

Indicators Assessment – Non-Unitary States

Australia

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This Indicators Assessment report offers a country assessment of 4 composite indicators: (1) state-religious institutions relations, (2) status of religious minority groups, (3) religious radicalisation level, and (4) radicalisation prevention measures. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. This assessment report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.

Countries covered in this series:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation.

Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.

While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity.

The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Raciunas from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (~~Melbourne~~, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022.

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GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Country Assessment Report

Name of Country Assessed: AUSTRALIA

I. Composite Indicator 1: State-Religious Institutions Relations

Overall Assessment:

Australia has been relatively stable in relation to **state autonomy from religion** from 2000-2020. This is in large part due to the [Australian Constitution's Section 116](#) (1900), which states: 'The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.' However, the Constitution has never provided explicit protection against religious discrimination, unlike Acts that do provide for protection against discrimination on other bases, such as the [Racial Discrimination Act](#) (1975).

As a non-unitary nation, Australia's eight States and Territories are also able to legislate on religious (and other) matters relating to education, health, employment, services and associations. Such legislation must accord with both State/Territory and Commonwealth standards in other Acts that protect against discrimination. The most significant change in the 20-year period under consideration is the [Religious Freedoms Review](#), concluded in 2018, and the accompanying draft Religious Freedom Bills that remain under consideration and debate as of 2020. The 2018 Review was driven largely by the concerns of religious institutions in the lead-up to [Australia's Marriage Equality Act](#) passed in 2017.

The current bills now under consideration seek simultaneously to both extend protections against discrimination on the basis of religion but also potentially enable discrimination by religious institutions on the basis of religious faith and belief (e.g. in education, aged care, health care or social service delivery). They do so in a climate that has seen a rise in religious intolerance, vilification and discrimination, particularly in relation to Muslims and to a lesser extent Jews. In 2020, these debates and arguments against the legislation from both secular and religious institutions and critics remain ongoing. The GREASE Australia Country Report provides further detail on these issues.

While in legal and constitutional terms Australia scores highly to very highly in relation to guaranteeing **freedom from religious interference**, bias, suppression or discrimination for members of minority religions, and possesses multiple mechanisms that allow for investigating and redressing such matters when they do occur, in practice this has been weakened slightly by two factors. These factors are as follows. 1) A media environment that at times enables broad negative coverage of particular religions without necessarily being actionable under existing human rights, Press Council or other levers that can potentially curtail discriminatory media coverage. This is one reason for the growth in calls to address the absence of discrimination based on religion in federal discrimination legislation. 2) The long history of Christian-majority dominance in the education sector in particular, as well as social services (dealt with also under Indicator 2 below), which has created an imbalance in the presence of minority-religion whole-of-community service provision in education and social welfare services.

1. State autonomy from religion	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law defines the state as secular	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/independence from religion.	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Actual level of state political autonomy/ independence from religion	Medium	2020
2. Participation of religious institutions and religious groups in political decision-making and policy-making.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids formal participation of religious institutions and religious groups in formal political decision-making.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious institutions and religious groups lack formal participation in political decision-making.	Medium	2020
3. Religiously-based political parties in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation forbids participation of religiously-based political parties in political life.	Low	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Low	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religiously-based political parties lack participation in political life.	Low	2020
4. State non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including regulation of religious courts, councils, religious family laws, etc.).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of religious matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of religious affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
5. State non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities (including personnel and funds).	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)

(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation enforces state non-interference in the regulation of the administrative matters of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, there is no state interference in the regulation of the administrative affairs of religious institutions and religious communities.	Medium	2020

6. State recognition of freedom of religion.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation allows freedom of religion.	Very high	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	High	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious groups/communities enjoy freedom of religion.	Medium	2020

7. Freedom for religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows religious groups/communities to set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious groups/communities set up and manage educational institutions.	High	2020

