

Indicators Assessment – Non-Unitary States

Belgium

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: Belgium

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

Church and state are separate in Belgium but it is not a formal constitutional separation. Belgian church-state relations can be characterized by, on the one hand, separation, and on the other, active support for religion by the state. Articles 19 and 20 of the [constitution](#) fix **the positive freedom and negative freedom of religion** respectively and state support as found in art.181, for instance, has the purpose of guaranteeing these religious freedoms.

Representative bodies for recognised religions serve as interlocutors on policy matters, which have expanded during the period: Muslim people (in practical terms having in theory been recognised since 1974), Buddhists in 2008, while a union of Hindu associations and the Syrian Orthodox Church have requested recognition. There is an annual general assembly of the National Ecumenical Commission to discuss various religious themes at a national level. **Major parties** are no longer confessional, and faith as party affiliation predictor (although relevant) is no longer as strong as previously. Various attempts at founding a specifically and self-defined Islamic political party have been made since the first in the early 1990s, although none have enjoyed any real success.

Religious rules are not applicable or enforceable in the **state legal system** and there is no religious personal law status. **Religious courts** have no formal jurisdiction in Belgium and their rulings are not recognised by the Belgian courts, although they are not formally prohibited and such courts exist for the major faith traditions. Religious **marriages** are not considered on the same legal footing as civil marriages. State courts have no competence when it comes to interpreting or reviewing church decisions. Belgian courts generally avoid interpreting religious rules through a 'deference principle', and this applies to recognised and non-recognised religions. The [Anti-Discrimination Law \(2007\)](#) provides some exceptions for religions in difference of treatment so to enable them to maintain their religious ethos.

Article 21 of the Belgian Constitution prohibits the state from "interven[ing] either in the appointment or in the installation of ministers of any religion whatsoever". However, in the social and political context marked by fears of religious radicalization, the government stipulated **interventions** for the recognition of Islam and greater levels of interference in Muslim institutions. These have included **interference** in the election of members of the Muslim Executive, and the termination of Saudi Arabia's lease to run the Grand Mosque in 2018.

Articles 19 and 20 of the constitution fix **the positive freedom and negative freedom of religion** respectively and state support as found in art.181, for instance, has the purpose of guaranteeing these religious freedoms. In terms of **religious attire**, face covering has been banned (focussed on the niqab) and while head coverings (focussed on the hijab) have been controversial, there is no blanket ban. Both Wallonia and Flanders do have ad hoc bans in different areas of society, however.

*Article 24 of the constitution stipulates that “all pupils of school age have the right to moral or **religious education** at the community’s expense” and religions receive funding from the state for religious courses in schools (both state and private). The constitution provides for support for faith-based education and the possibility of education in the recognized religions or non-confessional ethics, although Catholic schools have maintained their prominent position in Belgium’s education system.*

***Media**, both print and online, enjoy substantial freedoms and religious media are not specially restricted. The three (Flemish, French and German speaking) broadcasting communities offer airtime to recognized religious groups on public channels, although this does not include these being state funded.*

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion.	Medium	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/ independence from religion	Medium	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Medium	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Insufficient information	2020
4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the	Medium	2020

regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.		
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2020
7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	Medium	2020
8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	High	2020
(8b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	High	2020

(8b) **UNIT 2:** Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.

High

2020

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

During the period, **official recognition** was granted to Buddhism in 2008, while a union of Hindu associations and the Syrian Orthodox Church have requested recognition. In order to be recognized a religious faith must have a nationally representative institution and four further criteria must be fulfilled, namely, they must bring together “several tens of thousands” of adherents, have been present in Belgium for a fairly long period, be of social benefit, and not contravene public order in their activities. These **requirements** have often meant that more recent minority religions have faced difficulties in gaining official recognition. Islam provides a good example here as although it technically gained recognition in 1974, this didn’t come into practical effect until the 2000s.

Representative groups consult with authorities over various aspects of life in Belgium. Minority, including Muslim, **political candidates** have served in the national and European parliaments. Various attempts at founding a specifically and self-defined Islamic political party have been made since the first in the early 1990s, although none have enjoyed any real success. There are no bars **on voting, running for office**, or recruitment based on religious criteria.

