

Indicators Assessment – Non-Unitary States

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Center for the Study of Democracy

April 2020

This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<https://www.grease.eu.eu>



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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall assessment:

Overall, the relations between state and religious institutions in BiH remained unchanged during the studied time period (2000-2020). Where present, the differences between the legal and practical dimensions of the links between state and religious institutions are not significant. Whilst they are separate and independent from one another, they are still tightly connected in several ways, not least because the persisting political, socio-economic and cultural divisions along ethno-religious lines.

The **relationship** between the state and religious organisations is not specifically mentioned in BiH's [Constitution](#). However, Art. 14 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in BiH¹ ([the Law](#)) explicitly establishes the state and the religious organisations as independent from one another. In practice, there are interdependences between the dominant ethno-religious group and the governance structure in each both entities studied here – FBiH and RS. constituent entity.

The Constitution does not address the participation of religious institutions in formal **political decision-making**. In practice, one way in which religious organisations play a role in it is through official representatives' consultations with politicians. Religious institutions also actively participate in public debates and political events.

The Constitution and the Law do not mention **religiously-based political parties**. In reality, major parties could be viewed as religious, as they are established along clear-cut ethno-religious lines, usually representing a concrete ethno-religious group (for instance Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs).

The Constitution does not touch upon religious matters as a subject of religious institutions and religious community, rather it perceives religion as a personal matter. Art. 14.5 of the Law regulates the mixed jurisdiction of state and religious organisations in family practices. No state interference in the **management of religious affairs**, practices, rituals and ideals is reported in the entities. The Islamic Community has criticised the state for not taking enough action to close the so-called 'para jamaats' (illegal mosques).

Art. 14.6 of the Law establishes administrative and structural independence of the religious organisation from the state. No state interference in **administrative regulation** of religious structures is reported both FBiH and RS.

There have been no changes in state's **recognition of freedom of religion** in BiH. It is considered an individual right of each citizen. However, there are privileges (mostly related to public expression and access to group goods and resources) which have only been accessible to members of one of the registered, state-recognised religious organisations (the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church, the Islamic Community and the Jewish Community). [Occurrences of aggression and violence against Muslims](#), practicing their faith in RS persist. The nationwide [Ban on religious symbols](#) could be interpreted as a breach of the individual freedom of expression of religion.

¹ In this document, BiH means "Bosnia and Herzegovina", FBiH means "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and RS means "Republika Srpska". When we discuss both BiH entities, we refer to FBiH and RS. BiH also includes a third unit, the Brčko District, which is governed under local government and is not studied in practical detail here.

The Constitution does not discuss **religious education**. Art. 7.4 of the Law defines freedom of religion as the right of everyone (individually and in community) "to establish, maintain and administer religious institutions, including institutions formed for humanitarian and educational purposes in compliance with the law". In practice, religious education is executed in similar ways in the two entities analysed. All religious organisations set up and administer elective [religious education classes](#). However, there are conditions for these classes to take place, for example a specific number of enrolled students. The practice of "two schools under one roof" is especially illustrative of the existing persistent separation between students belonging to different ethno-religious groups.

Religious media is legitimate and exists in BiH. Two big media agencies are owned by religious organisations in FBiH – one by the Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops of BiH and another – by the Islamic Community of BiH. The Serbian Orthodox Church operates an online TV and coordinates its management and dissemination with RS. All three dominant religions are represented by nationally disseminated religious radio stations.

Overall, the situation in the two entities of BiH – RS and FBiH is fairly similar – there is autonomy and cooperation between state and religious structures. The relationship between the government of RS and the Serbian Orthodox Church is a bit more explicit and influential for state affairs, especially when it comes to the entity's singular standing in international relations.

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion.	Medium	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/ independence from religion	Medium	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Low	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Not applicable	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Very high	2019

(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Very high	2019
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4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Low	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Very high	2020
6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	Very high	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2019
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2019
7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020

(7b) **UNIT 2:** Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.

High

2020

8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Medium	2020
(8b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Medium	2020

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall assessment:

Overall, there have not been significant changes in the status of religious minority groups during the studied period. Differences between the legal and practical dimension of religious diversity are not significant. Representatives of the three dominant religions (Catholicism, Islam and Orthodox Christianity) continue to be privileged over those of other groups. The majority religion in each entity is privileged over the others. Desecration of religious sites persists and is yet to be addressed in full.

BiH's Constitution does not address **religious minorities** directly. The 2004 Law allows for individual freedom of religion and its expression with the only condition that those are in compliance with national and international laws. However, it dictates certain privileges and rights to religious organisations. Thus, belonging to one of the three major religious groups could be considered a legal advantage.

Between 2000 and 2020, there have been no changes in **minority group participation in political life** in BiH. Art. 14.3 of the Law prohibits any "church or religious community and their officials [to] participate formally in any political institutions". In reality, there has been [overrepresentation of the majority religious groups](#) in both FBiH and RS. Representatives of other religious groups are significantly underrepresented.