8. Autonomy of religious media	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(8a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant legislation recognises and allows religious media.	Very high	2020
(8b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	Very high	2020
(8b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious media practice their activity.	N/A	

II. Composite Indicator 2: Status of Religious Minority Groups

Overall Assessment:

The **legal status** of all religious groups, minority or majority, has remained stable in the period as protected by the Australian Constitution, which forbids any religious test to be applied for consideration of the holding of any political office or public trust under the Commonwealth, and the same applies for States/Territories. **Minority religious groups** are treated as equal to any others before the law in relation to social security benefits, with no special treatment or benefits conferred based on religious minority status. There are recommendations from the Religious Freedoms review to grant such consideration to Australian Indigenous customary law given the special status of First Nations people and beliefs in the context of colonial and modern history, but this remains unresolved pending further inquiry.

One reason for the difference in **legal versus practical** scores under Indicator 2(4) below may be explained by the fact that Commonwealth law, as expressed in Sec. 116 of the Australian Constitution, prohibits the establishment of a state religion and a prohibition of preventing any form of religious observance. However, it does not extend to specific protections against religious discrimination at Commonwealth.

As the Australian [2018 Religious Freedom Review Report](#) notes, the landscape of legal protections guaranteeing the right to access public spaces and enjoy other participation in public life is largely left to the States and Territories, and these protections are uneven across these second-tier legislative instruments. Section 1.390 of the Religious Freedom Review states, 'Australian laws should do more to protect the right to non-discrimination on the basis of religious or other beliefs' and recommended that the Commonwealth of Australia should make religion a protected attribute under federal anti-discrimination law (Religious Freedom Review Report, p. 94).

The issue of **ownership of houses of worship** is in legal terms a high score. However, it is impossible to score at the State or Territory level (or lower, at Local Government Area level) because of the way in which property ownership is managed at these levels and the time and resources it would take to establish any patterns around ownership of houses of worship by religious minorities. It is possible to say, however, that many thousands of houses of worship either owned or leased by religious minorities exist across all States and Territories, including mosques, synagogues, temples and others. There have been recent attempts to block the building of houses of worship using various local laws provisions around traffic management, urban planning constraints and so on, particularly in relation to mosques (see Australia Country Report for more detail), but these have largely been unsuccessful.

1. Legal status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation recognises religious minority groups.	Very high	2020
(1b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
(1b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups enjoy legal registration status recognised by the government.	High	2020
2. Religious minority group participation in political life.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Legal Dimension: Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to participate in the political life of the state.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Very high	2020
(2b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups participate in political life.	Very high	2020
3. Special social security status of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to special social security benefits.	Very low	2020
(3b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Very low	2020
(3b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: In practice, religious minority groups have special access to social security benefits.	Very low	2020
4. Access of religious minority groups to public spaces.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(4a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	High	2020
(4b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups enjoy access to public spaces.	Medium	2020
5. Access to public funds for initiatives/activities of religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(5a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups right of access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Very high	2020
(5b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups have access to public funds for their own initiatives/activities.	Very high	2020

6. Public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(6a) Legal Dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation allows public accommodation of cultural practices specific to religious minority groups.	High	2020
(6b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	High	2020
(6b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups express their cultural practices publicly.	High	2020
7. Ownership of houses of worship.	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(7a) Legal dimension: The Constitution/Basic law or other more relevant religious legislation grants religious minority groups rights to own their houses of worship.	Very high	2020
(7b) UNIT 1: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	N/A	2020
(7b) UNIT 2: Practical Dimension: Religious minority groups own houses of worship.	Insufficient information	2020

III. Composite Indicator 3: Radicalisation Levels

Overall assessment:

Australia scores very positively on a number of structural factors, including a consistently high level of **civil liberties** and **freedom ratings** over the last 10 years, as well as good scores in relation to **human rights**. However, Australia lags behind most other high-income countries in guaranteeing equal treatment and non-discrimination for immigrants and low-income people. Australia also scores well in relation to the **rule of law**, with generally high levels of adherence to the rule of law comparative to the region and in world rankings. While civil justice in Australia is generally impartial and efficient, it also characterised by significant inequality of access to affordable legal counsel for disadvantaged groups. There is a relatively high level of **state legitimacy**, consistently improving since 2013. There are low levels of **restriction on religion** and, in global terms, a relatively low level of **group grievance**. Uneven **economic development** has been steadily declining since 2006, but **wealth disparities** have been increasing since 2012 at a relatively slow rate, globally speaking. **Distrust in government** is moderate: 15% of people trust the government 'almost never' but 50% trust the government to 'do the right thing' only some of the time. Trust in government institutions dropped in 2010 to around 30% and has remained relatively stable.

Discontent with politics has steadily increased over the last decade, with over half of Australians saying their country was on the wrong track since 2012, and declining levels of satisfaction with democracy from 86% in 2007 to 59% in 2018. Australia has not experienced significant **economic discontent** over the last decade, with the economy generally ranked with high levels of satisfaction for the period 2008-2018 and levels of concern about poverty and unemployment significantly lower (25%) than the global average. In terms of **perceived discrimination and polarisation**, Scanlon Foundation and Ipsos surveys show that Australians have a more positive attitude to refugees and ethnic minorities than the global norm. There is a generally high level of support for multiculturalism, with only a small minority of 6% disagreeing that multiculturalism has been good for Australia, largely among communities describing themselves as 'poor'. At the same time, however, experiences of racism and discrimination grew significantly from 2007 (9%) to 2017 (20%) and have remained roughly at this level. Concerns about terrorism in Australia have declined since 9/11., but in 2018 over half the population still saw this as a serious concern.

Australia has experienced an extremely low level of **state-based armed conflict**, with only one death between 1989 and 2018. On **violent extremist incidents**, there have been seven terrorist attacks since 2014 and 16 successful major disruption operations. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) has consistently ranked the **impact of terrorism** on Australia as between low and very low. While scoring very low on conflict or violence related to religion, the nation still experiences **social hostilities involving religion**, with Pew rankings of high to moderate over the past ten years. There is no systematic or consistent national monitoring of hate crimes. However, a 2019 study by the University of New South Wales (UNSW) found that between 2007 and 2017, 2,467 reports were received that fit the criteria of a bias crime, mostly motivated by race and religion and, to a lesser extent, sexual orientation or gender identity. In terms of significant **violent extremist actors and networks**, *religious* violent extremism is largely limited to jihadist networks in Australia. Despite the low level of violent extremist acts, a variety of factors such as disrupted plots and the number of terrorist foreign fighters who joined or attempted to join the IS caliphate means Australia is rated as having a moderate influence of violent extremist actors and networks. This does not include right-wing extremism, which to date has not been linked by its actors to religious motivations.

1. Structural factors/environment	Score/Level/Percentage	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Level of Freedom	Level: Free Freedom score: 1	2019
(1b) Level of adherence to rule of law	Overall rank: 11 Overall score: 0.80	2020
(1c) Level of religious-related government restrictions	Score: 1.1 Level: Low	2017
(1d) Level of state legitimacy	Score: 1 Level: High	2019
(1e) Level of protection of human rights	Score: 1.7 Level: High	2019
(1f) Level of group grievances	Score: 3.5 Level: Low	2019
(1g) Uneven economic development	Score: 1.6 Level: Low	2019
(1h) Wealth disparity (top 10% possessing above average percentage of the total income share)	Percentage: 31.90	2019