Religious minority groups are not granted **special and specific benefits** upon recognition, just those open to any such recognised religion. **Financial support** is not necessarily fairly distributed upon recognition, favouring Roman Catholicism, something commented on by various bodies, including a ‘commission of wise men’ reporting to the Belgian Ministry of Justice in 2005, and a follow up study group report, set by royal decree, in 2009. Recognized religions receive financial support through tax exemptions, the state pays the salaries and pensions of the ‘ministers of religion’ and for education, but there is no special status for minorities. Groups might receive funding for social work activities, but these are not specifically religious.

Under Belgian law there is no general duty for public or private institutions to grant forms of reasonable **accommodation on grounds of religion**, matters are largely left to ad hoc measures rather than general principle, and the granting of accommodations remains contingent on a variety of localized factors. Belgium has introduced a criminal **ban on face-covering** in the public sphere (in 2011), provoked by the desire to outlaw the wearing of the niqab, but a general ban on head coverings has not been brought in. **Halal and kosher slaughter** were banned in Wallonia and Flanders in 2019.

Restrictions to **public spaces** are those that apply generally under state law, although bans on some forms of religious clothing since 2011 can effectively restrict access to some Muslim people, particularly women, in some ways.

There are a number of **places of worship** for recognised minority religions, although there are many more that are informal.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	Medium	2020

(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	High	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	High	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Insufficient information	2020
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Low	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Low	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Low	2020
6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Medium	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Low	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	Low	2020

7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	Medium	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Low	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Low	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

*Belgium scores highly for **freedom and civil liberties** and has been stable the last few years. Concerns in recent years affecting the scores have been heightened policing and security measures in response to terrorism, affecting civil liberties, and corruption scandals in Belgian politics.*

*Adherence to the **rule of law** score is quite high and has improved in the last five years and is generally above the EU average.*

***Religious related government restrictions** have fluctuated during the period within the mid to high end of the moderate level. This is primarily a result of restrictions and bans targeted at Muslim people.*

*On **state legitimacy, economic inequality and level of protection of human right** on the whole, Belgium's scores worsened until around 2011, since when they have been improving. A couple of notable features are: cohesion indicators follow this trend, although security apparatus is still worsening; social indicators have been improving. The general trend is also true for **group grievances**, although it is still higher than the 2006 score. On **wealth inequality**, the low (meaning positive) point was 2006, since when it worsened but improved between 2010 and 2016.*

*On **political indicators, distrust in national parliament and national government** have improved markedly since 2010, when they were at a high point for the period in the context for Belgium's political crisis between 2007 and 2011 – trust in national parliament is slightly higher than in government. The percentage of people who think **things are going wrong** in their country has remained stable at just over 40% since 2015, and just over a quarter of people in 2018 **thought the situation in Belgium** was bad or very bad. **Satisfaction with democracy** has also increased since 2010 by 5%.*

*On **economic indicators**, people rating their household income situation as bad or very bad has slightly improved since 2010, although the view of the national economy greatly worsened between 2010 and 2015, following the financial crisis 2008, although has improved since.*

*When it comes to **discrimination**, two thirds of those polled in 2015 thought it was widespread for religion and belief, and nearly three quarters for ethnic origin. Muslim people face more **hate crimes** than other groups, followed by Jewish people. When it comes to **discomfort with religious minorities**, the percentages of people who would be uncomfortable with a work colleague of a different faith are highest for Muslim people, followed by Jewish people and then Buddhists.*

*A poll in Antwerp in 2013 found 10% of young Muslim people thought **terrorism was acceptable in some circumstances**. Antwerp has been one of the areas in Belgium most affected by foreign fighters leaving for Syria, although this poll was before the incidents in Belgium itself.*

*Belgium has been involved abroad in the conflict in Iraq and there have been more than 30 fatalities in Belgium connected to ISIS. **Social hostilities** involving religion are low but have increased during the period, prominently associated with anti-Muslim prejudice. On*

*the **Global Terrorism Index**, Belgium's score has slightly increased since 2015. This is in large part because prior to the Brussels bombings in 2016, Belgium was principally a staging area for attacks in other places, but since then has seen further low-level attacks. Belgium has also seen more foreign fighters leave per capita than anywhere else in the EU.*

*A number of **extremist or extremist related groups and networks** have operated in Belgium during the period, although these are much fewer now. Prominent among them was **Sharia4Belgium**, which was declared a terrorist organisation in 2015 and had disbanded in 2012, and recruitment networks for foreign fighters in Syria such as the **Molenbeek based network around Khalid Zerkani**.*