The Constitution does assign **special social security status** to religious minorities. Art. 12.4 of the Law dictates that pensions, disability and health insurance for religious servants are regulated by the state "in a manner, initiated by [the Presidency, The Council of Ministers, and the entity governments]. However, only employees of the religious organisations benefit from the said special social security assistances in both studied entities.

The Constitution does not explicitly address **access to public spaces**. Art. 4.1 of the Law dictates freedom of public expression and realisation of religion. Hence, religious groups can occupy and utilise public space, in compliance with entities' and state's laws. In practice, the desecration of religious sites and attacks on religious servants (and state's inaction to fully address this problem) could be considered an obstacle to the peaceful practice of religion.

Public funding access of religious organisations is regulated by Art. 14.4 of the Law. In reality, the majority religion is privileged when it comes to receiving public funding in a given entity (Orthodox Christianity in RS, Islam and Catholicism in FBiH).

The **accommodation of cultural practices** of religious minority groups is regulated by Art. 7.2 of the Law that establishes the freedom "to practise religious rituals in own, leased or rented buildings or premises which" are subjected to certain limitations. In reality, this right has been occasionally denied to Muslims in RS, for instance through

attacks on Muslim clerics, identified through their religious symbols in public and the following reported state inaction to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators.

Property ownership rights are regulated by articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the Law, which stipulates that churches and religious communities can acquire and own properties, which can be used and administered freely. In practice, ownership of houses of worship is only reserved for state-recognised religious organisations, which privileges Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Furthermore, the ownership and religious practice in houses of worship has not been sufficiently regulated by the state, as is evidenced by the large number of [illegal houses of worship](#) (para-jamaats), especially since 2010. Their existence contributed significantly to the spread of radical ideas among certain circles in BiH.

Overall, the situation of religious minorities in RS and FBiH is relatively the same – the privileged religious group is the one with the highest number of adherents in the governed area, and members of religious groups outside of the major three (Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox) face structural obstacles in obtaining institutionalised status and the benefits, which go with it.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2019
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2019
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Medium	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Medium	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Medium	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Medium	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Medium	2020
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	Very high	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	High	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Medium	2020
6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	High	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Medium	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Medium	2020
7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	High	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

Structural factors:

Between 2000 and 2020, BiH's performance with respect to all structural factors has consistently remained average. A worrying trend is that between 2000 and 2020, the country was repeatedly classified as **partly free**. This is in chime with the steadily moderate level of adherence to the **rule of law** and **of state legitimacy**. Especially problematic is the widespread corruption and the lack of measures to prevent lawlessness. **Human rights** have also not been fully protected, although the situation slightly improved in 2019 in comparison to 2015. The level of **religion-related government restrictions** has risen from low in previous years to moderate in 2017 – for instance, employees of judicial institutions were prohibited to wear “religious insignia”. A concerning trend through the years has been the high level of **group grievances**, although some decline is noted after 2010. Many issues between the major ethno-religious groups remain unresolved – especially with respect to war crimes during the 1990s war and the absence of reconciliation. Moderately **uneven economic development** is also observed. Wealth disparities persist as the pre-war middle class was impoverished and reduced in size during and after the war.

Perception-based indicators:

Despite the scarcity of quantitative information before 2013, qualitative reports allow us to conclude that there have not been significant fluctuations in the perception-based indicators explored here.

In 2019, **political grievances** in the form of distrust in Bosnian Parliament and Government remain high at 60%. Alarmingly, as late as in 2019, 83% are dissatisfied with the direction of their country, whilst in 2015, a quarter of the population believed that in the future, the country's situation will deteriorate. **Economic discontent** is also widespread, as many citizens are dissatisfied with the financial condition of their household and believe the state of the economy is the most serious problem the country is facing. According to a 2019 survey, 87% are on the opinion that **discrimination** is prevalent and 30% have experienced unfair treatment in the last 12 months. Almost two thirds do not have friends, acquaintances or colleagues from a religious minority, which is both contributing to and a consequence of the high level of group grievances, reported above. Almost half of the population think that **violent extremism** is a problem/threat and 8% believe there are groups/individuals in the community that are prone to it.

Incidence-based indicators:

The country has not been involved in a **state-based armed conflict** since the end of the 1990s Bosnian war. In 2015, the level of **social hostilities involving religion** peaked from moderate to high, which cannot be isolated from a similar trend in Europe during that time period. Again in 2015, the **impact of terrorism** in BiH rose to moderate, as this was also the year with the highest number of incidents (six).

