are taking place, but are mainly focused on general radicalisation awareness raising or CT response preparedness. There is limited **state-commissioned research** that would produce evidence to guide setting of policy priorities. Research is mainly produced by independent organisations. A handful of **civil society actors and academic institutions** have initiated prevention projects and have produced relevant research on radicalisation, but national funding mechanisms for such activities are lacking. **Strategic communication / alternative narrative campaigns** to build resilience have been initiated by some civil society actors, but remain limited in scope.

Prison and probation services have not been mentioned in the 2015 P/CVE strategy and action plan, but are highly likely to be considered in the next strategy 2020 and beyond. Some relevant EU-commissioned initiatives on prevention of radicalisation in prison and probation are underway and have started building institutional capacity to deal with the problem. However, there are no official deradicalisation or rehabilitation programs.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of P/CVE action plan	YES	2020
(1b) Existence of P/CVE strategy and a national action plan	YES	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	YES	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with P/CVE strategy development and coordination	NO	2020
(1e) Compliance of P/CVE strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	YES	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	YES	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Partial participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	YES	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	NO	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	YES	2020

(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	YES	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	YES	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	NO	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders (in relation to P/CVE)	NO	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	NO	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	Very limited	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	NO	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	NO	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	YES	2020
(2l) Programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	NO	2020

Project name: Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Project Acronym: GREASE

Project Coordinator: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou

Contact: anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu

April 2020

Document series reference: D3.2 Indicators Assessment



This document can be downloaded from the publications section of the GREASE website at <https://www.grease.eui.eu/>

The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the authors. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.



The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640