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: Free Freedom score: 96	2020
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 14/128 Overall score: 0.79	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: Moderate Level: 3.9	2015
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 1.4 Level: High	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 1 Level: High	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: 4.7 Level: Moderate	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 2.1 Level: Low	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 28.6%	2016

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Distrust in Parliament: 55% Distrust in Government: 59% Other: No data	2018 2018 n/a
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: 42% Dissatisfaction with overall situation: 26% Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: 32% Other: No data	2018 2018 2019 n/a

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(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: 19%	2018
	Dissatisfaction national economy: 32%	2018
	Economic situation is the most serious problem: 9%	2018
	Other: No data	n/a
(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: 67%	2015
	Opposing diversity: No data	n/a
	Discomfort with minorities: 8%-53% depending	2015
	Experienced discrimination: 3%	2015
(2e) Views on violent extremism	Other: Percentage racial discrimination among reported cases: 27%	2016-2018
	VE is a serious problem/threat: No data	n/a
	Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: No data	n/a
	Other: Sympathy for VE: 10%	2013
	Other: Terrorism acts serious problem: 88%	2016
	Other: Risk of terrorism is high: 50%	2016

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Yes/No: No	2019
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: Low Score: 2.1	2015
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: 3.6	2019
	Number of Incidents: 1	2018
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: 1045	2018
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/networks	Level: Moderate	2020

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Overall assessment:

*Belgium was among the first European countries to adopt relevant **legislation** and Belgium had been concerned with radical Islamism since the 1980s, although its legal framework was considerably strengthened following the Paris and Brussels attacks. [The Terrorist Offences Act of 2003](#) was an early measure following 9/11 and in 2015, the government decided on a package of 30 counter-terrorism measures.*

*More **coordinated government action** begun following 9/11, with 'Plan Mosques' (Plan M) in 2002. [Actieplan Radicalisme](#) or 'Plan R', was established in 2005. Coming under Plan R and stepped up since the attacks in 2015 and 2016, the government has made efforts to implement a connected approach between federal and regional levels. This included setting up a National Task Force as well as Local Task Force. 'The Canal Plan' was brought in to help coordinate focus in different areas between authorities by the federal government. The main agency at the federal level is the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), established in 2006. There is tension between repressive and preventive authorities, but greater collaboration has been encouraged in the 2010s. A **wide range of actors** across repressive and preventive authorities has been a longer term feature of Belgium's approach. Reference to **human rights** has been a systematic feature of Belgian strategy documents, although breaches of these rights are debated.*

***Foreign fighters** have been a central concern, Belgium having seen the most such fighters leave per capita in Europe to fight in Iraq and Syria (as well as in previous conflicts) and Belgium was home to notable recruitment networks.*

*Initially coming under earlier law for money laundering, Belgium passed a law to implement EU Directive 2015/849, which aims to prevent money laundering and **terrorist financing**. The Royal Decree 84 of 28 December 2006 concerns specific restrictive measures against persons and entities in the context of the financing of terrorism and provides for freezing of funds and financial resources.*

*Plan R makes stipulations for **communication**, including what can be considered **counter-narrative** strategies. Mayors are encouraged by government, although 'integration' matters are a devolved competence and thus exact strategies vary between regions and municipalities. In 2015, the Islam Expert Network was created to offer an alternative to radical Islam.*

***Preventive and welfare measures** have been a longstanding part of Belgium's approach as has an emphasis on local, community policing. Two services were created by the Wallonia-Brussels Federation in 2016: a support and resources centre (CREA) with responsibility for **support and training** regional service providers; and the Center for Help and Support for anyone concerned by Extremism and Violent Radicalism (CAPREV).*

*The need for **training** was identified in Plan R and has increased in the 2010s. **Youth work** has been at the core of Belgium's general prevention work and services, which has in many ways adapted under the framework of radicalisation. **Inter-faith** work is facilitated through representative bodies for recognised religions. Also some NGO initiatives. **Civil society networks** tend to be stronger at regional and municipal levels owing to Belgium's federal structure. **Research** through research institutes financed and/or funded by the government and consultation with experts has been a feature of Belgium's response.*

*Although the success of measures taken in **prisons** is debated and there are issues based on devolved competencies, there are some measures in place and it has been an area of attention.*

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	Yes	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	Yes	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	Yes	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	High Participation	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2020

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	Yes	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focussed on prevention	Very High Level	2020

(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	Yes	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	Yes	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Yes	2020
(2l) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings	Yes	2020

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