The 2015 occurrences could be attributed to the increase of ISIS's territorial extent and violence, and the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters leaving BiH during the same time. Worryingly, less grave violent extremist acts such as **hate crimes motivated by religious or ethnic bias** persist in the country. Overall, the situation is improving in comparison to years prior to 2018 (for example, religiously-motivated attacks are mostly directed against sites and buildings rather than persons). However, many crimes remain unreported, uninvestigated, or unprosecuted. In 2015, both Islamist extremist ideology and **regional nationalist extremist groups** were identified as potential sources of violent extremism in BiH. The situation improved in 2018, when fewer BiH

citizens attempted to leave for foreign battlefields and the BiH Ministry of Security and the Interreligious Council made efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Status: partly free Total score: 53	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 64 (128) Overall score: 0.52	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Moderate (2.9)	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Moderate (6.3)	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Moderate (5.0)	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	High (7.2)	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Moderate (4.7)	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 28.6%	2011
2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust Parliament: 20% totally distrust and 40% “tend not to trust” Distrust Government: 23% totally distrust and 39% “tend not to trust” Other: No data	2018
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: 83% Dissatisfaction with overall situation: 24.9% believe things in the future will be “totally worse” Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: No data Other: No data	2019 2015
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: 19% - “completely dissatisfied” and 32% “mostly unsatisfied” Economic situation is the most serious problem: 43% Dissatisfaction national economy: No data Other: No data	2019 2019

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(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: 87% (44% “present to a large extent”; 43% “mostly present”)	2019
	Experienced discrimination: 30% (30% of whom – due to religious beliefs)	2019
	Discomfort with minorities: 58.2 % (“do not have a colleague, friend or acquaintance from a religious minority”)	2019
	Opposing diversity: No data Dislike neighbors from minority groups: No Data Other: No data	
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: 13% - “it is a big problem” and 30% - “somewhat of a problem”	2019
	Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: 8% - “there are groups or individuals in community that are prone to VE” Other: No data	2019

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	No	2018
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Moderate (3.2)	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	GTI Score: 1.388	2019
	Number of Incidents: 2	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Hate crimes recorded: 71 Anti-Semitism: 2 Bias against Christians: 9 Bias against Muslims: 15 Bias motivated by sexual orientation and gender: 20 Bias against Roma and Sinti: 2 Racism and Xenophobia: 20 Racism and Xenophobia and Bias against Christians: 1 Racism and Xenophobia and Bias against Muslims): 2	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: Low	2018

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Overall assessment:

In recent years, especially since the onset of the IS-related conflict in Syria/Iraq and globally, BiH has undertaken a number of measures to strengthen its CT and P/CVE legislation and policy, in line with similar efforts in other European countries. However, a certain dissonance between the existence of such measures and their actual implementation is observed.

BiH's Criminal Code was amended and extended, thus closing many **legislative** loopholes with respect to terrorist offences. A **strategy** for preventing and combating terrorism and an accompanying **action plan** were adopted in 2015 and 2016 respectively, as the strategy was much more detailed in comparison to its 2009 and 2013 predecessors. However, according to criticisms, the strategy has not been implemented at all levels and its implementation has not been sufficiently **monitored**. Concerns were raised that the Monitoring body included mostly representatives of the BiH security agency and **security-oriented actors**. **More and diverse actors**, especially NGOs, need to be included in the 2020 revision of the strategy. This could ensure greater compliance of strategic documents and their implementation with **human rights standards**. This is needed due to suspicions that CT measures disproportionately target Muslims, especially in places, where they form a minority.

The steps taken by BiH, especially since 2015, to address the issues of **foreign fighters** and **terrorism financing** have been described as important. With respect to **multi-agency cooperation**, in 2018 the BiH Ministry of Security worked with international partners to create the first CVE referral mechanism, however, as at 2019, such a mechanism has not yet been established.

All BiH CT strategies point to the need for large-scale **public-awareness media campaigns**. However, such campaigns are usually limited in scope and carried out at the initiative of the CSO sector, funded by foreign donors. For the most part, this observation is valid for **trainings of frontline practitioners** and P/CVE-specific education initiatives and projects involving **youth** and **women**. In a positive development, such initiatives have increased in the last five years. No programmes specifically designed to **support victims** of violent extremism were identified. BiH's Interreligious Council serves as the main **platform for intra and interfaith dialogue** and initiates P/CVE-specific activities for active engagement of women and young people. However, it is argued that although dialogue is developing at national level, this is not necessarily the case at local level. The incongruity between developments at national, entity and local levels continuously affects Bosnia in a negative way – politically, economically, and socially, hindering its prospects for European integration.

National networks and **grassroots initiatives** focused on P/CVE exist, albeit in nascent form and mostly supported by regional and international organisations and donors. The same pertains to the **in-depth academic research** on the topic carried out in the last few years. Further steps are needed to **prevent radicalisation in prisons** – the measures currently being taken are scarce and limited in scope.

In sum, whilst in BiH policies and strategies are developed and programmes and projects are implemented by state and local authorities and CSOs, this is usually driven by international partners or conditional upon financing by foreign donors. Major stakeholders are yet to guarantee the full implementation of adopted policies and engage in active cooperation with each other.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	YES	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	YES	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	YES	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	YES	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	YES	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Insufficient Information	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Partial Participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	YES	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	YES	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	Insufficient Information	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	YES	2018
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	YES	2018
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	YES	2018
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	YES	2018
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	YES	2018
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	YES	2018
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	Moderate	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	YES	2017
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	NO	2019
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Insufficient Information	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	YES	2015

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