2. Perception-based indicators (social grievances)	Percentage (%)	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Distrust in national institutions	Parliament: Government: Other: 15 (Scanlon Foundation)	2019
(2b) Political discontent	Dissatisfaction with country direction: N/A Dissatisfaction with overall situation: N/A Dissatisfaction with democracy/government performance: 14 Other: 62 (Ipsos)	2019
(2c) Economic discontent	Dissatisfaction own financial situation: N/A Dissatisfaction national economy: 23% Somewhat bad Economic situation is the most serious problem: 28% Other: Financial situation of average person getting worse 46 % Other: Global economy a major threat 43%	2018 2019 2018 2018
(2d) Discrimination	Discrimination is widespread: N/A Opposing diversity: 6% Discomfort with minorities: N/A Dislike neighbors from minority groups: N/A	2019

	Experienced discrimination: 19% Other:	2019
(2e) Views on violent extremism	VE is a serious problem/threat: 59% Endorsement of VE actions/ actors: N/A Other:	2018

3. Incidence-based indicators (religious violence and conflict)	Score/Level/Number	YEAR (Most Recent)
(3a) State-based armed conflict	Yes/No: No	
(3b) Level of social hostilities involving religion	Level: Moderate Score: 0.33	2017
(3c) Incidence and impact of terrorism	Score: 2.65 Number of Incidents:	2020
(3d) Violent extremist incidents	Number: 7	2020
(3e) Significant violent extremist actors/ networks	Level: Moderate	2020

IV. **Composite Indicator 4: Radicalisation Prevention Measures**

Comprehensive strategic approach: In the wake of the 9/11 attack and, closer to home, the Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah's Bali bombing attack in Indonesia in 2002, in which 88 Australians were among the 202 people killed, Australia began to systematically putting in place a **legislative framework** to respond to terrorism. The first legislation introduced in 2002 was the [Security Legislation Amendments \(Terrorism\) Act 65](#), defining and making terrorism an offence. In 2005 two Anti-Terrorism Bills (Acts 127 and 144) were introduced, relating to control orders, defining terrorist acts, detention and incitement to terrorism. In 2015, the Commonwealth Government introduced new laws stripping citizenship from dual nationals who are found to have engaged in terrorism-related conduct. In 2019, a [Counter-Terrorism \(Temporary Exclusion Orders\) Bill](#) was passed to prevent Australians with suspected involvement in terrorism from returning to Australia.

Australia has successively refined its national **strategy framework** for combatting violent extremism, largely focused on combatting ideological support for violence-based beliefs and actions rather than on radical or extremist ideologies themselves. The first National Counter-Terrorism Strategy appeared in 2005 and has been updated periodically, with a new review of the 2015 Strategy currently underway. Strategic CVE (countering violent extremism) policies and programs have been in place since 2011, when the Countering Violent Extremism Sub-Committee (CVESC) was established under the National Counter-Terrorism Committee framework to coordinate C/PVE related targeted activities between federal and state agencies. There have been consistent efforts to engage civil society and grassroots organisations, including religious leaders and institutions as well as media, in CVE activities since the early 2000s, with mixed success. Early policies resulted in Australian Muslim communities feeling stereotyped and targeted based on religious identity, leading to a priority focus on community involvement in counter-terrorism policy and program design in 2015, including support from government to build capacity to deliver intervention services, with some success.

Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects: Australia has not set up specific terrorist **victim support mechanisms**, and individuals who experience terrorist events are managed through existing victims of crime support mechanisms. **Training** for frontline practitioners in how to deal with concerns and events related to violent extremism and terrorism has steadily increased over time. This includes simulations led by policing agencies, training for psychologists and social workers, and education and awareness resources for health professionals and other service providers. A National Disruption Group (NDG) was set up in 2014 to **increase capability** across a wide range of government agencies to respond effectively to terrorism and violent extremism. In addition, the National Counter-Terrorism Coordination Centre engages in a range of initiatives to help strengthen **preparedness, awareness and capability** for security and intelligence related to terrorism. Civil society organisations also offer training and awareness programs for security and law enforcement capacity-building.

Australia is strong on **interfaith and civil society dialogue** involving cooperation and best practice on violent radicalisation, including consultative bodies and relationships between different faith groups regionally, nationally and locally. **P/CVE youth-specific programs** are both civil-society based and cooperatively designed and delivered between government and civil society. Most successful are those programs addressing resilience, intercultural understanding and democratic participation. State and Territory

Governments also have consultative bodies that regularly engage in dialogue with youth, women and religious organisations. In addition, **civil society women's and community groups** run both public and less visible initiatives designed to educate and support women who may be experiencing challenges in relation to violent extremism and radicalisation. There have also been efforts to develop **education materials and resources** specifically for schools in Australia, but these have not been consistently developed or implemented.

Australia has a wide range of initiatives focused on **counter-narrative and alternative narrative** information and influence campaigns. Since 2011, the Australian Government has included challenging extremist messaging and supporting alternative narratives as part of its P/CVE strategic goals. Australia also contributed to the development of international counter-narrative hubs and resource compendia focused on the Asia Pacific region. **Multi-agency cooperation and referral mechanisms** for people on pathways to violent radicalisation are managed cooperatively through the CVE Centre within the Department of Home Affairs alongside State and Territory jurisdictions. Each State and Territory also has a CVE Intervention Coordinator who facilitates service and support connections delivered at local community levels. Both federal and State Australian government agencies have since 2010 consistently strengthened ability in the area of **commissioned and funded research** on religiously inspired radicalisation and violent extremism through a number of different agencies and funding streams. There is no public database of such research, but various public-facing research programs, institutes and networks exist that have assisted government in sourcing academic research capacity to help inform evidence-based policy and strategy.

For those convicted of terror offences who are in prison or on probation, **prison and reintegration programs** exist to mitigate prison-based radicalisation and support community reintegration during probation. These include the CISP (Community Integration Support Program) in Victoria, jointly delivered by government agencies including police and the Board of Imams Victoria, and, since 2015, the PRISM (Proactive Integrated Support Model) in New South Wales.

1. Comprehensive strategic approach	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(1a) Legislative foundation for adoption of PVE action plan	Yes	2020
(1b) Existence of PVE strategy and a national action plan	Yes	2020
(1c) Presence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms of strategy / action plan implementation	Yes	2020
(1d) Presence of dedicated body tasked with PVE strategy development and coordination	Yes	2020
(1e) Compliance of strategy and action plan with human rights standards and the principles of rule of law	Yes	2020
(1f) Participation of a wide range of government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2020
(1g) Participation of non-government actors in development and implementation of PVE strategy and action plan	High	2020
(1h) Reference to FTFs and related measures in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2019
(1i) Reference to terrorism financing and related measures in PVE strategy and action plan	Yes	2019
(1j) Reference to communication counter- or alternative narrative campaigns in PVE strategy/action plan	Yes	2019

2. Comprehensiveness of measures - areas of action, actors and projects	Score	YEAR (Most Recent)
(2a) Development and implementation of programmes for support of victims of terrorism and violent extremism	No	2020
(2b) Training for frontline practitioners	Yes	2020
(2c) Initiatives to improve the preparedness of security forces, law enforcement and justice institutions to deal with radicalisation.	Yes	2020
(2d) Development and implementation of P/CVE-specific education initiatives for youth	Yes	2020
(2e) Development and implementation of P/CVE education initiatives and projects for women	Yes	2020
(2f) Platforms for intra and interfaith dialogue between the state and religious leaders	Yes	2020
(2g) Networks for civil society, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations for dialogue, cooperation and best practices.	Yes	2020
(2h) Grassroots initiatives by civil society actors focused on prevention	High level	2020
(2i) Counter- and alternative- narrative campaigns	Yes	2020
(2j) Multi-agency cooperation and/or referral mechanisms at local level identifying and supporting at-risk persons	Yes	2020
(2k) State-commissioned research on religiously-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism	Yes	2020

(21) programs and measures to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in prison and probation settings

Yes

2020

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